A SPECTATOR'S NOTEBOOK
ISEE that a New -York paper decries the idea of Anglo- American co-dperation at Shanghai on the ground that it was London's " walk-out " in Washington at the time of the Manchurian episode that led to the present situation in the Far East, and that" having been left out on the limb once America hardly wants to be caught out on the same limb again." Simultaneously a London paper, writing with con- siderably less restraint, observes that " as a direct result of the British Government's shameful betrayal of China, and its refusal to co-operate with America in 1932, we can do nothing now. America, having been once bitten, is twice shy of British talk of co-operation." I have never hesitated to criticise Sir John Simon's Far Eastern policy, particularly in regard to America, but this is really pushing the pendulum much too far. I believe I know all the essential facts about Anglo- American relations over Manchuria both before and behind the scenes. I have carefully studied the book written on the subject by Mr. Henry Stimson, who was then Secretary of State. And the plain truth is this, that in the temper in which Japan was then Great Britain and the United States, if they had decided to take joint action, would have had to take it in the full knowledge that war might result. Was America prepared in case of need to go that length ? There was never the least indication or suggestion that she was. All her post-War policy, indeed, suggested the reverse. Skilful British diplomacy might have led America on step by step till she had no alternative but to keep on going forward. But to imply that America was ready for firm action and we were not-is to depart seriously from fact.
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