Concessions?
IN spite of the basic differences, it has been widely suggested that the Russians might start a Berlin blockade in retaliation for the Cuban quarantine. There arc no signs, as yet, that they propose to do this. But all the crisis areas where East faces West are part of one interlocking game. And we may calculate that, on the con- trary, the fact that President Kennedy has shown such a high degree of firmness over Cuba should make the Russians more prudent in Berlin.
The basic allied position in the city has now been whittled down to its bare minimum. Khrush- chev has taken all that he can get without major risk to himself, and there is nothing more we can give him without major risks to ourselves—and not to our position in Berlin alone, but to the whole structure of the Western Alliance. Yet this is only true of the essentials. If, as appears likely, Khrushchev now no longer wants to force the issue, then there are certain face-savers which it might do no harm to consider.
The much-bruited proposal for an inter- national authority to control access to the city, with East German participation, would give technical control only, and not political, to the body in question. Thus, once more, the sub- stance of the Allied position would be preserved and the shadow handed over for Khrushchev to boast about. But there is a little more to it than this. For the Allies would at least have demon- strated that, though unprepared to give in on any of the points which would fatally compromise their whole position, they are nevertheless 'not anxious to provoke trouble.
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