THE GENERAL'S FRANCE

The State of Relations

ELDOM is the destiny of two peoples so inti- mately linked as has been that of France and Britain for centuries.

For a long time, it is true, our common histori- cal heritage was essentially made up of memor- able battles: Hastings, Crecy, Agincourt, Calais, Fontenoy, Waterloo. But it is a remarkable fact that this rivalry never was an obstacle to a deep and active reciprocal influence: in the seven- teenth century, our classicists influenced• yours; in the eighteenth, Montesquieu, Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists drew upon your ideas.

It was only at the dawn of the twentieth cen- tury that the French and the British realised that, on the political ground, what united them was more important than what divided them. From this point of view, the Entente Cordiale • of 1904 looked like a successful conclusion. Each side at last recognised the need to end an age- long rivalry in order to face a common peril: the rise of pan-Germanism.

Today, we can look sufficiently far back to be able to state that the 1904 agreements were essentially the base on which, through many vicissitudes and hesitations, our relations grew even better and closer. There were, however, ups and downs in our relations between the two wars; to ignore this would be to take too unrealistic a view: it is a fact that, in spite of the war-time alliance and the victory won in common, the Franco-British- entente was not then as effective as it ought to have been. At no time, from Versailles up to Munich, did our two countries really act in concert.

From the second war, the outbreak of which our entente failed to prevent, was to emerge a new world in which the relative position of our two countries was no longer comparable with what it had been before 1939.

In this new world, France and Great Britain felt the need to be more closely associated. This rapprochement was facilitated by the ending of their colonial enterprises. Having had to face, since 1945, the same task of decolonialisation, they discovered that their interests were parallel in those parts of the world where they had been rivals and that they now had common rather than competing interests with regard to the de- veloping countries.

This evolution towards greater solidarity also became apparent at the political and military level, where the alliance has succeeded the entente. Instead of the simple pre-war under- standing, which could leave some illusions in the mind of a potential aggressor, Great Britain recognised that it was advisable to substitute a real alliance: and so the Treaty of Dunkirk of 1947 came into being. Shortly afterwards, the accentuation of the Soviet threat was to reveal

that this alliance itself had become so necessary as to be no longer sufficient. Our two govern- ments, therefore, agreed to offer to other coun- tries the opportunity of joining in with them— an invitation which the three Benelux countries accepted in 1948. In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty, with the inclusion of the United States, made this defence system incomparably stronger. Yet it is not enough to talk in terms of formal alliance: it must also be added that since 1945 our relations have rested on the solid foundation created these last years between our two countries by • the growth of exchanges in the economic and cultural fields.

Our trade has not only developed spectacularly' and become much more diversified; it has also --and this is an important fact—shown a ten- dency to grow more rapidly than the trade of each of our countries with the rest of the world. In• another sphere, links that are completely new in relation to the pre-war period have developed. We have, indeed, reached the crucial point in technological development, of which certain achievements—the biggest ones—demand an in- dustrial and financial infrastruoture of such magnitude that, unlike the largest states, countries like ours, although industrialised, are unable to promote them independently. It is this com- pelling fact that lies behind the Franco-British project of the Concord supersonic aircraft, as it does behind various European organisations in which our two countries are associated for atomic and space research : the European Or- ganisation for Nuclear Research, the European Launching Development Organisation and the

European Space Research Association. • In the sphere of cultural exchanges, the figures speak for themselves: 250,000 children or young people now cross the Channel every year in one direction or the other to improve their knowledge of either English pr. French. In France, 75 per cent of the pupils in our schools choose English. In Britain; 90 per cent of the pupils learn French.

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Thus, even though there may seem to be some coolness from time, to time, since 1945 our re- lations have, in fact, become an all-round and much closer alliance than before the war. There remains, however, a vital sphere in which we do not yet see eye to eye: that of the unification of Europe. We must be aware, in this respect, that there are notable differences in the basic facts which govern our policies, and these facts are themselves explained by historical, geo- graphical and political causes. Sir Winston Churchill gave a remarkable definition of Britain's policy when he stated that it was inscribed within three circles: relations with the United States, relations with the Commonwealth and relations with Europe. French policy since the war, on the contrary, can be defined as revolving round one main axis: European unity. Considerably weakened by the Second World War, France had no, alternative, if she wished to survive, but to form part of a European group. That is why she joined various European organisations in succession, the two most important being the ECSC and the Common Market; it is, of course, a fact that both organisations owe their existence for a great part to French initiative.

When Great Britain, who for a long time re- fused to take part in the efforts towards Euro- pean integration, did decide to apply for membership of the Common Market, she came up against our conception, which, in her view, was too exclusive and too rigid.

Starting from a true European economic union, and not a simple free-trade area, France does, in fact, hope to achieve the political organisa- tion of Europe, even at the cost of sacrificing

the number of participants in the interests of a greater degree of commitment on their part. As she sees it, this organisation must gradually lead to a common European foreign policy, taking in all the vital problems, particularly that- of a common European defence. It is for this reason that we desire a reform of NATO that would secure a more balanced sharing of responsi- bilities within the alliance between the United States and Europe, more especially where atomic weapons are concerned.

Great Britain is reluctant to commit herself to such a Europe, which might well weaken her links with the rest of the world: Drawn towards the other two circles in which her vital interests are at present centred—i.e., the United States and the Commonwealth—she is inclined to think of her own future and of the future of Europe within the framework of a wide Atlantic Com- munity, with which the Commonwealth would be associated, rather than along the lines of French thinking.

If on these two great problems, the building of Europe and its nuclear defence, French and British conceptions still differ fundamentally, the French and the British have, after the two wars suffered in common to safeguard world freedom, established such close ties between them in all fields that they are at heart anxious to find themselves in unison again.

For my part, I am convinced that if, owing to the nature of things, there still are differences between us on these problems, an evolution is taking place in the course of which the obstacles will be swept away. The day is sure to come when we cannot but see facts in the same light; •then we shall march together towards great achieve- ments. I have no dearer wish.