TOPICS OF THE DAY.
AMERICAN IMPULSIVENESS. THE first feeling of Englishmen at the action, or rather, to be accurate, at the proposed action, of Congress in Cuba is one of surprise so bewildering that it rather dis- turbs their judgment. They are so accustomed to be guided in foreign affairs by the Executive, or in rare cases by the leaders of Opposition, they comprehend so little a war to which the Queen's Government is opposed, that the threat of a war declared by Congress and opposed by the President seems unreal, and they give heed to stories which only hide from them the truth. That is all non- sense about certain Senators making money out of Jingoism. Even if the slander has a foundation in the discreditable sharpness of one or two men, the Senate and the House of Representatives have to vote that the independence of Cuba be acknowledged, and the majority of those bodies, we may rest assured, are neither bought nor directly at variance with the State Governments or bodies of voters who send them up to Washington. Why, in the name of common-sense, should they risk their seats by demanding a war to which their constituents are opposed? Nor do we attach any real importance to the suggestion that the two Houses are voting for war, or, if you will, for the recognition of Cuba as a Republic, which they know must produce a war, With the amiable intention of snubbing President Cleveland. Why should they want to snub him when the people have just dismissed him and his party from power, and have ordered that eleven weeks hence the other party and another man should be in possession alike of the Legislature and the Executive ? Stories of that kind have no base except in surprise and the irritability which surprise usually pro- vokes. The plain truth of the matter is that the American people are as impulsive as the English people, that their representatives in both Houses are nearer in culture to the voters than our representatives are here, and that while English impulsiveness seldom affects foreign affairs—there have been some marked exceptions— American impulsiveness almost invariably takes that direction. There are two reasons for that difference. One is that the idea of State sovereignty breaks the force of any internal question, the State having the right of settling it, and not the nation. It is not the nation which is irritated by stories of official blackmailing by the police of New York, but the State, which again has the exclusive right of deciding on a revolutionary proposal like female suffrage, or of suspending the municipal fran- chises in any city within its boundaries. Except the tariff, the currency, and foreign affairs, there is nothing for the whole nation to be impulsive about, and foreign affairs offer by far the liveliest provocations. Then Englishmen are bound over, and know they are bound over, to prudence in foreign affairs. They have possessions in all corners of the globe ; they are surrounded by jealous rivals better armed on land than themselves ; and they are aware that under certain circumstances those rivals might coalesce. It takes, therefore, a very distinct threat like that which they saw, or thought they saw, in the German Emperor's telegram to President Kruger, to rouse them out of their experienced calm. They prefer, as a rule, to leave such questions to the experts, and except when their leaders, whether in the Government or in Opposition, give the signal, they rarely indulge in a movement of opinion the result of which might be war. The people of the United States are differently situated. They are not liable to invasion. They have practically no enemies within their own hemisphere, and, except Great Britain, they do not believe that there is in Europe any Power able or willing to assail them. They think France the next Power to Great Britain in mobility and readiness to undertake adventure, and they remember that France under a Napoleon scuttled out of Mexico at the bidding of General Grant. They feel, therefore, free to take any action they please in foreign affairs, and are ready for a moment to obey any impulse which a European people, even if it felt it, would from fear of consequences keep down. Our own people, for instance, though boiling with indignation at the Armenian atrocities, sunk back in silence when the leaders on both sides asked for caution and quiescence. As regards Spain, the American im- nulse, owing to causes which are partly traditional, is peculiarly strong. Nothing would persuade most Americans that Spaniards are not still a cruel people, by which we mean a. people disposed to govern by threats, executions, and occasionally torture. The horrible stories from the Philippines, for instance, will be accepted by Americans, not as possibly true, but as certain to be true, because the Governors and Bishops in those islands are all sent out from Spain. Then they have a contempt for Spaniards which we scarcely understand, but which is due, we presume, to the failure of the Spanish-speaking peoples in Mexico and South America to build up stable constitu- tions, and to their defeat in some places, especially those nearest to the Union, by the old Indian tribes. When, therefore, Americans are told, as they are told every day, that Cuba is striking for freedom, that General Weyler is executing political prisoners by the hundred, and that it is their duty, if the war goes on, to intervene, an impulse takes possession of them which has found expres- sion in the Resolution of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs, and will, it is assumed, find expression in both Houses of Congress.
That the impulse is genuine and not factitious we feel certain, but whether it will last is another matter. Experience seems to show that the American voters, unless led by men like the Southern gentlemen who in 1845 had made up their minds that they wanted fresh territory in the South, and therefore made war on Mexico, or by soldiers, like General Grant, eager to try conclusions with a foreign army, fall very soon under the influence of their own more moderate politicians. Their Constitution usually gives them time to reflect before they act,— more time, we think, than Englishmen, who think them- selves so reasonable, would endure to spend in argument. It is quite rare for all the three depositaries of power in the Union to coincide in sentiment, and just now they are believed to be decidedly antagonistic. President Cleve- land, through the Secretary of State, refuses point-blank to recognise a Republic which does not exist, and de- clares that even if the two Houses of Congress pass• their Resolution " over " his veto by a two-thirds majority he shall treat it as a mere expression of opinion, or a tender of advice by " eminent gentlemen " who are not entitled to give orders to the Executive. The Resolution is, therefore, from the first a dead letter. Even if Mr. Olney is entirely wrong in his interpretation of the law, no means exist for enforcing the will of Con- gress, except through impeachment or an appeal to the Supreme Court for a constitutional decision, and either of those processes will occupy more time than the time of office remaining to Mr. Cleveland. Impulsive Americans have, therefore, months in which to consider themselves, and will probably decide in the end that they had better wait a little longer, until Spain, hopelessly over-strained, is willing to negotiate for the sale of the island, or to grant autonomy to its people, or at all events until a Provisional Government capable of con- trolling the island has been created by the insurgents. We say this is the probable decision, but there is one reserve of some importance to be made. If the people of the United States are pining for a war, then un- doubtedly there will be war, the people in the last resort having the means of overriding the reluctance of their delegated rulers. Neither party in the Union, we may be sure, would run the party risk of defying a general and unquenchable desire of that kind. Many observers believe that such a desire does exist, especially in the West, that the majority there is sick of the tedium of every-day life, and that the new practice of the Union in regard to war-pensions has enormously increased the readiness of the younger section of the population to engage in hostilities. They point to the fact that the Union has had a war every thirty years, and deduce from it the doctrine that every generation as it reaches maturity grows thirsty for a little blood- letting, and finds the incidents of ordinary life too tame. We find it difficult to accept those statements. That there is a Jingo party in the United States is no doubt true, a party, that is, which looks on war as the readiest method of increasing the territory, the influence, and the grandeur in general of the country ; but then that party exists in every country of Europe, not excepting our own, and though it exists, does not bear rule. It is true, more- over, that there are many thousands of men in the West and South who would enjoy a war no matter with whom, who would form regiments with amazing speed, and who, when the signal came from Washington, would provide at once a formidable advance-guard. But then the Jingoes have existed all through the century, and there always have been American filibusters planning adventures some- where or other; but they have only once dragged the nation into war, and then the South, which ruled the Union, wanted Mexican lands. We cannot believe that either the Union or its Government wants either a bankrupt island like Cuba or a heavy addition to her Roman Catholic and parti-coloured vote. We question, therefore, if the advance-guard will induce the general army of voters to follow it, and until it does we imagine the Executive at Washington will prove itself quite powerful enough to delay acting on any passing impulse until it dies down. Spain can have war if she wishes it, of course, but unless she wishes it she has many months of effort before her, unhampered by the interference of any foreign Power. After all, if there are in America thousands " who would die for Cuba," nothing prevents their doing it, though these must reach the island in ships which will not bear the national flag.
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