THE HEALTH OF THE COMTE DE CHAMBORD.
THE French journals have been full recently of speculations as to the health of the Comte de Chambord. According to some of them, he is dying slowly of the same internal: disease as Gambetta,—ia unable to walk, and is declared by his doctors past all hope of a radical cure. According to others, he is quite well, about to go out on a hunting tour, and only amused with the anxiety of his enemies that he should pass out of the way. A third group of the well-informed, however, affirm that he is not dying, or near it, but that he has hurt his knee, or his foot, and that the quiescence to which he is unaccustomed seriously injures his health, which, he having the Bourbon appetite, requires constant exercise. This last account corresponds with the few certain facts, and with the testimony of those who saw him arrive at Frohadorf, and is probably more or less true ; while the tendency to exaggerate what at first sight is so unimportant is easily explained. The leading Republicans, and the leading Monarchists of France, like the leading foreign statesmen, are all alike of opinion that the death of Henri Cinq would greatly affect French politics, by bringing fairly to the front a Monarchical candidate who is at least possible, as "Henri Cinq" and Prince Napoleon are not. The rumour that the Comte de Chambord would acknowledge Dan Jaime, son of Don Carlos,—the head, if the Salic Law is observed, of the Spanish Bourbons, and, indeed, the eldest of the whole Bourbon Family, if they are considered as an undivided stock,— as his heir, is evidently disregarded in France, and we should think with justice. It is most improbable that the Count would break the compact with the Orleanists, and impossible that the Legitimists, by acknowledging a foreigner whose claims to the French succession are barred by Treaty as the representative of the House of France, should perpetuate division, and make success all but impossible. Deep as their prejudice against the Orleans branoh has been, they would adhere to French tradition, and the Comte de Paris, uniting both lines, would become, in certain contingencies, a formidable candidate. The Bonapartes are out of the question while Prince Napoleon lives, and his son's character is as unknown to the people as his person. The Comte de Paris, though not popular, leader of no party, and indeed little known, is understood by politicians to be a man of good, though not first-rate abilities, thoughtful and calm, and free of those fixed ideas which have wrecked all modern Bourbons, except Louis XVIII. It is believed that it would be easy for a considerable General, say, the Due d'Aumale, to reign under him, or a considerable statesman of the temperate type, and that he would constant. to rule upon modern principles and through a Liberal -constitution. If, therefore, the Army or the peasantry grew. die.
satisfied either with internal politics or the position of France, they would have a possible candidate ready to their hands, whose elevation would not preclude the selection as the real ruler of any able man who could accept a dynasty at all. That such a contingency is at present visible, no one affirms ; but the lives of nations, it is said, are long, misfortunes always arrive in due season, and the existence of a candidate who would unite Legitimists and Orleanists, the larger portion of " Society," the majority of the clergy, a section of the peasantry—the Bretons, for example—and large numbers of the higher officers, is a new danger for the Republic to encounter.
These ideas, which are freely uttered in French society, are sufficient to explain the otherwise unintelligible interest with which the Courts and the politicians of all parties watch the health of the Comte de Chambord, but we suspect that anxiety predisposes them all to involuntary exaggeration. The defect of French Republicans, as of their predecessors, is want of fortitude in politics. The Monarchists saw dangers in every Liberal movement and every Liberal who gained the popular ear, and the Republicans, with less reason, dread every Monarchical intrigue, and grow frantic with every rumour, or it may be accurate report, of a new combination among the Princes. They seem to fancy that a throne may suddenly be evolved in their midst by the operation of unknown forces. None of them produce the smallest trustworthy evidence that the three permanent forces of France, the peasantry, the Army, and Paris, have grown unfavourable to the Republic. Paris notoriously has not, or if it has, it is only because the Republic is not advanced enough to suit workmen who are out of temper not with this or that form of Government, but with the system of modern society. The Irreconcilables are not wanting Marabous back again. The peasantry, so far as appears, are contented with the Republic. In France, as in England, it is most difficult to fathom the latent ideas and test the secret feelings of such masses, but those who go to the poll elect Republicans. For the past six years the Right in the Chamber has been slowly dying down, and is now in a minority even in the Senate. The only serious doubt is as to the feelings of the abstainers, who, it is true, are numerous, but who are just as likely to abstain either from content or indifference as from hostility. The reluctance of the ignorant to vote whenever the emergency is not sharp enough to press upon dulled intellects, is of itself sufficient to account for great numbers of abstentions. The discontent must be strong to make great numbers wish for a revolution, and if they wished one, what should make them select " the King," who, in the minds of half the peasantry of France, is associated with traditions they abhor, with the reign of nobles, with the corvees, and with the priestly ascendancy which, and not the existence of priests, the average rural Frenchman dislikes. The French politicians of a certain class forget that the Comte do Paris under the new circumstances would be proclaimed not as the heir of Louis Philippe, or as representative of a Constitution, but as " the King " by hereditary right, that is, as the heir of the old and detested regime. Personally, he is unknown, and his family has outside the educated, no party. Mr. Hamerton indeed aflira:el, in 1870, from his long acquaintance with French peasants, that, though they knew " the Bourbons," and theBonapartes,and the Republic, they knew absolutely nothing of • the separateclaim of the House of Orleans. The Comte de Paris wouldbe to them the Bourbon back again, and-that they should with any willingness accept that, is to us incredible. They value their suffrage, they revel in their right to elevate a newscouche sociale, and they desire the steady peace which, as every Republican would tell them with only too ranch vigour, they could notexpect from Monarchy.
It is from the Army only that the danger could come, and but for the excitement among Republicans, and their readiness-te proscribe any Prince' whom any section of the Army appears to approve, we should regard this apprehension also as chimerical. What has the Army to obtain from the Bourbons ? Positibn4 The King will never make masters of the Marshals as Napoleon III. did, or place military men at the head of society; a course opposed to all Royal traditions, and to all that is known of the character of the Comte de Paris. War? That 'might be a result of a Restoration, as Prince Bismarck believes it mould be, for a .successful war would gratify France; but, then, is the French Army, taken as a whole, and >not limiting the word to a section of the higher officers; thirsting for: a war which; with the Triple Alliance still inexistence, meat be both great and:daagerous ? Every one assumes that armies want war, and that the French Army in particular is fretting at finding the prestige of France so lowered in Europe and in the East ; but what is there in conscription to make young soldiers differ so radically from the class from which they sprang I That the French Army, if conscious of some new strength, such as the possession of a first-class General, or a new weapon, or a fresh organisation, should desire a war, we can conceive ; but a throne will not, to French imaginations, give new military force, the Comte de Paris is not a soldier, and the Duc d'Aurnale, though there is no reason to undervalue his capacity, has never done anything to attract the full confidence of an army well aware that the work before it must be of the most arduous kind. A few diplomatists, we imagine, seriously hold that a French Monarchy could secure alliances more easily than a French Republic, and that may even be true ; but such a belief as that cannot be spread in a great Army. It is not the tradition of the French Army to " pronounce," except under two circumstances, when called upon by a victorious General who can himself bear rule, or when ordered, as in 1852, by the legal chief of the State ; and neither of these conditions exists at present. We do not believe the Army will move, unless discontented on its own account—that is, discontented at its treatment by the Chamber—and no instance of bad treatment can be suggested. There is a tone, no doubt, among the Radicals which an Army conterminous with the nation may not like—the tone displayed in the foolish vote of last week forbidding the Government to appoint any soldier Commissioner in Tonquin—but the tone is not more " pekin " than it has been at any time these ten years. Every vote required for the Army has been granted eagerly. The position of non-commissioned officers has been distinctly improved. The conscription, though wider in area, has been made less severe ; and the most advanced Republicans are always urging that the time of service should be shortened. The expedition to Tunis, with its terrible losses from sickness, had, it is true, an evil effect ; but then, it was not an effect tending to increase the enthusiasm for war. It is impossible to be certain, but, on the evidence, the only probable effect of the death of the Comte de Chambord would be to increase Republican jealousy of the Bourbons, and perhaps to excite a successful demand for their expulsion. Such a vote would be mischievous, because it would revive Party hatreds, already much too strong; but it would in no way increase the chances of the Bourbon restoration, which some men believe would be imminent were the Comte de Chambord once out of the path.
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