THE FATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE.
WE do not like the way things are going. It is quite clear that a cue has been given to the Press, and that the cue is substantially this. Her Majesty's Govern- ment is deeply moved by the sufferings of the Armenian people, which still continue, and most indignant at the recent conduct of the Sultan ; but it is not prepared without allies to apply coercion to him, nor is it prepared in order to secure allies to depart from the traditional policy of this country in respect to Eastern Europe. It is ready to make any appeal to the Czar's feelings or those of his people, but it is not ready to make any great con- cession to their interests or aspirations. In other words, her Majesty's Government will not promise to regard the occupation of Constantinople by a Russian force with approval or indifference. That seems to us equivalent to throwing up the sponge, and admitting that in the cir- cumstances of the situation the Sultan must be allowed his own way, even though that way leads him to the final extirpation of the Armenian people. It is admitted, rightly or wrongly, that Great Britain, however furious with just indignation or however openly defied, cannot move against the Sultan without an ally, and it is clear on the face of the present position that the only ally worth having for the end in view is the Russian Government. We cannot obtain the hearty support of France without Russian consent ; we cannot obtain the hearty support of Germany by anything we may do ; and we cannot obtain the hearty support of Austria without accepting all the burdensome obligations which would be entailed on us by an entrance into the Triple Alliance. We must,in fact, either win Russia to an alliance, either active or passive, or sit quiet in bitter humiliation ; and Russia will not be won without a guarantee that her permanent and unchangeable policy shall not be once again baffled by a new conference of Berlin, possibly by an armed defence of Constantinople. She was too bitterly disappointed in 1878 to run again a similar risk. That is the truth of the situation, and it seems to us that British policy, as described in inspired paragraphs, is based on two incorrect ideas. One is that we can go on declaring that we are still able to protect Constantinople for the Turks. We are not able. Wholly apart from all ideas of the possibility of a hostile coalition, in which, as we said last week, we are unable to believe, we cannot fight Russia, much less Russia plus France, with- out the hearty assent of the British people, and they would give no such assent. To wage a great war in order to main- tain Turkish dominion would revolt their consciences too deeply. It would be like fighting a civilised Power in order that Barbary corsairs might have free range of the Mediterranean. The people would not do it, and any Government which proposed such a course would find itself either in a minority, or with a majority which had not the energy or the single-mindedness essential with Englishmen to success in a great war. The Opposition, however patriotic, would ask every day what we were fighting for, and the answer could only be the maintenance of the foulest and most destructive tyranny which now harasses mankind. Within a week of the declaration of war military considerations would force us into active and warm alliance with Abd-u1-11amid,—that is, with a Prince regarded by nineteen out of every twenty Englishmen as outside the pale of humanity, a tyrant of the type which, according to optimist philosophers, has been extinguished by the progress of man. The situation would be unbear- able, and would either produce a defeat or would be got rid of by some humiliating but " necessary " compromise. If, then, we cannot fight for Constantinople, what is the objection to say so frankly, and thereby convince all Russians that whether we are selfish or not—and we are selfish enough, except when we are moved, as in the present case, by loftier emotions—our selfishness will not stand in the way of their secular aspirations ? They are free, we want to say to them, if they will help to do the world's work, to take the only pay which in their judgment will be sufficient compensation for the effort.
But we shall be told, indeed we practically are told by the action or inaction of British diplomacy, that there is another question to be considered. It is the traditional policy of Great Britain, acknowledged to be sound by all grave thinkers, to prevent the rise of any Power capable of founding a Universal Monarchy in the West, and Russia in possession of Constantinople could found such a monarchy. The "master of Constantinople," it is repeated every day, is master of the world. He would at all events be master of the Mediterranean. We are wholly unable to believe this statement, which, made in many quarters and in the broadest way, is based on inaccurate thought. It is utterly contrary to history, which shows us that the master of Constantinople, even when much the strongest military Power in the world, has never been able to master Europe ; has usually, in fact, sunk gradually into a weaker Power, standing always on the defensive. In what way would the possession increase Russian ability to attack Germany, or Austria, or Great Britain ? She might, it would be said, ally herself with France to drive us out of Egypt ; but to whose advantage ? and what prevents her from attempting that enterprise now ? Is it, per- chance, Turkish love for England which would induce the Sultan to close the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles against a Russian fleet? An alliance of Russia, Turkey, and France for our destruction could be arranged in a month even now, and would be at least as powerful as an alliance between Russia and France with the former in possession of Constantinople, a position, as Mr. Gladstone once pointed out, always singularly liable to attack from a maritime Power. The alliance, moreover, is, as a permanent policy, only an assumption. It is at least as probable that all States with interests in the Mediterranean would feel a new and keen dread of Russian ambition, a new and a strong disposition to seek the aid of the great maritime Power, which, allied with them, could keep the Mediterranean free and the road to Asia always open. This interest would always be vital to Italy ; it would be enormously strengthened in Austria if she possessed Salonica ; and it would be felt, we feel assured, even by France, though from her seat on the Atlantic she would remain as she is now, more independent. The subject is almost too large for a newspaper, but this belief, that Russia in a new position would be so much stronger than Russia as she is, seems to us to be part of that apprehensive view of politics which holds that there can be no freedom of the Mediterranean while France is seated at Biserta or England at Gibraltar. Positions are of a certain import- ance, but the mastery of positions is not the mastery of the world.
At all events, if this is the danger, the danger is in- curred already. Turkey, with the Balkans in Bulgarian hands, with her Fleet rotting at anchor, with her Army unpaid, with her Christian population in despair, with a weak Sultan, and with Europe unanimously contemptuous of her Administration, lies, and it is believed is conscious of lying, at the mercy of Russia unless she is defended from outside ; and who is there to defend her ? Great Britain, as we have already said, and as almost all Englishmen admit, will not, lest she should share in the guilt of the recent massacres, or give their author a new lease of the power he has so fearfully misused. France will not, because she hopes some day to recover her provinces through Russian assistance. Germany will not, because she has no direct interest in the matter sufficient to justify the Emperor in risking a war upon two frontiers, or calling on his whole people to sacrifice themselves for a diplomatic idea. And Austria will not, because, as we have so repeatedly argued, Austria, when it comes to the point, will prefer Salonica and the chance or certainty of a great Asiatic trade to the infinite risks of a war, with half her soldiers Slays, against the head of the Slavic world. Russia can take Constantinople if she pleases, and the choice before us is that of suffering her to acquire it apparently in our despite, and possibly through a Pro- tectorate, which would make of the Ottoman Army Russian soldiers, or permitting her to acquire it upon terms, the first of which would be that Ottoman oppression of Christians should cease for ever. Those are the true alternatives before us, and we cannot honestly say that the Government, if they are accurately represented in inspired accounts, are choosing either the wiser or the better one. Most certainly, if their decision is based upon the idea that Lord Salisbury's "free hand" will include permission to defend Turkey by force, they are lamentably deceived.
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