MOUNTAIN WARFARE.*
MAJOR-GENERAL SHADWELL'S volume on Mountain Warfare is not and does not pretend to be original. In his modest and sensible preface he explains exactly the motives which led him to undertake the task, and names the sources whence he has derived the story set before the reader. We can well believe that during his "occasional tours " in Switzerland, he, as a keen and intelligent soldier, had his interest aroused by personal surveys of the ground where captains like Massena and the Archduke Charles, Lecourbe and Suwarow, won and lost renown. Moreover, the cam- paign of 1799, the year in which, during Bonaparte's absence in Egypt, fortune seemed to have favoured the Allies, pre- sents a fruitful field of study. " It occurred to me," writes General Shadwell, " that a separate critical narrative of these particular operations might possibly be of use to the younger members of my profession;" and hence he sat down to the labour of translating the " Swiss Narrative," itself based on the writings of the Archduke Charles, of Jomin' i, and on the Memoirs of Massena and Soult. To this interesting compilation he has added a valuable paper written by one of Suwarow's staff officers, giving an account of that General's doings in Switzerland ; and also the story of a less known, but still more instructive campaign,—that of the Due de Rohan in the Valteline in 1635, drawn up by General Dufour. Hence it will be seen that Major-General Shadwell has included in one volume a series of military proceed- ings, ranking among the very highest of their kind, and embody- ing a record of experiences in one field of warfare probably exceeding in worth any others of a similar character in military annals. In addition, the translator has written a suggestive pre- face, as remarkable for its soundness as its modesty. Indeed, the only drawback to a useful book is the maps. Sufficient care has not been bestowed upon the printing, and they are so dark in tint as to be almost unreadable. Even the best is greatly wanting in clearness ; and we regret this all the more, because the volume not only deserved good maps, but is not intelligible without them.
In many respects, mountain warfare excels all other forms in attractiveness and interest, since it draws as largely on the faculties of the hunter as the soldier, demands a profound know- ledge of topography, and what is rarer, an accurate judgment on the tactical and strategical value of roads and positions ; a sure eye in detecting the essential points, and promptitude in resolving how best to profit by the errors of a weak or how best to frustrate the designs*of a strong adversary. It is full of unforeseen oppor- tunities, affords many occasions when a few troops, well applied, can produce large results ; and hence a mountain campaign is usually marked by great vicissitudes, because there is such scope for the play of character, and so much depends on the aptitudes of subordinate commanders. Evidence illustrating these views abounds in General Shadwell's pages, notably in the career of Lecourbe, who is rightly characterised as the leader who "dis- played the greatest genius for conducting warfare in the moun- tains," and who, "under every circumstance, showed himself equal to the occasion." Nothing would bring out the fairness of this statement more than a comparison between Lecourbe and Suwarow, who, a soldier of undoubted ability, failed conspicu- ously when he had to face the problems of Alpine warfare. In- deed, the only rival of Lecourbe is the Due de Rohan, who as a General, on a small scale, no doubt, anticipated the brilliant cam- paign of 1796, and equalled in the Valteline and Engadine the exploits of Bonaparte himself. on the Adige. The merit of the operations of 1799 as sources of instructive study consists in the immense variety of the incidents, and consequently of the lessons which those operations afford. Nor is it mountain warfare proper only which is concerned. The protracted wrestlings of eager antagonists among the Alps are closely connected with the mightier strife on the plains between such leaders as Massena and the Archduke Charles, and the student is made to feel the truth so succinctly expressed by Napoleon :—" Les pays de montagnes dependent des plainer qui lea nourrissent " (Corr. v. xxx.). After all, the decisive strokes were not given among the Alps, but at Stockach, Zurich, Novi, the Trebbia, and in the subsequent year on the plains of Marengo. Nay, Swiss independence was founded and Swiss liberty itself preserved by battles fought in the lowlands. Morgarten and Sempach even, still more Morat • Mountain Warfare. Illustrated by the Campaign of 1799 in Switzerland. By Major-General Shadwell, C.B. London: Henry S. Ming and Co. and Granson, are outside the mountain region proper. Although the marches and combats herein narrated are well worth close study, since, as Napoleon himself admits, mountain warfare is sometimes a matter of necessity, the greater part of those which occurred in 1799 were the consequences of false ideas, and in- volved a pure waste of time and life. Napoleon, in his pregnant comments upon the campaign, condemns alike the plan which directed Lecourbe and Desolles by mountain pathways upon the Tyrol, and that which turned the Archduke aside into the Swiss defiles. He says the first scheme was devised in Paris, " par des hommes sans experience, qui n'avaient que des idees obscures et fausses sur fart de la guerre ;" and he lays it down.dogmatically, that the Archduke Charles, " en attaquant de front la Suisse, et s'engageant dans une guerre de montagnes, a neutralise les avantages qu'il avait obtenus sur divers champs de bataille." He 'thinks, indeed, that by moving on the Lower Rhine, the Austrian General would have compelled Massena to evacuate Switzerland in order to defend France. The truth is that neither Massena nor the Archduke were responsible for the direction given to the war at that period ; one was controlled by the Directory, the other by the Government at Vienna. Of course the mistaken character of the operations regarded as means to an end does not diminish their value as objects of study, examples of processes worked out under very trying conditions. We doubt, however, whether a detailed examination of the Due de Rohan's campaigns is not the more in- structive, because they so pointedly exemplify the governing prin- ciple underlying successful mountain warfare, as well as illustrate its tactical devices, when the moment of collision has arrived. "As a general rule," says our accomplished translator, " in any war in which a mountainous country forms only a section of its theatre, the decisive blow will not be struck in the high mountains, and for this reason it is unnecessary to employ a large force in defence of them." And again, "The true principle of waging war in mountains is to keep the main body of the forces in the prin- cipal valley, concentrated on the most important theatre of operations." It is that point which the Due de Rohan's pro- ceedings enforces with the weight of practical experience. Of course the student who would master the bearings of mountain warfare will have to read much more than is contained in this useful volume ; and indeed, if other guides be wanting, avail himself of the infor- mation supplied by General Shadwell in his preface ; but a con- scientious study of the campaigns here narrated will carry him very far on the road, and enable him to peruse with profit dis- courses, like those of Clausewitz, on the "Defence of Mountains," and the short, but very able chapter, entitled the "Key of the Country." As might be anticipated, Napoleon's " observations" on this very campaign of 1799 present, in a most condensed shape, the cream of the subject. General Shadwell also refers to a com- prehensive work on mountain warfare by Lieutenant-General von Kuhn, recently Austrian Minister of War, and intimates his in- tention to publish a translation. The state of the Central-Asia ques- tion should quicken the interest of all soldiers in the matter, since it is essential not only that our officers should have sound ideas upon the right methods of acting in hill regions, but of the rela- tion which these rugged territories bear to the plains.
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