THE CENTRAL AMERICAN QUESTION. •
IN multitude of councillors there is wisdom ; and since so many are advising our Government and the American on the subject of Central America, it seems possible that both the Governments may be able to retreat from the false position which they have made for themselves. Some of the advisers are unusually liberal; for each councillor, not content with advising one course apiece, proposes several and contradictory propositions,—a liberality which offers to the advised a great freedom of choice, and throws the whole question wide open. The same leading journalist who hinted at warlike proceedings to coerce our ally under the Bul- wer-Clayton treaty into an acceptance of our interpretation, now threatens that same ally with the frightful alternative that we may give up the question altogether and simply withdraw from the contest. The Ministerial Globe, after assisting the President of the American Republic to maintain his popularity by advising him to enforce a little more control over the Fillibustering wan- derers that enjoy the citizenship of the States, turns round upon our Government and advises it not to build walls in order to keep sparrows from cherry-trees. This, then, is the ultimatum offered on our side, a la Dogberry—America may either submit to receive chastisement from the power of -England, or she must submit to see our claim abandoned! Between these two extremes, both of which receive so high a sanction, it does seem possible to strike out a course -which shall be at once moderate and reasonable.
Now, the best course will be that which is dictated by a clear conception of the case as it stands, and of the mode into which we got into the difficulty. It is curious that both parties to the question, the United Kingdom and the United States, pursue their litigation upon ground which confessedly belongs to neither. We are quarrelling, ELS it were, for rights to land which is not even a "no-man's land," but belon.s. to the states of Central America. Our own Minister, avowedly, gives up many sovereign rights over the territory, but stands by claims based upon our former encroachments, upon the Bulwer-Clayton treaty, and upon the wrongdoing of the Americans. We claim, to occupy the island of Ruatan and other territories as our settlements, because we obtained, the right of usufructuary occupation ins, limited portion of the state of Honduras while it belonged to Spain ; and we have succeeded in encroaching both upon the territories and the sovereign rights of the feeble states that have inherited Spanish authority. Abandoning any sovereign rights in terms, our Min- ister claims to exercise a protectorate over the Mosquito Indians —a few thousands in number—who have no fixed territorial rights, and whose recognition, in fact, violates all precedent and analogy, and stultifies all territorial claims on the part of any European race on both American, continents. Further, since the Bulwer-Clayton treaty prohibits any encroachment upon terri- torial possession or sovereign power, our Minister tells the United States Government to look to its own citizens who are committing the most flagrant trespass under Colonel -Walker. Let us sup- pose the parallel to this position in Europe. Imagine England extending her settlement of Gibraltar across the intervening part of Spain and over a portion of Portugal ; claiming to protect a tribe of gipsies resident in Cintra, Oporto, and the intervening coast ; at the same time stipulating not to occupy any part of Spain or Portugal, but just4ing the whole position because sonic vagabonds from Algeria, calling themselves Frenchmen were making a revolutionary invasion of Portugal notwithstanding the proclamations and the repressive exertions of the Emperor Napoleon. This would be the exact parallel to our position.. If, at the same time, the Emperor Napoleon disclaimed all inten- tion of invading, colonizing, occupying, or ruling Portugal, he should be stultified, by his own subjects under some &dean or Pelissier who might lead the invading Frenchmen,—in such ease- his position would be exactly analogous to that of the Presi- dent of the United States. The question is, whether, under such circumstances either of the two Powers would be justified in. going to war io defend the illegal acts of their uncontrolled sub- jects ?—for that has really been the imminent probability in Cen- tral America. The Americans have behaved very badly : does it follow that we have a right to behave as ill ; or that we should abet our subjects in violating precedent, international law, and grammatical construction of stipulations, because the American Government cannot compel its subjects to behave lawfully ? Every further step in the dispute as it has hitherto been conducted only complicates it more, and renders any equitable issue impossible. The clearest course would be just to undo what has been done. The Bulwer-Clayton treaty, differently interpreted by its own authors, proves to be impracticable in fact. The attempts to re- concile the interpretations are, probably, not more impossible than it would be to reconcile the practical enforcement of the treaty to the condition of the country. The first step, then, would be, for both parties to agree in abrogating the treaty, and for each side to fall back upon the status quo and begin afresh.
The object of the compact was, to secure the neutrality for commercial transit from the Atlantic to the Pacifiel and we have to see how that object could be secured if the treaty were can- celled. The worst apprehension in this country would be, that the citizens of the Union would repeat in Central America the operation which they effected in Texas,—that they would first invade the territory, as they are now doing under Colonel Wal- ker; settle it, forcibly or otherwise, with Yankees, until they had secured a resident majority of their own race ; then establish their independence, and as an independent state ask admission into the Union. This is about the worst that could happen if England were to leave the region alone. It may be very wicked of Yankees to encroach upon alien territories; but if we were to protect all foreign states that cannot protect themselves, we should have to maintain a force for half the countries of the world. There are some reasons to suppose that the annexation of Central America would be less easy than that of Texas. It is contrary to ,the spirit of the United States to annex a distant province or one peopled by a foreign race. It is the inextinguishably alien character of the Mexican.population that forbids the annexation of Mexico ; and Mexico intervenes between Central America and. the Union.
If we do not rely upon these obstacles but suppose the annex- ation complete, still it does not follow that ultimately the objects of the Bulwer-Clayton treaty would be less effectually realized ; per-. haps the reverse. If Central America were to become one of the States of the Union, peopled by Anglo-Saxon citizens, we should have one material guarantee for the facility of transit from ocean to ocean. It would be the interest of a resident population, alive to commercial objects, to furnish that transit ; quite as much the interest of the resident population as it is of the citizens to en- courage the transit from the Canadian lakes by river or railway across the Union, in competition with the commerce down the St. Lawrence ; and we in, how the desire to obtain such a trade, assisted the Earl of Elgin in his reciprocity with the United States. It seems more than probable, therefore, that if the Spanish races and Mosquito Indians were replaced by an Anglo- Saxon population—Republican as it might be—we should have a better security for the transit than we can obtain while all ar- rangements are complicated and impeded by the presence and the interests of semi-barbarous states, that tempt invasion and cannot protect themselves.
So far we have anticipated those results that are apprehended as the very worst from the withdrawal of Great Britain ; but is it so clear that we need leave the result to such a continency? We desire concessions on the other side ; we are in a position to make concessions : we are very jealous of American encroach- menta ; we have been far ahead of our rivals in establishing
encroachments of our own. The tenure of these encroachments., teehnieellY as well as morally, practically as well as logically, is extremely doubtful; and yet so extremely anxiou.s does the other side show itself to obtain a removal of the encroachments, that something would unquestionably be obtained as the purchase- money for a concession. The present value to this country of any rights of protectorate that we possess in MosTiito, of settlement in Ruatan, or of encroachment on Nicaragua, is actually nil ; the prospective value is entirely neutralized by the prospect of hosti- lity from the United States, whose power of creating inland trouble is much greater than our power of military or naval police. The concession,therefore would cost us little that we need regret. The principle of the Bufwer-Clayton treaty is purely negative— the abstinence of both the parties to it from all encroachments on Central America ; presuming more special arrangements with the local states that would give the neutrality of transit. Now it is a question whether it may not be possible to obtain from the United States a positive instead of a negative compact. Let us suppose the Governments both of London and Washington com- pletely reconciled; and let us suppose them in sincerity bent upon acting together. Let us suppose them requesting the states of Nicaragua, Costa-Rica and the others whose territories are involved, to grant a ;trip of land which shall be placed under the joint control of Great Britain and the United States ; and let us suppose the American and the English Governments positively agreeing, under all circumstances whatsoever, to defend that particular territory against the en- croachmenis or aggressions of all races or governments whatso- ever. It appears to us, that in obtaining a special guarantee of that kind, we should secure the best possible protection for the transit-lands during any period in which the local government may be unable to furnish that protection for order and commerce which either the American or the English Government could give in its own territory. To purchase such a guarantee, the con- cession of all our rights of nuisance in that part of the world would be indeed a sacrifice costing us little, but valued by our rival ally. Possessing the provisional security, we might leave the questions of Spanish development or of Anglo-Saxon substitu- tion to be controlled by the course of events ; confident that if a well-organized commercial transit were established, a civilized community mild be established on both sides of the route, whether the staple of the resident race were Spanish or Anglo-Saxon. Ultimately, that resident and civilized community would consti- tute in itself a guarantee for the order and neutrality of the transit ; and thus the course which we have suggested promises to secure, both at present and in the distant future, the objects which the Bulwer-Chiyton treaty has proved quite incompetent even to approach.
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