THE FALL OF TOBRUK

By STRATEGICUS

THE fall of Tobruk is a serious military blow. Indeed, it is much more serious than most of the critics appear to realise. If we wish to appreciate its loss at its true value a careful study of the account of the two Mediterranean convoys can be commended. If movement in the middle stretch of the Mediterranean was then so precarious, what is it likely to be if the enemy is able to establish

himself in the port of Tobruk? It must entail the creation of a new bottle-neck, about 800 miles from the Sicilian Channel ; and this great section of the Mediterranean will be denied to us. As

it is undoubtedly the intention of the Axis to destroy our power in this sea, it must be admitted that they have, at least temporarily,

secured a large measure of success. There is also the loss of a great number of fine troops and probably vast stores. If these losses appear to rank a little lower in one's estimation, it is because

only six months ago we captured about the same number of enemy troops in the frontier garrisons for negligible losses, whereas there can be no doubt that Tobruk was not captured without heavy losses in men and material.

It is important to bear this fact in mind ; and, since no responsible person desires to criticise unjustly, it is only right to use the same

scales in our military judgement about every sector. If we rightly lavish our praise upon Russia, who is fighting the enemy some 500 miles within her own frontiers, it is well to remember that Tobruk is in enemy territory and that, since Wave11's first campaign, the enemy has not entered Egypt except for short-lived raids. In fine, if we are thoroughly disappointed and disconcerted by the grave

reverse in Libya, it is because, whether reasonably or unreasonably, everyone's eyes have been fixed on the Sicilian Channel and the lavoidance of defeat is taken for granted.

This attitude is almost universal, and it has become more deeply entrenched during the last few months when, what with the dispersion due to the opening of the Far Eastern theatre and the

growing tide of shipping losses, it is least justified. At the best reinforcements have to travel round the Cape at the cost of a great delay ; at the worst many fewer ships have to carry much less

available war material to the Middle East while reserves are built 'up in India and Australia. The unfortunate fact is that hardly any

of us is patient enough to realise that Japan's entry into the war effected a very definite dispersion of our military resources. It is not very creditable to us that we should have taken the magnificent victories of Wavell as if they were only to be expected and to have verlooked the fact that Ritchie inflicted a clear defeat upon Rommel ith inferior forces and drove him nearly soo miles across his own ground. Material has its role, and these victories were won in defiance of it.

Perhaps the reason for the lack of realism in our judgements is that we have not been well served by the official reports and the ews from Correspondents at the front. It is for this reason that, hile it is imperative that we should direct our criticism aright, e lack almost all the material to do so. We have suffered a serious efeat in Libya, and neither General Auchinleck nor the Cor- tespondents help us very much to discover either its causes or its extent. There is no doubt that Ritchie was completely master of the t phase of the battle, none that his army was stronger than when opened the fourth campaign. Some of the Correspondents indeed intain that at the end of May Ritchie should have struck back ith all his force while Rommel was reeling ; and General Auchinleck ncedes that there was an opportunity then of defeating him. But makes the adequate answer that Ritchie was as exhausted as ornmel ; and he must be admitted to be the judge of that fact. Indeed he goes further, and says that when Ritchie counter-attacked June 4th it was premature.

It we accept this judgement also, and it is easier to admit than e earlier, we must look for the occasion of the turn of the tide the period subsequent to that date. Something happened on e 13th, though what an where is not easy to say. One Corre- ndent says the bulk of our armour was decoyed into a trap by

a small number of German tanks, another says it was by a bogus message. A third says we ran into the trap. The Correspondent who is most critical of the Command says it was "west of Acroma," another says it was at Knightsbridge, another that it was east of Knightsbridge ; a fourth that it was between Knightsbridge and El Adem; and a fifth, with an instinct for safety, places it within the triangle—Acroma-El Adem-Knightsbridge. All that General Auchinleck says is that on this day "we were forced to abandon some positions at Knightsbridge" as the result of heavy fighting in the Knightsbridge-El Adem area. We are forced to conclude that, if any such incident occurred, it may have been a phase in this battle that has assumed a disproportionate importance.

The Correspondents' evidence about the general causes of our defeat is in little better agreement. One says we had worse aero- planes but more, another says we had fewer but better. General Auchinleck says our "air forces" maintain their "moral" supe- riority. Some of the Correspondents and Commentators suggest that our generals were inferior ; they had little experience of tank warfare, whereas Rommel had taken part in the Polish and French campaigns! This is an amazing suggestion. In neither campaign did the fighting last more than a few weeks, and in neither did anything approaching these tank battles in the desert take place. Moreover, Ritchie and some of his generals took part in the defeat of Rommel only six months ago. It is quite true that some of the generals who were then available to the Eighth Army—Blarney, Morshed and de Villiers—are with it no longer ; and that is clearly a great loss. But the Commander who appears most to have impressed the Correspondents is the newest—Gott Ritchie and Norrie were there long ago.

It does, however, appear to be clear that we were inferior in tanks and guns, and since most of the" Correspondents agree about this it is a little odd to find some of them critical of the generals.

It is not very easy to act with complete assurance when Tou know that your opponent has tanks which can bear and inflict stronger blows, which outrange yours by hundreds of yards, and which operate with considerable supplies of anti-tank guns that fire at longer range four times as fast, a shell only slightly lighter in weight, and are more easily manoeuvreable. The 88mm. German gun bears that relation to our very useful 25-pdr. Our tank-guns appear to have been 2-pdrs. ; though it is quite unjust to attribute the holding up of the 6-pdr. to the lack of imagination of the soldiers. It was the lack of imagination of the pre-war Budgets. We had some General Grant tanks, and they proved a disagreeable surprise to the Germans ; but they were too few and too slow, and they were inferior to the German models in range of fire.

Battle was joined on such terms. We were definitely inferior in tanks and guns ; but some of the Correspondents lay too much stress on the disparity of range. The fourth campaign was wifn against such disparity by means of a simple expedient ; and, neces- sarily or culpably—some light is desirable—we were limited to the material that could be sent out from this country or from the United States some months ago, limited again, as I have already pointed out, to what could be afforded when the new theatres had been supplied. We could not refuse battle ; and we were stronger than in the Fourth campaign. The unfortunate fact is that Rommel was absolutely and relatively stronger still. He had been consider- ably reinforced at the cost of heavy losses to the Luftwaffe ; and, of course, his role has hardly begun to take shape.

It is the unknown that is " disconcerting " and here too much is left to the imagination. There is no satisfactory explanation of the Tobruk episode. The decision, as Mr. Christopher Buckley says in the Daily Telegraph, was an "eleventh hour" change of plan. That is an intolerable situation. It was the same sort of mixed mind that provided the tragedy of Crete. It is possible to understand a decision that we could not afford to hold the position ; but, if we decided to stay there, every sort of careful preparation should have been made for its defence. The same correspondent makes another point that requires explanation. Why was there no effective attempt to create a diversion to weaken the weight of the attack if not to prevent it? As for the rest, it cannot be forgotten that Rommel is at his worst when he is bustled, and if we had some warning of his attack it is not easy to understand why we did not anticipate it. It is easier to propose conundrums than to answer them, and the apparent ineffectiveness of our tactics is caused by our being placed in the position of a brains trust compelled to provide answers of vital importance at a moment's notice. 'We did not come well out of the test, just as Rommel, with a relatively much stronger force, failed last winter. Now he is apparently preparing to attack us on our frontier positions, and it is difficult to gauge the chances of defence because we have no knowledge of the present relative strength of the opposing armies. This, however, at least we know. Ritchie started from weaker positions than these to inflict a clear defeat upon Rommel, and now that he has been reinforced there is no obvious reason why he should not do it again. The next week should show us how events are likely to develop. But of one thing we may be sure. We stand on the threshold of a severe trial, and it is neither wise nor just to expect our generals successfully to meet a challenge unless they are appropriately armed, and even then not invariably.