THE OCCUPATION OF DONGOLA.
OlTR troops have occupied Dongola, and with very little opposition from the Dervishes, who, though they show a good deal of strategic ability, are quite over- powered by the sledge-hammer blows which the Sirdar delivers. Hit quick and hit hard is his principle of action, and there is none better worth following by a soldier, especially when face to face with a savage foe. A lightning blow hard out from the shoulder is the surest form of attack. The only opposition met with by our forces was on the river about thirty miles below Dongola. Our troops when they began their advance were as they have been throughout the campaign, on the east side of the river- i.e., on its right bank—and so were the enemy. When, however, our troops reached the Dervish encampment they found it vacant, for the enemy had used their boats and crossed to the opposite side of the Nile. The only thing left for the Sirdar was to order his gunboats to advance, but it was obliged to be an advance unsupported by the land forces. The Dervishes seem to have expected this. The gunboats had to pass up a channel between the west bank of the river and an island in the stream, and the sides of this channel had been lined with rifle-pits. Cannon also, for the Mahdists have several pieces of field artillery in working order, were posted on the banks. The gunboats, then, had no easy task before them when they were ordered to advance. If the situation is considered it will be seen to be most curious and dramatic. The English force was on the right bank, and the Dervish force on the left. But the channel by which the gunboats had to ascend the river was under the left bank. Hence, while the action between the gunboats and the enemy was in progress, our whole army had to stand inactive and, like spectators at a cricket-match, watch across a mile of water the progress of the fight. It must have been an exciting scene, but one not very easily tolerated by eager soldiers. The gunboats alternately advanced and retreated, their plan being to discharge their guns and then retire out of range. By keeping on the move they also rendered themselves far less liable to be injured by the enemy's fire. It soon, however, became evident that the gunboats alone would be unable to force the passage, so steady and fierce was the are from the Dervish positions, and so well were their men concealed. The Sirdar then hit upon one of those lucky devices which so often snatch a victory from fate. He found that the water between the right or English bank and the island was not very deep, and that, in fact, it was just possible to move a battery of artillery across. This he did, and this decided the battle. The battery on the island was able to play upon the Dervish rifle- pits and to render them untenable. After its estab- lishment the Dervishes very soon found that the game was up, and a final assault by the gunboats, in conjunction with the shore and island guns, secured the passage of the river. The gunboats passed up towards Dongola, and the Dervishes, seeing that they were beaten, trailed off into the Desert. This was, in reality, the end. Two days after our troops entered Dongola, seizing plenty of guns and ammunition and huge quantities of grain. Our troops, then, are safely established at Dongola, and the remains of the Dervish ,forces which are being harried from the river by the gun- boats and chased on shore by the Camel Corps and cavalry, will soon be entirely disintegrated. And other forces than those of arms are breaking up the army of the Emir Bishara. The black troops under his command are deserting in considerable numbers, and are offering their services to the Sirdar. The truth is that the true negroes, while they loathe the Arabs, seem to have a natural respect for and sympathy with the English. As soon as they realise that the advancing army is an army controlled by English- men, and not merely an Egyptian army, their impulse is to desert the hated Baggaras, and put themselves under our protection. Hence our army grows as it marches, and the waste of the campaign is almost supplied by the new negro recruits.
The occupation of Dongola naturally raises the question, What is to be the next step ? Is the expedition to halt there and to be content for the time with the extremely rich province just acquired, or is it to move on at once ? Of course, military considerations on the spot must to a very great extent guide the decision. For ourselves, how- ever, we hope that it may turn out possible for the army to wait at Dongola, or the nearest position of strength, till the railway can be completed and a firm base created, including a good supply of gunboats of light draught. While this process of waiting is going on the Sirdar will be able to see the effect of the conquest of Dongola at Khartoum. It may be that, when the news of the reverse at Don gola and the destruction of Bishara's force reach Khartoum, a panic so complete will take place that the Khalifa's power will be overthrown from inside. If this happens, it may be possible, by moving directly from Korti to Khartoum by the Desert route, and simul- taneously from Suakin to Berber, to destroy the last remains of Mahdism with very little trouble. It may be, however, that things will not go like this, that the dying embers will flicker up in a last flame, that the Khalifa may preach a holy war, and try to march down to Dongola to dislodge the infidel invader. No better piece of luck could possibly happen to the Sirdar than to be attacked by the Khalifa, at some strong position on the river either at Dongola or near it. There could be but one result. The Mahdists would be annihilated just as Wad-el-Negumi's army of twelve thousand men was annihilated at Toski when that gallant fanatic tried to invade Nubia, and attacked us in the neigh- bon:hood. of Wady Halfa. There is a third alternative, however, and this is the least favourable to us. The Khalifa, though weakened, may be able to keep control over his people, and may be able to persuade them that if they will only wait patiently and leave the infidel to his own devices they will be safe. In that case we shall have ultimately to cross the Desert and attack the Khalifa at Khartoum. This is by no means an impossible task, especially if we are not in a hurry ; but it is not an easy one. Probably our best plan would be first to occupy Korti strongly. Next, to seize the Desert wells and hold them with efficient garrisons. We could then work slowly up the river till we had taken Berber. With Berber in our possession, as well as Korti and the chief wells on the Desert route, we could make a double advance on Khartoum—i.e., by the Desert route and by water—which could not fail in its object. To do all this would, how- ever, take time and care and preparation.
In any case it is much to be hoped that the military and political exigencies of the situation will allow the Sirdar to wait at Dongola till the middle of November, and in that breathing - space of two months to push on the railway. If once the railway can be got to Don- gola he need fear nothing. His base will be abso- lutely secure, and from thence he can prepare to deliver another blow as powerful as the last. Before we leave the subject a word of praise must be bestowed on the Sirdar. It may be true that he is a hard man, reaping where he does not sow, but he has proved himself a first-class commander, and has entirely justified the great confidence felt in him by Lord Cromer. A word, too, must be said in regard to the Intelligence Department. The Sirdar has been splendidly served by Major Wingate. Without his aid and that of his colleague, Slatin Pasha, the expedition could not have done what it has done. The Sirdar, again, has been extremely lucky in his brigade com- manders, and indeed in the whole body of officers under him, Colonel Hunter, Major Lewis, Major Jackson, Major Macdonald,. and Major Colinson, to mention only a few names. have done the work assigned to them with won- derful devotion. We do not wish to detract from the Sirdar's individual merits, but when a General is so well supported by his subordinates, his chance of making a success is enormously increased. To him, of course, must fall the chief credit., but at the same time his sub- ordinates must not be forgotten.
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