MEMOIRS OF CHANCELLOR PASQUIER.—VOL. III.*
THE third volume of Pasquier's Memoirs concerns the years 1814-15, beginning with the first restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy, after the abdication of Fontainebleau, and ending with the second restoration after the clacicle of Waterloo; and as the Chancellor was an observant man who took notes, a member of the new Government, and a trusted counsellor of the King, this part of his work, though less lively than his previous volumes, is a valuable contribution to the history of the period with which it deals. Louis XVIII.'s heritage was a heritage of trouble from the first, and his restoration to the throne was far from being a restoration to happiness. He owed his crown to the Powers who had invaded and conquered France, and were still, by most Frenchmen, regarded as France's enemies. The peasantry, fearful that they might not be left in peaceful possession of the confiscated lands which they had bought from the Revolutionary Govern- ment, were not too well affected to the Royalist regime; and the people at large could not take kindly to a Government which had been imposed upon them by foreign bayonets, nor to a King whose sole claim to their allegiance was the divine right in which only Legitimists believed. The returned emigrants were also a cause of trouble; some bore themselves as haughtily as though time had gone thirty years backward, demanding the restoration of their forfeited estates and the restitution of their ancient privileges, and opposing the grant of a donstitution. Said Monsieur one day to Pasquier, a prcrpos of the new form of government which the King had promised to concede :— " People have got what they asked for, and it is necessary to give this form of government a trial, but the experiment will soon be over, and if in the course -of a year or two things do not go smoothly, there will be a return. to the natural order of things." Which meant, of course, absolute rule and the old regime. What the Comte d'Artois said to Pasquier he repeated to others, thereby alienating many of the King's friends, as well as moderate men who Wanted nothing so much as internal peace, and foresaw that an attempt to make the monarchy absolute would provoke another revolution. Moreover, the military were bitterly discontented. They still idolised Napoleon, and the substitution of the fleur-de-lys for the tricolors was regarded as a slur on the heroes, alive and dead, who had carried the discarded. flag into every capital of the Continent.
Strangely enough, too, the termination of the war had rein- stated the Army in popular favour, and rekindled the popular passion for glory. Pasquier, who in his character of Director- General of Fonts et cluxussges was making a tour of inspec- tion, informed the Abbe de Montesquioa, that the placing of men on the retired list, together with furloughs and deser-
• Memoirs of Choncoltor Pasquisr. Edited by the Duo d'Audiffret-Paseuier. Translated by Charles E. Roche. Vol. III., 1814-15. London : T. Fisher Cnwin. tions, had brought into the bosoms of their families a con- siderable number of officers and privates who were always talking of Napoleon's great exploits, and lamenting his suf- ferings and humiliations. They found sympathetic listeners, and with the admiration for the Emperor and the Army was "coupled a profound hatred of the foreigner." In short, the train was being laid which five months later exploded, and brought upon France the bitterness of another conquest. Yet, though all this came to the King's knowledge, he seems to have had no foreboding of a catastrophe, perhaps because his mind was taken up with the immediate difficulties of his position, as well it might be. He was between the horns of a dilemma. Being beholden to the Allies for his throne, he was constrained to consult their wishes, and defer to their judgment; while as King of France it was his duty to make her interests his first care, and obtain for her the best terms in his power. He could not get from the Allies more than they chose to give him ; yet if he failed to satisfy his subjects, they would never forgive him. The Congress of Vienna, which was to divide the territories wrested from Napoleon, opened in October, and Louis sent thither as his plenipotentiary Talleyrand. No better selection could have been made, the ex-Bishop of Autun being as potent in the Cabinet as Bonaparte in the field. Albeit the representative of a beaten and unbeloved nation, and only admitted to the Congress as an act of grace and in the character of a suppliant, it was not long before he became one of the leading members of the assembly ; and had Napoleon not spoiled everything by his departure from Elba, Talleyrand would have set them all by the ears, and obtained better terms for France than she had any right to expect. The departure, though it came like a bolt from the blue, and threw all Europe into consterna- tion, was not altogether unexpected. General Pozzo de Borgo, "whose perspicacity was sharpened by his hatred of Napoleon," openly declared at the Congress that the only way of assuring the peace of Europe was to transport Napoleon to some spot where it would be impossible for him to carry on the dangerous correspondence which had become his principal occupation. Pasquier expresses the belief that, "with the accord of the Duke of Wellington and M. de Talley- rand, he then and there suggested that Napoleon should be transported to St. Helena,"—of which Napoleon was doubt- less informed, probably by the King of Naples' envoys, who were present at the Congress. On no other hypothesis can his sudden departure from Elba be explained. He had every- thing to gain by waiting. The Powers were disputing over the division of the spoil, and it seemed not unlikely that they would separate in anger, and the matters at issue be left to the arbitrament of the sword. Be that as it might, there could be no question that in a few months their armies would be disbanded or diminished, and Napoleon could then count on gaining important advantages before the allied Powers were able to meet him in the field with adequate forces. But Europe would never have suffered him to retain the the sovereignty of France, and after a sanguinary struggle, lasting it may be for years, he would again have been over- thrown.
Perhaps the most utterly unscrupulous thing Napoleon ever did was his return from Elba. Some writers have sought to justify the proceeding, or at least palliate its enormity, on the ground that the Bourbons had not paid him the subsidy which they had agreed to place at his disposal, and that he knew that the Allies meant to remove him to a more remote residence. In acting thus the Bourbons undoubtedly broke faith, but Napoleon might have obtained a remedy by apply- ing to the Powers, and though he had been paid his due to the last centime, there is no probability that be would have re- nounced his project. The second plea amounts to this,—that because Bonaparte suspected allied Europe of an intention to convert his gilded exile into virtual imprisonment he was justified in plunging Europe into war, sacrificing thousands of lives, and risking the integrity of the country which he pro- fessed to love and had sworn to defend. For had the Allies, after Waterloo, effaced France from the map of Europe, or dealt with her as Napoleon dealt with Russia after Jena, they would have been quite within their right. This issue was greatly dreaded by Pasquier and other patriotic Frenchmen, who had served Napoleon, and once admired him. Waterloo and Ligny were fought not to defend France, but to save its Emperor, and had he been treated as he treated those whom
he hated or feared—for instance, the Duo d'Enghien and Andreas Hofer—his fate would have been more tragic than exile to St. Helena.
Pasquier refused to take service under Napoleon during the Hundred Days, and was ordered into exile,—albeit, as a matter of fact, he did not leave France. Of what befell at that time and afterwards he has much to tell that is interesting, and some things that are not generally known ; for example, that Fouche was greatly favoured by the Duke of Wellington, and that Talleyrand, then past sixty, was so greatly affected by the departure from Paris of a lady whom he loved as to be quite unfitted for business.
Yet it may be doubted whether a book like these Memoirs is worth translating. Save by students of French his- tory, it is not likely to be much read, and students of French history are generally conversant with the French language. But if a thing be worth doing at all, it is worth doing well, and Mr. Roche's translation is done ill. His style is wooden, his English bad. Here is one of his sentences :— "And truly it had been dreamt of so little that it had not been feared to form a body of troops at Grenoble, and com- posed with as little heed as if it was to have been sent to the banks of the Rhine." He makes his author say that he is indebted to somebody "for a circumstance ; " adopts such phrases as "when the son could have flattered himself with succeeding the father ; " "he flattered himself upon in- augurating a movement." The Due d'Angouleme succeeds in "surprising this movement," and the translator adopts the vile Americanism of using " happening " as a substantive.
Previous page
