ITALY'S DIFFICULTIES.
BY their naval reconnaissance in. the lEgean and the exchange of shots with the Turkish forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles the Italians have acknowledged in effect that they are making no progress with the war in Tripoli, and that they are compelled, in disregard of their self-denying ordinance, to carry the war into European waters. This is exactly the result which those who took a long view of the Italian adventure in Tripoli always feared. What further results will flow from the same impulse to get effectually at the enemy time alone will show. But the systematic reconnoitring of the Italian Navy in the /Egean and the seizure of the island of Staaripalia, which is no doubt to serve as a naval base, mark a, new phase in the war. And this is true whether we suppose that Italy has decided actively to make war on Turkey elsewhere than in Tripoli, or whether we suppose that she is only uttering a "warning."
The difficulties of making war with Turkey are enor- mous, as Russia has not yet forgotten, and a frank recognition of them is the only basis on which the Italian Government can think out their future campaign. When most countries are conscious of being in very hot water they are anxious to get out of it even by a movement wanting in dignity. But it has become Turkey's normal occupation to be in hot water. It must not be supposed that because she is distraught she regards that fact as the beginning of the end. She knows from experience that it is not. The anxieties of Turkey cannot be trans- ferred to the account of Italy in the form of a corre- sponding degree of confidence. The great danger which the Italians ought to avoid is that of entirely reconstruct- ing their plans and substituting for the old ones naval and military enterprises that would most likely be disastrous. The Tripoli campaign so far has merely been disappoint- ing—bitterly disappointing, it is true—but it has not been in any shape or form disastrous. To send the Italian Navy into the Dardanelles and to laud a large Italian force in European Turkey or Asia Minor would be to run up against the peculiar natural advantages or latent strength of Turkey. Yet we cannot disguise from ourselves that the Italian Government will be exposed before long to strong and impatient criticism at home if tho war makes no headway, and will be tempted to save its face by some showy adventure. The landing of Italian troops in European Turkey would probably raise the whole Balkan question, as of course there is no State in the south-east of Europe which is not waiting for an oppor- tunity to cut off from Turkey, when she is sufficiently embarrassed, the piece of fat for which it has long been waiting.
The only thing likely to restrain the Italian Government from satisfying by rashness the present enthusiasm for the war in Italy is a, proper appreciation of the difficulties of making war with Turkey. The first of Italy's troubles is the unexpected behaviour of the Tripolitan Arabs. The whole Tripolitan coup was based on the assumption that directly the coast towns had been captured the Arabs, more intent on trade than on religion, would throw off any loose allegiance to the Sultan that they might still profess and welcome the Italians as the guarantors of new oppor- tunities of wealth. In the conquest of nations there have been many delusions like that, but none perhaps more complete than the Italian miscalculation. The Turkish garrison and the Arabs of Tripoli and Cyrenaica bickered continually before the war, but now they have become friends and comrades in arms under the com- mon pressure from without. Ought, then, the Italians to penetrate into the interior of Tripoli in spite of the oppo- sition and dislike of every Arab, man, woman, and child ? We believe that tame though a. policy of patience must necessarily appear it is the only sound one. A desert campaign which has no objective and which would end in pursuing innumerable small bodies of tribesmen who scatter and form again like mountain mists would be madness, and ruinous madness, too. The chief blunder, no doubt, was the formal and premature announcement of the annexation of Tripoli. That infuriated Moslem senti- ment of every shade and degree. It would have boon much better to prefer the substance to the form, and to have settled down to some such tenure (more or less illogical, but perfectly practical) as Great Britain has in Egypt. But it is characteristic of a Latin race that it always wants to occupy a sharply defined and terminologically defensible position. It is useless now to lament this error in political tactics. The Arabs and Turks, who might have been kept apart, are united, and the proper method for Italy remains one of patience. The Arabs may be indifferent now to every Italian bait, but in a few months or years they will feel the inconvenience of having imports shut off from them along the whole littoral. Smugghng there will be, of course, for the Italians cannot possibly prevent it along 1,200 miles of coast ; but, all the same, the rifles and other European goods which represent the amenities of Arab life will be irregular in supply and higher in cost. This is not an heroic argument for soldiers to use in prosecuting a war, but it is the only one likely to toll in. the long run that would not be exhausting to Italy herself, 02 course whenever the Turks or Arabs approach the Italian posi- tions it will be proper to attack them ; but we are certain that in all essential respects the right policy of Italy is to "Bit tight" in Tripoli and wait for the Arabs to come to them for trade.
Of course if the political disposition of the European States in Europe had been otherwise Italy would have had a very easy course open to her. She might have landed troops in Albania or in Epirus under cover of her ships' guns. The Albanians probably would have been well enough disposed towards them, and the effect of such an invasion on Turkey would have been very great. Albania is the one part of European Turkey where Italian troops might have landed with a real prospect of influencing the course of the war. A glance at the map will show how simple an expedition would have been from the naval port of Otranto to the Albanian coast. The south-east corner of Italy is a perfect base for such opera- tions. We do not say that Italy could have carried the war through Macedonia to the gates of Salonika, which to-day has a political prestige equal to that of Constanti- nople; but the mere occupation of Albania would have been a most powerful lever in her hands.. All this was impossible, however, because of the Triple Alliance. Italy had to mould her plans to suit the susceptibilities of Austria. We even suspect that before she declared war she was constrained to give a definite undertaking to Austria that she would not invade Albania. As it is, Italy has to operate in the lgean, where she is a con- siderable distance from home, and that is quite another matter. She cannot keep ships there without some ap- prehension as to what the Turkish Navy may be plotting to do. The obvious remedy is to get rid of the Turkish Navy. But, unfortunately, the Turkish Navy is inside the ]Dardanelles, and another glance at the map will reveal the terrors of a naval attack in the Dardanelles. Ships that sailed in there would go straight to their doom. The narrow channel is completely controlled by forts. There would be no chance of escape. Even if the fire from the forts were so poor as to miss at short range, the channel would no doubt be strewn with mines. The only possible way to seize the Dardanelles would be to land an army near Gallipoli, in the Gulf of Saxes, and reduce the Turkish forts singly. Nor would the capture of the Dardanelles, even if it were possible, avail Italy very much. The Turkish trade which passes from the Black Sea or the Sea, of Marmora, into the IEgea,n is an insigni- ficant proportion of the whole. Italy would not be crippling Turkey, but provoking other nations by touching their interests. We feel sure that Italy will not try to force the Dardanelles with her ships, and we hope that she will not take the risks of a land war with such excellent natural fighters as the Turks in their own country.
Even when we have reckoned up the obvious advantages of Turkey other points which make her an extremely awkward customer to wage war with can be mentioned. The Young Turks, for instance, have their back against the wall. They live by prestige alone. It is necessary for them to defend the Cause of Islam against a. Christian nation with extravagant scrupulousness, or they would suffer from the suspicion, which peculiarly attaches itself to reformers in Turkey, of being lukewarm in the faith. The Young Turks, in brief, cannot afford to yield. Further, we must remember that the war in Tripoli is a very cheap war for Turkey. It may be that in indirect ways it is costing more than the Government thinks; but the expense is not apparent, and the Turks therefore do not feel it acutely. The actual loss in trade through the severance of Tripoli from the Empire is next to nothing. Italy's difficulties are so numerous that we suspect that if the war is seriously carried into Europe or Asia. Minor it will be with the active help of some other Power. We trust that such a dangerous expedient—the long-delayed Balkan scramble would then probably begin—will be avoided. It is a danger, however, and we had better recognize it. Meanwhile we trust that Diplomacy has not said her last word in the way of mediation. We should like nothing better than to see Italy mistress of all her difficulties. In a way her troubles are unnecessary because she and Turkey, apart from Tripoli, have a large measure of common interests. It would be a charming irony indeed if circumstances forced the two countries into a working uxiderstanding which had never been contemplated by statesmanship. After all, is the blessed word " Annexa- tion " so essentially blessed ? Might not Italy even now give up the " word " if the " thing " were assured to her ? The Italians are the most skilful diplomatists in the world. Surely they will not let themselves be injured by the fact that they said too much in their original proclamation !
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