THE COUNCIL OF WAR AT CONSTANTINOPLE.
" COUNCILS of War never fight," and the Ambassa- dors at Constantinople are sitting just now as a Council of War, with these especial disadvantages. They are all under severe "instructions," and they are all trained to believe that their professional business is to avoid the use of force. They never consent to be defeated in argument, they never threaten plainly if they are dealing with a Sovereign, and they never know precisely what they may do if a Sovereign proves refractory. They hold meetings which usually end in a decision that they must "seek for further information," and they agree on " principles " which as often impede action as advance it. When they are sure of submission they are definite enough, as they have been in the case of Crete, but when they are not sure they hesitate, and propose " alternative courses," and arrange for " another meeting before any- thing is done." They are then mortally afraid of their " responsibility " to their masters at home, and inclined to believe that the electric telegraph, which they curse at other moments, is after all a blessed invention specially discovered to relieve the undecided. That is not the way in which a competent firm manages its business when it wants to make a good bargain or to avoid a great loss, nor is it the way in which a Cabinet with a great debate on hand settles the line it is necessary to take. There is another obstacle, too, to action which some of our readers may think so foolish as to be almost comic, but which, we can assure them, has a most material influence on the progress of affairs. The Ambassadors have a strong personal jealousy of each other, that is to say, each one is anxious that his particular policy should be known to be the one that has been ultimately adopted. M. Cambon does not want to follow the lead of M. de Nelidoff, M. de Nelidoff would not for worlds have it thought that he was indebted to Sir Philip Currie, and Sir Philip Currie can- not bear the notion that the Austrian Ambassador should have everything his own way. They are all equal, they are all European " personages," they have all "careers " to pursue, and to each one of them the idea of playing second-fiddle has in it something of humiliation. So strong is this feeling, arising doubtless from training, that it is almost independent of the personal character of Ambassadors, that it always needs the clearest in- structions to induce them to follow suit, and that Con- gresses have scarcely ever been successful at which Sovereigns or Secretaries of State have not been present. It seems to plain men the funniest obstacle to business ; but it not only exists, but actually affects the counsels and the tempers of the Governments behind. At this very moment the value of the Russian alliance is ques- tioned in Paris because, though all Europe is assumed to be " in concert," M. de Nelidoff is taking the " lead " at Constantinople, which, as a Frenchman, M. Cambon thinks is naturally his due. The Council of War, therefore, either does not agree, or does not agree heartily enough to decide on " representations " which, if they were the result of genuine unanimity, would be equivalent to action. There is needless delay, and the delay produces two separate sets of mischievous effects.
The first is on the mind of the Sultan, who is the only individual in Turkey with real power. So long as the Council of War confines itself to discussion, sends in to Yildiz Kiosk no unanimous and clear demands, and allows time for remonstrances, replies, and argu- ment generally, the Sultan will not modify his policy by one hair's-breadth. He has, as Europe generally is aware, a will which closes on a policy as a tiger's jaws close on its victim ; but he has another peculiarity which Europe notices less,—conceit in his own ability. Every Oriental, be his character what it may, at heart thinks his European interlocutor a stupid fellow. He may fear him, or respect him, or even in rare cases like him cordially, but it never occurs to him that he could not, if he had time and the courage, take him in. He compares his own capacity for finesse with his opponent's brutal directness, and is perfectly satisfied of that. Abd-ul- Timid, who is a subtle Armenian by temperament, who if he knew anything would be as skilful a politician as the Emperor of Austria, and who has a hundred diplomatic successes to record, does not doubt that he can deceive all Europe, or set it by the ears, and so long as the game is one of words he will play it with a tenacity which is nearly as effective as courage. He will argue, and delay, and remonstrate, and talk about Mussulman opinion, and plead his obligations as Khalif, sign dozens of promises. issue decrees by the score, and remain at the end of it all just what he was before, an Oriental Philip II., with his grip on every department, and the faculty of crushing vitality out of every department he grips. Until he receives orders to which he must bow—that is, orders that he is convinced will be followed by naval or military action—he will continue to believe that there must be some way of gliding out of the difficulties around him, and that he shall find it. Nor will that be in any way a fatuous belief. A man must form his opinions from his experience, and the lifelong experience of Abd-ul-Hamid shows him that he has only to play a waiting game and he is sure of ultimate success. Russian officers have actually on one occasion entered his capital, and he is still, in consequence of the jealousies of Europe, sitting there a free Padishah, able to inflict banishment, torture, or death on any subject whom he may suspect, dislike, or dread.
The second mischievous effect is the despair produced among all who are hostile to the Sultan's rule. Not to men- tion Armenians, Macedonians, Druses, and taxpayers without money, all of whom are liable under the existing system to extremities of suffering, let us consider for one moment the situation of orthodox believers in the capital itself if they happen to be suspected of Liberalism or of favouring a change in the occupancy of the throne,—" Muradism," men call it on the spot. They are arrested literally in scores at a time, hurried off to Yildiz Kiosk, questioned, as is believed, by torture, but at all events questioned, kept for days in fetid cells, and then deported to places in Arabia or Armenia, where they die from " insanitary conditions," or pneumonia, or some other of the many evils with which Providence afflicts the enemies of the Sultan. It is asserted all over Europe that even the officers of the Turkish Army have no security, and that on one night last week fifty of them " disappeared," swallowed up in the dread Palace whence no one who is suspected ever returns to Constantinople. Recollect that the men thus struck at are personally among the bravest of mankind, that they have no possible kind of appeal unless they can change the Sultan, that they have no loyalty to the individual though much to the dynasty, that all their traditions prompt them to revolt, and then judge whether the situation can be con- sidered safe even from hour to hour. People talk of the cowardice of the Sultan, and no doubt he is more nervous than members of his house have ever yet shown themselves to be; but he is the shrewdest of the shrewd, and probably knows better than his best detective what terrible reason he has for apprehension. Other Sovereigns are liable to assassination, but he is liable also to dethrone- ment, and dethroned Sovereigns in Turkey "commit suicide with a pair of scissors." Grant the memories that must be in his mind, grant the seething discontent among all Mussulmans above the poorest, grant that dis- content has invaded the very garrison of the capital, and grant that the Mussulman mob is armed, and would the most experienced Ambassador guarantee order in Constan- tinople for a fortnight ? M. de Nelidoff certainly would not, and yet if order ceases even for three days the whole Eastern question is upon Europe, with the Continent split by the deep cleavage of the two "Alliances," with no one ready, with no final arrangements made, and with the Ottoman caste, which will fight to the death for its ascendency, neither conciliated nor subdued. It seems to us, who are mere historians looking on, that to allow such a risk as this to remain unremoved is political madness, and yet it is asserted, apparently on authority, that the Ambassadors, who alone can remove it, by giving through their decided action hope of better times, are " seeking for further information," and will take no steps "till February," while the"steps"themselves are rigorously concealed. One will not assert that this procrastination is foolish, because it is the outcome of a hundred conferences among the governing heads of Europe ; but certainly it seems to all who are outside diplomacy worse than foolishness. Or is there perchance a destiny at work which has decreed that the hour has arrived for the tolling of the passing-bell, and that not all Europe, though it rules the world, shall prevent the burial of the Ottoman dominion ? If that is so, it is vain to struggle ; but it will be a good many years before mankind believes again that there is much in the boasted wisdom of diplomatic methods.
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