Political Commentary

Second-rate second chamber

John Grigg

About a fortnight ago (on 9 June, to be exact) the House of Lords debated the economic situation. It was a long debate, lasting until 11.19 p.m.—a late hour for their lordships. Twenty-five peers took part, and a brief consideration of them should be helpful to anyone trying to make up his or her mind on the merits of our second chamber as at present constituted.

The debate was opened by Lord Aidington who, as Toby Low, was a Tory MP and middle-rank minister, and who has since be come chairman of Grindlays Bank, the Port of London Authority and other concerns.

He would be a good man to belong to any second chamber, and his age is a sprightly sixty-two.

Most of the other speakers were either distinguished but elderly (e.g. Thorneycroft, Amory and Cobb°Id), or elderly and undis tinguished (Lee of Newton), or old and dotty (MacLeod of Fuinary), or not-quite elderly but not-quite-good-enough (Rochester and Shepherd). Twelve of those who spoke were in their late sixties or older— nine of them over seventy.

It is often said that the hereditary system ensures a good supply of gifted young peers to balance all the eminent veterans, but only two speakers were under forty. These (Seisdon and Gowrie) are indeed hereditary peers, but their qualifications to speak on economics are not immediately apparent.

Lord Selsdon—not to be confused with that interesting creature of Sir Harold Wil son's fancy, Selsdon Man—was educated at Winchester and served as a sub-lieutenant in the RNVR. For the rest he seems to be not able chiefly for his recreations, which are listed as rackets, squash, tennis, lawn tennis, cricket and ski-ing.

Lord Gowrie, who not only spoke but wound up for the Opposition, was a junior minister in the Heath government. A large part of his entry in Who's Who is devoted to his own and his parents' matrimonial

careers, but it also informs us that he has been a lecturer in English and American literature, and that he is the author of, A Postcard from Don Giovanni, as well as jointauthor of The Genius of British Painting.

The economic debate therefore illustrates rather vividly two points about the com position of the Lords. The age bias in the chamber is heavily weighted towards senescence, and the hereditary element does not compensate with a sufficiency of all-round youthful talent.

Changes to the House of Lords in recent years have been ill-thought-out and mainly reactionary in their effect. The two principal measures were both enacted during Mr Harold Macmillan's premiership—the Life Peerages Act of 1958 and the Peerage Act of 1963. Both are superficially progressive but on a closer inspection quite the reverse.

The only good thing about the Life Peerages Act is that it applies to women as well as men. In other respects it has been disastrous, because it has done more than anything to give the House of Lords the character of a geriatric institution. Even hereditary peers are 'life' peers in the sense that they cannot attend the Lords after they are dead. But they can go there, vote there and speak there for as long as they are physically capable of doing so, and the same is true of the new class of life peers, which is, moreover, an increasingly numerous class.

Of course there are many outstanding people among the life peers, but as a group they have very seriously aggravated a fault from which the hereditary second chamber already suffered. Life tenure of seats in Parliament may be preferable to hereditary tenure, but it is still a gross evil.

The 1963 Peerage Act is remembered for only one of its provisions—that allowing hereditary Peerages to be disclaimed for life —which created the false impression that it was an anti-hereditary measure. But it also enabled all peeresses in their own right to sit, and the whole of the Scottish peerage (instead of sixteen representatives, as before).

Britain needs a proper second chamber, and never more so than now. The existing one is obviously defective. What is to be done?

Parliamentary reformers are very busy suggesting improvements to the House of Commons, but they have much less to say about the House of Lords, which is by far the more suitable case for treatment. The system of first-past-the-post election in relatively small, single-member constituencies is right for the House of Commons. It protects the country against dictation by small minorities, and it keeps the dominant chamber close to the people.

But some system of proportional representation would be thoroughly appropriate to a reformed second chamber. Members might be elected to it by regions, and the best method would probably be that of the single transferable vote. Many candidates would be nominees of parties, large or small, but independents too would be free to stand. Elected representation in Parliament would thus be provided on a basis numerically fairer than the House of Commons system, which sacrifices fairness to practical rough justice.

It would, however, be foolish to contemplate a wholly elected second chamber, if only because the House of Commons will never vote such a deadly rival into being. But that is not the only reason. Some appointed membership of the second chamber is desirable, provided it is for a fixed term and not for life.

Without some scope for appointment Prime Minister would be restricted in his choice of ministers to people who were already in Parliament or for whom elective seats could be found.

Granted the case for an appointed element, for how long should appointment be? Clearly the term should be long enough to give a sense of security, but not so long as to create a reservoir of club bores. Ten years might be just about the right period. This would enable quite young people to be appointed, but there should be no undue bias in favour of youth. What is needed is an "equitable balance between age-groups. But perhaps the most important area of reform would be ex officio errunbership of the House. At present there is one categorY of peers sitting ex officio—the two archbishops and twenty-four senior diocesan bishops of the Church of England. They are not peers for life, but simply for the duration of their episcopates.

The 'spiritual' peerage derives from a° earlier age in our history, when the Church was an immensely powerful corporation threatening the authority of the State. Gradually the Church was controlled subordinated to the Crown and brought within the four walls of Parliament.

. What is the closest analogy, today, to the power of the mediaeval Church? SurelY that of the trade unions, which is exercised by means of worldly rather than otherworldly sanctions but which has a similar basis in the quasi-mystical solidarity of trade unionists. Somehow this power must be absorbed into the institutional fabric 01 the State.

The trade unions should be forma' established as an estate of the realm, bY admission of the whole TUC General Council as ex officio members of the second chamber. The General Council, thirty-nine strong, represents the supreme concentration of unofficial civilian power in the country. It should be given its place in Parliament, where such power must alwaYs be accommodated.

But what about the other 'side' of industry? Should management not be established in the same way? The answer is that management is more diffuse than the trade unions, and has no corporate representative body to compare with theirs. But if the CBI were to become more nearly the equivalent of the TUC, it should be given a similar constitutional status. Meanwhile many car tains of industry would sit as individuals in the second chamber, as they already do. Members of the reformed second chain,' ber should not have to bear the title 'lord, They should be free to sit under their ordinary names, merely adding the letters LP—Lord of Parliament. And people awarded peerages in honours lists should not automatically sit in the House of Lords.