LORD LANSDOWNE ON ITALY. -1 - 4 0RD LANSDOWNE'S speech of Friday week
upon Italy has excited much attention on the Continent, and was not, we think, altogether a wise one. It was no doubt a good Parliamentary speech, and disposed pretty effectually of the speech which had provoked it. Lord Spencer's central idea was that although the British Government had gained the alliance of Japan, it had lost that of Italy, which was essential to the maintenance of the freedom of the Mediterranean. We had, in fact, flung Italy into the arms of France. Lord Lansdowne's reply to that is that we had no alliance with Italy in the strict sense of the term, that we had an understanding which remains intact, that we are on the most cordial terms with the' Italian Government, and that we have no jealousy whatever of the recent rapprochement between Italy and "France. All that may be quite true, and is certainly most judiciously expressed, especially as regards the revived friendship or spirit of mutual consideration in respect to commercial affairs between the two Mediterranean countries. It is no business of ours to interrupt, or blame, or even criticise any cordiality between any two countries, especially countries for whose prosperity we have of necessity warm good wishes. But still Lord Lansdowne made a mistake. He pressed too strongly his aspiration for a continuance of the status quo in the Mediterranean. The status quo is the pleasantest of settlements for those who have all they want, but it is not quite so agreeable to those who wish for more than they at present possess. The average Italian, when he thinks of foreign politics at all, sighs for some little prospect of the " expansion " which, as he clearly sees, all the nations of Europe are seeking, and most of them, in one quarter or another, are successful in securing. The Italians, partly from tradition andpartly from strategic considerations, specially desire this expansion on some shore of the Mediterranean; and as they can acquire nothing on the north side, not even Albania, they look with unsatisfied longing towards Tripoli and Berea, which will, they feel certain, shortly be detached from the decay- ing Empire of the Turk. They have obtained assurances from France—which has quite enough to do in Tunis and Algiers—favourable to their ambition ; but that ambition is fatal to the status quo, and they are, therefore, convinced that it is opposed by the statesmen of Great Britain. This materially cools their friendship for our country, more especially as they do not acquit Great Britain of selfish- ness, believing in their hearts that the masters of Egypt will want some day or other to enlarge their dominion westward. They disbelieve, indeed, in the possibility of a British Hadrian, and fancy that this country would, if it could, dominate all the world.
We cannot see the smallest reason for throwing cold water upon Italian aspirations to the south of the '. terranean. Those aspirations may be unwise, or even foolish, for Italy has not yet half digested the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and would gain more by settling and im- proving her southern provinces than by any conquest she is likely to be able to make. Though Turkey, moreover, is powerless at sea, the fanatical Arabs of the Hinterland of Tripoli would probably fight hard for their independence, and might involve Italy in great expenditure and great losses for a period of years. That risk, however, is the business of Italy, not of Great Britain, who, though she wishes well to Italy, has no manner of obligation to save her from herself. Why, then, are we to play the part of dog-in-the-manger ? Nobody even argues that the world would be the worse if a civilised Power replaced the Turk in the direct government of Tripoh and Bares. We certainly do not want Tripoli and Barca for ourselves, for even under our rule those provinces could never pay, and would bring us into just that direct contact with French dominion which we are so desirous to avoid. We have no wish that they should continue in their present condition of anarchy moderated by executions, and no anxiety to see them handed over to any other Power. On the contrary, Italy is precisely the Power we should like to see seated there in the fullest possession. An Italian Vice- royalty in Tripoli and Berea would be an almost ideal buffer-State interposed between Egypt and the vast and fully garrisoned French dominion on the southern border of the Mediterranean. Italy could never invade Egypt in the face of the British Fleet, as France could if she held Tripoli and Barca, while we could give Italy what would practically amount to an effective guarantee. France will not, without severe provocation, engage in a contest with us both. Why, then, should we appear—for it is only appearance—to be thwarting Italian wishes by making speeches about our desire and resolution to maintain a status quo which Italy regards as a barrier to her natural and non-injurious ambitions ?
It is replied that we want peace, and that Italian ambition might disturb peace ; but is there anything substantial in the reply ? Suppose that Italy during some quarrel with the Sultan occupied Tripoli, who except the Tripolitans, and possibly the followers of El Senoussi, would go to war ? We should not, because we should ap- prove the occupation ; and France would not, because she has pledged herself, during the recent negotiations, not to interfere. Austria is not afraid of Italy in the Mediter- ranean, though gravely opposed to her pretensions in Albania ; and Germany, though devoted to the Sultan, who repays her with profitable concessions, would hardly break up the Triple Alliance in order to preserve to him the least profitable portion of his dominions. She might ask Italy to send a tribute to Yildiz Kiosk, or advise her to hold her conquest as the Sultan holds Bulgaria, so that Mussulman honour might be preserved, but she could • hardly go farther and attack her own Southern ally. Turkey, of course, would be indignant, and would have a full right to fight for her province if she pleased; but how is Turkey to fight with her Fleet all rotting in the Bosphorus ? She cannot get to Tripoli by land. We see no prospect of a. war, and cannot imagine why the British Foreign Secretary should annoy all Italians by appearing to insist that a status quo which they consider full of danger to their prospects should be indefinitely maintained. Lord Lansdowne, we cannot but suspect, forgets—as for that matter we all do—that his people have rather too much than too little of the world, and that the phrases about the virtuousness of content which seem so righteous to the millionaire strike the man who is struggling upwards sometimes as insults, and always as cold douches thrown on a natural and not un- becoming ambition. But perhaps Lord Lansdowne did not really mean to throw cold water on the Italian aspirations, and was only, as we would fain believe, putting his views clumsily, as is too often the way of British statesmen when they deal with foreign affairs. Our statesmen are the most honourable and sincere, and in intention the most courteous, in the world ; but far too often when dealing with our foreign relations they manage to give dire offence to some- body they meant specially to please. For example, the last thing in the world that Lord. Cranborne meant was to give offence to the Japanese when he talked of granting alliances, yet he managed to do so quite as effectually as if he had studied to be rode.
Previous page
