THE UTILITY OF LITTLE POWERS.
TIENMARK, says King Christian, in the mournfully L./ resolved speech with which he dismissed his Parliament, " is still alone in the world," and still, we may add, fighting on as only Northmen can fight on against forces visibly irresistible. The Prussians have brought up their artillery at last, rifled pieces with huge bolts, costing the Treasury "a pound a shot," and have been hurling them into Diippel as if their Treasury were overflowing. The Danes, with inferior artillery, for like ourselves they are hampered by a certain unreadiness' have resisted with the slow courage of men who "look listless till there is a chance of action," but the Germans can .expend ten men for the freemen's one, and though the works are not carried, or likely as yet to be car- ried, the end of the glorious struggle is beyond all doubt. The Danes will be killed by tens, and when too few for suc- cessful resistance Alsen will be carried, and the last of its defenders buried in the last remaining corner of the de- pendency they have held so well. Jutland will be ex- hausted of food about the same time, and while conferences are proceeding in London to carry out the treaty which provides for the "independence and integrity of Denmark," Denmark as an independent monarchy will have ceased to exist. And we who showered honours on the eighteen thousand Englishpen, who when Northern India rose in revolt faced death by,torture rather than relax the hold of thelr country over a sgbject race, scarcely even admire the heroism which prefers death to a foreign yoke. Why, indeed, should we ? The German taxation will probably be lighter upon the Danes than that levied from Copenhagen, and what are honour, and freedom, and self-government,, te right to say what is in you, to speak or to write what you have thought, compared with twopence a pound less on an annual income-tax? Nationality is an "idea" merely, and freedom not much more, and if Denmark were dipped in the Baltic, England would scarcely lose a per-centage on her trade.
It is vain to write of the moral reasons which, as it seems to men whose knees are not loosed by fear lest sugar should keep its price, bind us to the support of the few free races Left in the world ; but there is one side of this matter which has been scarcely enough discussed. It may be quite true that the balance of power is a very useless theory, and since nations began to develop from within its utility has certainly decreased; but uniformity of power has certainly not become desirable. There are not many persons, we suspect, even in Manchester, who quite desire to see North America given up to a single nation, governed by a single class, and acting through a solidi executive, and still fewer who would like to see entire Europe at. the mercy of three or four wills. Even our Eng- lish contempt for weakness does not quite blind us to the advantages derived from the existence of weak States, the various forms of life they develop, the experiments in Go- vernment which they are able to try, the breaks they inter. pose to centralized and consequently despotic action, and the check their needful caution imposes upon rash or unscru- pulous ambition. Some of us even remember with pleasure that in every nation however small, so long as it be but sepa- rate, there is an almost limitless capacity for unique action and development,. that England was worth defending in 1520, though it contained only two millions of sturdy folk, that the independence of Attica was a gain to the world, though it was barely the size of.Funen, that mankind would not have been the gainers had the Assyrians finally crushed out the independence' of Palestine—barely equal to Schleswig and Jutland. Yet it is very difficult to perceive, if the only free station in Europe will not maintain treaties by force of arms, how the few little States which still exist are to be kept alive. They are protected by treaties, and by treaties alone. Belgium is independent—and the only place in which French thought .ean be freely uttered—solely by force of written documents supported by the idea that if they were torn England might go to war. Sweden, if left alone, would in two years be a ",.quiet and orderly," Russian province. People are in the habit of saying that Switzerland, though neutral by written treaties, is able to defend herself, but steel bolts "costing a pound a piece" have ended that delusion, even if the Republic and Napoleon had, not traversed Switzerland at will., Mr. Motley has made us all think that Holland is a hard nut to crack, but Holland is too rich to cut dykes again, and France overran Holland in a single campaign. We dare say Elizabeth was pronounced by Radicals very silly for wasting' money and men in the defence of Holland, but was that the opinion of England in 1688? Will any statist venture to calcu- late the intereet in actual cash gain which England has received upon the few pounds which the Queen doled out so grudgingly ? Turkey avowedly stands solely by force of agreements, and though its existence seems to us a mischief, that is not the belief of the ruling statesmen of Europe. Would the world gain by the destruction of all these Powers, by this erasure not only of four separate political developments, but four sources of new development? The conquest, it may be said, makes no change, for the men remain under their new designation. Well, let us take an extreme case against ourselves. The free little republic of Corsica was crushed by France amidst sympathy in England, such as England now feels, but does not show, for Denmark. It was too expensive to fight for, however, on any adequate scale' and the island was very little' and our interests were not directly affected, and the balance of power was rather ideal, and so the inde- pendence of Corsica went, and we saved our money, and paid as penalty for that cowardice just four hundred and sixty millions in direct addition to our debt, and much about the same amount in permanent increase of taxation. Had Eng- land had the heart to delay the conquest of Corsica one month the Bonapartes would not have been born French- men !
But we shall be told, though little Powers are valuable, nations can only fight when they are directly threatened. Germany would be right in fighting for Belgium, because the annexation of that State would render the Rhine unten- able. France would defend Switzerland against any German attack, and Austria must war with Russia rather than bear her extension to Constantinople. Why should we war for Denmark ? Simply because it is not the " interest " of the great Continental Powers to keep these little States alive out of mutual dread, but to agree to mutual compensations out of their spoil—Poland was just such an object of jealousy, and the three Powers found that the cheapest mode of agreement was to divide her among them. People are easily convinced of the virtue of generosity when the expense has not to be borne by themselves. Germany would give Belgium for Holland very readily, and Russia consent quite heartily to Germany having Jutland, if only she might have that barren corner of Sweden between herself and Hammerfest. It is agreements aniong the despots against which we have to guard, and we can only guard against them by making it a most dangerous enterprise to dismember any weak Power. So far from doing that we are actually aiding in the dismem- berment. If Denmark fights on, resolutely protracting every siege to the utmost, defending every sound, and refusing to acknowledge occupation as defeat, she may ultimately be aided by the rising of the nationalities, by the bankruptcy of the Prussian exchequer, and by dissensions among the German Powers. But England by persuading her into a conference, which if it ends in anything must end in "personal union," cuts off the only remaining source of hope, compels her to cede before she has exhausted all for which Germany com- menced the war, tears from the nation its richest province in order to make it an appanage of her King, saves, indeed, the position of the family of Glucksburg, but leaves a free ally powerless under a sovereign legally responsible with his for- tune and his head to a foreign confederation. All the result of our diplomacy is an arrangement which is as just as if France had forced England to cede Wales to the Elector of Hanover, and called that "personal union" equivalent to the maintenance' of the integrity of Great Britain.
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