LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
AMERICA AND THE VETO
Sul,—From the European point of view it is difficult to be enthusiastic about Secretary Marshall's move to circumvent the veto. Not that there is anything wrong with the proposal itself, or with his diagnosis of the crisis. The Soviet Government's persistent misuse of the veto has irritated most members of the United Nations:—the nations of Western Europe among them. They do not quarrel with the criticism made by Louis St. Laurent, the Canadian Foreign Minister, that the United Nations is " frozen in futility." There is no doubt that they would welcome any move to liberalise the veto, or even to abolish it, provided always that it did not lead to a head-on collision between the United States and the Soviet Union; to a fierce quarrel in which others would be forced to take sides. The Western European nations do not want to take sides, at least, not now. Yet that is precisely what Mr. Marshall is asking them to do. The Americans would say that they are acting primarily in the interests and defence of Europe, and that without American backing Europe would inevitably succumb to Russian pressure. If Europe does not respond to American advances, so much the worse for Europe. That is not quite how the thing looks to the nations on the Continent. They see it as a struggle between Washington and Moscow for influence over Europe. While they may ultimately be forced to take sides, they have not got the strength to do so now. So the point about Secretary Marshall's proposal is not that it is impractical or wrong, but that it is untimely.
It is from the European point of view that it is untimely. The British Commonwealth and Latin America probably do not feel the same way about it; indeed, the Canadian and Australian Governments have been quick to express their approval of Mr. Marshall's speech. But Europe is bound to hesitate. By Europe one means, of course, the States of Western Europe—most of the sixteen nations that met in Paris to work out the Marshall programme for economic help. How many of these States can afford, at the present moment, to vote openly with the United States and against the Soviet Union on a question which involves not only the future of the United Nations. but the fundamental relations between Russia and the West? Can they afford openly to antagonise the Soviet Union at this particular time by walking boldly into the American camp, thus running the risk of finally cutting themselves off from markets and sources of supply in Eastern Europe? Who will supply Sweden with coal if Poland cuts off shipments? This may be a far-fetched possibility, but it is something which Governments are bound to keep in mind. Most of these sixteen countries are under considerable economic strain. Some of them, like Italy and France, are balancing on the edge of an economic precipice An awkward of unexpected movement may plunge them over the edge. to political as well as economic catastrophe. Others, like Norway and Sweden, are so overwhelmed by the proximity of the new Russian frontier that they are terrified of doing anything which may attract the suspicious eye of Moscow. They are conscious of being very much alone in the presence of a giant whose temper is uncertain and whose strength is enormous.
If they come down on the American side, • they will earn Russian hostility. They will feel even more threatened than now. Some will be chiefly conscious of the external threat, others of the internal menace, from Communist wreckers at home. All will fear that the prospects of reviving trade with countries outside the Western hemisphere—and it is only by restoring trade in Europe and with the East that the present disastrous deficit in the European balance of payments can be overcome —will recede even further into the dim future. It may well be that Europe is destined to be divided into two watertight compartments. In that event there will have to be a complete reorientation of Western European economic life, with a' vast increase in trade—two-way trade— between Europe and the American Continent. But there is still a hope that this will not happen. Indeed, the whole purpose of the Marshall programme is to restore the economic equilibrium of Europe. In the meantime, the nations of Western Europe cannot afford to take unneces- sary political risks. First there must at least be the prospect in sight of economic recovery, with some degree of permanence. In no other way can the present strains and stresses be relieved in countries such as France and Italy. But economic recovery is not even on the horizon and in some ways the outlook is more sombre than ever. Not until there has been an improvement can the nations of Western Europe be expected to pursue a healthy and independent foreign policy—inside the United Nations or out of it.
But the battle of the economic gap cannot be won without outside help. In view of Britain's weakness, that means help from the United States. And that brings us back to the Marshall programme for economic assistance. Until that has begun to do its work it is too much to expect the nations of Western Europe to show any great initiative or even to follow an American lead. At the moment—and this is the crux of the matter—there is no certainty that American help will be forthcoming. No one doubts the good intentions of the United States Government But the Administration cannot commit Congress. Expressed in its crudest terms, the risk that now faces the countries of Western Europe is this: to provoke Russian political and economic hostility, and even persecution, in the knowledge that it may have to be faced in isolation. The recent experiences of the French Government are not calculated to give them confidence. It is too little realised that France took a momentous decision in joining with Britain to invite the Governments of Europe to the Marshall economic conference. It meant the beginning of the end of that policy of balancing between Russia and tbe "Anglo-Saxon Powers " that France had followed for so long. In view of the internal situation it involved M. Bidault in considerable risk. What " compensations " has M. Bidault been given to enable him to disarm his critics? His objections to the new level of industry plan for Western Germany have been brushed aside. His plea that the Ruhr must be detached from the rest of Germany has been dismissed as irrelevant. The fact that France has abruptly changed the course of her foreign policy has not brought her into smoother or safer waters. This, and more, will be among the considerations that will guide the nations of Western Europe in their attitude to the American plan to circumvent the veto.—I am, Sir, yours, &c., G. B. THOMAS.
Previous page
