• TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE LITTLE CLOUD.
TT is useless to deny that the outlook of affairs, as between Great Britain and France, begins rapidly to darken. To most of our countrymen, it is true, a war with France is an almost inconceivable idea. They have been so accustomed to peace with France, and in a way, alliance, that the old traditions have died away, and de- scriptions of Frenchmen as our "natural enemies" seem to the new generation either rhetorical or ridiculous. They have no hostility to France, no fear of France, and no desire for anything that France possesses, and are hardly, therefore, able to believe that war with France is among the possibilities. Unfortunately, their cheerful- ness is ill-founded. Nations have before now drifted into war, and there are many and weighty reasons which dis- incline the French Government to arrest a drift that may produce a situation from which there is only one outlet. The first and most pressing is the direct conflict of claims as to the proprietorship of Boussa on the Niger, and as to certain reversionary rights in China. In the judgment of our Government, which is on such questions the judgment of the people, Boussa belongs to Great Britain by treaty right, known to, if not recognised by, the French Foreign Office, and Hong-kong is never safe unless Cowloon just behind it is in British hands. The French Government, nevertheless, has occupied Boussa and refuses to restore it, and has also asked terms from China which, if conceded, would completely cut off Hong-kong from any expansion on the mainland. These acts, taken together, are distinctly un- friendly, and to the first of them France adheres with an obstinacy which almost precludes amicable negotiation. She will hear no argument, accept no exchange, be content with nothing less than what for us would be a direct cession of Boussa as a place to which our right could not be defended. As we cannot yield up property in that way, whether we value it or not, there is, if France will not give way, no end to this conflict except war, and there are reasons, it is to be feared, which tend to make a giving way improbable. One, which is no doubt temporary, is the approach of the elections. Al. Meline's Ministry, for reasons connected with the safety of the Republic, dread these elections, which are fixed for May 8th, and are much the most important since Marshal MacMahon fell, and cannot bear to allow their adversaries, many of whom are crypto-Bonapartists, the advantage of being able to represent their conduct as pusillanimous. They must, to succeed, occupy a grand position in the eyes of electors, and would welcome an approach to war—though possibly not a war—as a basis for patriotic appeals. It is for this reason that they are making demonstrations with their ships, sending requests to Pekin which are far in excess of anything they really want or could use, and generally "advancing the flag" in the face of all the world. Even English Ministers feel an approaching election, and to French Ministers, aware that their Republic is unsafe, victory seems a matter of life and death. The second reason is the restlessness of the Army, which, aware that it can be made no stronger, and smarting under a belief that the insults often addressed to it by the Press are caused by its inaction, is thirsting for "an opportunity" somewhere, it hardly matters where or with whom. This spirit is said to have been greatly quickened by the Dreyfus affair and its consequences, and is undoubtedly not without its effect on French Republicans, who greatly fear the Army, who detest the idea of a "victorious General," and who may not be sorry to avert a military explosion by a war which, like all wars with Great Britain, would be a "war with limited liability," and, would shed glory, if upon anybody, upon statesmen and Admirals rather than commanders of army corps. A war with England must be a maritime war, be the object of expedi- tions what it might, and would create no reputation over- whelming enough to overpower the parties.
And there is a third reason, which, if it is well founded, is stronger than any of the others. It is doubtful whether the feverish unrest, the weariness of monotony, the desire for glory and adventure, which periodically seizes upon the French people is not influencing them once again. For twenty-seven years, it is said, they have had nothing to exult over, and they are sick of the tame- nest; of all things. They have paid, and are paying, untold sums for their Army and their Fleet, they believe that both are among the first in the world, and they want to enjoy "the triumph and the vanity, the rapture of the strife," which are to them the repayment for these sacri- fices. Neither peasants nor artisans care in the least about China, or know where the provinces with barbarous names are situate on the map, while they positively dread African acquisitions, fearing that sooner or later they will furnish graves for their children or themselves. Even Egypt hardly attracts the true French "people," though they have an idea that as Napoleon once conquered' it and Lesseps traversed it with a canal, it ought some- how or other to belong to them. They are a little afraid of a war with Germany, because the consequences of defeat would be so terrible ; but they would risk even that rather than not obtain "glory," excitement, and recognition as a great fighting Power. They do not want France only to be a Great Power, but a Great Power with a sword drawn. It was this temper more than anything else which overthrew Louis Philippe, it is one which has periodically reappeared in French history, and it is one which even a Republican Government cannot afford per- manently to disregard. Under such circumstances a French Foreign Office is sure to be obstinate, and as we cannot submit to be ordered out of our own posses- sions, the chance of a collision hardens into a sort of certainty which nothing, except, indeed, an understanding with Russia, can prevent. No doubt if the Czar wished it, and permitted his wish to be signified abroad, M. Hanotaux could recede with a certain grace, and at all events without censure from his own people ; but the, Czar will not wish it except as the result of an under- standing in the Far East, and of that there is very little apparent hope. It is our fault too. The little-noticed incident of last week, the retreat of Russia from Corea,, demonstrates almost beyond question that Russia is not ready in that quarter, and that till her railway is nearer completion she prefers asking China for routes and ports, and influence generally, to fighting Japan for Corea. She would probably welcome a British alliance directed for a short term of years to certain specified objects as a relief from a disagreeable situation, and would gladly, to gain it, exert her irresistible influence in Paris. We cannot, however, gather that there is even a chance of such an arrangement. The British public has fidgeted itself into• such a fever over Port Arthur and Talienwan and Man- churia, and Russian designs upon the universe, that the British Government is hardly free to act, more especially as there is no Premier to explain clearly and resolutely what he is about. The newspapers will not hear reason, and we are by no means sure that the papers and the people are in disaccord. The Times, for example, tells' us that it is no question of getting to the water, for that once possessed of Port Arthur, Russia can dictate to the Government of Pekin. The people applaud, never reflecting that nothing stops Russia from dictating now, or at any rate will stop her doing it on the day her Trans-Asian railway has reached Kirin. If we held Port Arthur, or ten Port Arthurs, we could only stop Russia, from pressing China by a declaration of war, and we can do that now. We do not say that Port Arthur would not strengthen Russia—though it will strengthen it little if the Chinese Court moves from Pekin to the south-west— but it will not strengthen her half as much as an under- standing with Russia would strengthen us. Her road to conquest six years hence will be a land road, not a sear route. We have, however, as we have said, little hope in that direction, and almost believe that between the obstinacy of M. Hanotaux and the people behind him, the clear necessity of defending our own possessions, and the unconquerable suspicion of our electors about Russian designs, we shall find ourselves involved in a great war with an enemy whom we not only do not hate, but do not want, if she will only be reasonable, even temporarily to. hurt. In truth, it is a muddled world.
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