BOOKS.
A FRENCH BOOK ABOUT MODERN GERMANY.* M. COHEN, the author of Lee Deicides, has spent several years in Germany since the war of 1870-1871, and has given us, in a series of brilliant essays, the results of his observations there. 'Though writing with very real Patriotism, he is not unjust to the conquerors of Sedan, and except in one or two instances -deals dispassionately with the relations between Germany and France. Prince Bismarck, whom he calls rather wittily la con- .ircaisation incantee, he blames for the folly of aggregating offices CM his own head, without imputing to him any material base- ness, and he spares harsh words in speaking of the conduct of the war. His rancour seems to be strongest against the Ultra- montanes, but even in discussing them he is not lecl away to ap- proval of those laws by which Prussia attempted to silence reli- gious scruples by a fierce persecution. As a store-house of in- formation about modern Germany, the value of the book is very great. Statistics which can only be very laboriously obtained from German books of horrible dullness are collected conveni- ently together, and put so vivaciously, that the idlest are tempted to read. The chapters on "Public Education," "Socialism,"
"The Imperial Constitution," and "The Relation of Germany to Europe," are each and all full of most valuable information.
But the most interesting part of the book is, of course, that which relates to the rivalry between France and Germany. It was not infrequently supposed in England, and in France, too, that Napoleon III. desired the war of 1870; that he hoped to refurbish by some new victories the fast-waning popularity of the Bonapartists, or rather to still the discontent, which grow daily stronger, as the despotism grew daily more reckless and unabashed. It was further supposed at the time that the • Prince Imperial was to be dragged into prominence in the cam- paign, and that thus the dynasty might be strengthened in its
-tenure of the throne. But the real originator of the war was, according to M. Cohen, Prince Bismarck. France was willing to fight, but Prussia absolutely desirous of the fray.
Napoleon III. believed most sincerely in the principle of nationality. He held that it was a law of nature that races speaking the same tongue should in time form one country. To him it was also a maxim of statesmanship rather to put oneself at the head of the inevitable course of events, than in any way to oppose it, oi even, passively to await its coming. Seeing the National principle at work in Italy, he sided with the National party ; threw himself into the work of redeeming Italy from the foreigner, and managed to get himself rewarded for his services by the cession to France of Savoy and Nice. So far M. Cohen has nothing but praise for Napoleon. But when the next development of the .national principle came about, Napoleon's action was different. That development was the gradual application of the principle to 'Germany. From 1865. to 1876 the song of Arndt which pro- claimed the unity of all German-speaking men had been cease- lessly the key-note of German policy. Hence the war with Denmark and the annexation of the Duchies, the contest with Austria, and the gradual absorption by Prussia of all the lesser Teutonic States. All this, says M. Cohen, was natural enough ; Napoleon was right to allow it, even to desire it, but why did he not do in the case of Germany what he did in the case of Italy P Why did he not, that is to say, save from the turmoil caused by the in- .auguration of a new order of things some portion of territory for his own country Right enough, truly, to promise Prussia neu- trality, but why did Napoleon not ask a price for his neutrality ? By certain utterances of Prince Bismarck's which have been' made public recently, it is obvious that Prussia could not have run her uninterrupted course in 1865 and 1866; she would not even have attempted to do so, had France threatened to place a stumbling-block in the path. It was not very long before France discovered her mistake, in allowing the victors at Sadows, breathing-space to grow strong again for new triumphs.
Bismarck, says M. Cohen, had been laughing at our folly all the time. He knew that the conflict must come one day, and as he knew much better than any one in France of what strength the 'Gallic armies were, and at what degree of fitness—or rather, unfitness—the military preparations of the Second Empire stood, he himself chose the moment for the combat. M. Cohen, like most of us, does not believe that the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern was seriously meant ; at all events, it was
*1eudea sap l'Empive crAlternape. Var J. Clohon. Paris : Levy. 1879.
simply put forward as the straw with which Bismarck knew French irritability would blate into open flame.
Every one will turn with eagerness to the chapters which treat of Alsace-Lorraine. Prince Bismarck himself, in a speech delivered in the Reichstag in March, 1879, held, forth some pro- mise of autonomy to the annexed provinces. Since then an act has been passed which has moved the seat of government of Alsace-Lorraine to Strasbourg, and relaxed, in some measure, the severity of the government of the two provinces. Prince Bismarck, during the war of 1870-1871, desired only to form a neutral borderland of the provinces, and this is the future which M. Cohen now foresees for them. Public opinion has been greatly divided. There was the party of protest, who simply refused to share at all in the councils of the provinces while they remained under the German rtigime ; sincere men, these, whose intensity of feeling M. Cohen does not despise, though he holds it of no value to the cause. There is one section of the protestant party not so unfavourable to Germany, called itilemand by the French clerical papers ; and another, stronger than is generally known, hating France as clerical, and longing for the separate existence of Alsace- Lorraine as a neutral State. Then the Ultramontane party, which has a separate grudge against Germany, is also strongly autonomist ; thus various contrasts are strangely huddled up together. Every one in Alsace-Lorraine felt, however, the painfulness of the new centralisation; it was hard enough possibly, when Paris was the capital of these distant provinces, but much harder when Berlin usurped the place that rightly be- longed to Strasbourg, and which has been, as we said, at length granted to her. M. Cohen gives a mournful picture of the dull despair which shows itself in the emigration of members of the old commercial families, and the con- sequent serious diminution of the financial prosperity of Alsace. His hope is that finally the Powers may agree that Alsace-Lorraine shall be, like Belgium and Holland, a district of guaranteed neutrality. That the provinces should over belong again absolutely to France, he can scarcely bring himself to believe. The touching passage in which he expresses this renunciation of fair hopes is too beautiful not to be quoted :—
"Will ye ever be given unto us again, yo dearly loved daughters of wounded France, who, like Rachel, will not be comforted for the loss of her children ? Rachel plorana filioa sues, et notuit consolari, quia non aunt. Will ye never return to tho maternal hearth P Alas may one hope that ye will, may one even desire it P Would it be right for us to reconquer by force what was by force torn away from us ? Must we make of your fair and fertile land the battle-field of
our revenge ? Our heart is troubled when we think of aban- doning you for ever, but our reason shrinks back in fear at the thought of the sorrows which we must call upon ourselves, and call, too, upon you, in order to claim you for our own once more."
Turning to a very different subject, we have a graphic account of the great financial crisis which burst like a tempest over Germany in 1874. M. 0ohen remarks very properly that GerTany, though possessed in Bismarck of an incomparable diplomatist, and in Moltke of an unsurpassed General, has no man of even ordinary talent to act as Financial Minister. Bis- marck has, of course, with his usual confidence, taken upon his own shoulders the chief administration of German finance ; but he is, in our author's admirable words, " un 6conomiste Irma- Bien, et un financier de hasard." His vast mistake—a mistake copied, to a certain extent, by France—has been his un- ceasing increase in military expenditure. The bad times that have oppressed all Europe since 1874 have been felt most heavily of all in Germany, where the reaction was strongest. Drunk' with victory, the people imagined that the milliards Paris sent to Berlin would, somehow or other, "the general coffers fill." But those milliards were poured into the cannon- factory of M. Krupp. The hopes of the many were turned, however, to the enormous profit of the cunning few. The founders of companies and banks (Griinciers, as they were called) had no need to ask for money ; credulous mobs were at hand, un- summoned, to contribute to any absurd speculation. Strongest of all was the enthusiasm for the notion of making Berlin the "capital of the world." A shoal of building societies sprang into existence to erect splendid Haussmann structures all over Berlin. There were plans to build houses enough for a population of ten million persons. Everything was prosperous ; at one time, the building material reached twice its average price, and workmen, working little more than half the usual time, were able to obtain twice the usual wages. Then came the crash. Ruin, com- parable only to the ruin after the bursting of the South. Sea Bubble, spread over every part of Germany. Nor has there yet been any considerable recovery from the pecuniary distress which then visited all classes of society. And if Germany still goes on producing nothing but materials of war; and insisting on the imbecile system of protective duties which are Prince Bismarck's latest hope, her material misery and social discontent can hardly soon abate. Nothing is more striking than the report, quoted by M. Cohen, of the German Commissioner at the Exhibition of Philadelphia, in 1876:—
" In the department of industry, we have suffered a defeat equal to two Sedans. People thought that Germany, now reborn and united, would surpass all nations in productive greatness. Facts here proved the exact contrary. German industry has produced nothing but articles of infamous quality and of small value. She has made no pro- gress in taste Or invention. In industrial implements sho has produced nothing, except the gigantic Krupp cannons."
In discussing the German system of education, M. Cohen is very properly severe on the exclusive patriotism that is taught in the Government schools. The reason why it is so insisted on is probably because of the novelty of the doctrine. Till 1866, the German was a cosmopolitan ; since then, he has re- turned to the Wartburg phase, to that patriotism,—that is to say, which means hatred and contempt of the foreigner, and
with all the zeal of a recent proselyte takes every occasion to proclaim his faith. "In our schools," says M. Cohen, "we try to teach the children to be men ; in Germany they try, above all things, to make their children Ger- mans." The German children are taught, in fact, to consider their country superior to all others in all things,— " a falsehood," says M. Cohen, "as dangerous and, silly to teach to children as to men." The hand of the Government is strong and far-reaching, and all teachers are carefully watched over, with regard to the efficiency of their pedagogy and the
orthodoxy of their political views. So far we go with M. Cohen, but we cannot admit him to be right when he says that the German school is but the " pseudo de la caserno." Educa- tion: and military service are certainly both compulsory through- out the Vaterland, but there seems hardly to be any further con- nection.
We cannot conclude without expressing once more our high appreciation for the book, as a whole. Designed for M. Cohen's own countrymen, it will, no doubt, be invaluable to them ; but it will also be of the greatest service to all intelligent English- men who wish to learn the main facts about the constitution, the politics, the resources, and the difficulties of the new German Empire.