TOPICS OF THE DAY.
TUNITY. THOUGH the panic on the Paris Bourse and the pessimistic rumours of a portion of the Continental Press need not be regarded as trustworthy indications of danger, it cannot be denied that there are very grave ele- ments of peril in the existing situation, and that the position of this country as regards its foreign relations is one which calls for the most serious and careful, consideration. A very little reflection will show that this must be so. All Englishmen, whatever their views as to the wisdom of the Japanese Alliance, agree in their desire to keep out of the war if possible. At the same time, they feel that if Japan were to be getting the worst of it, and were placed in a position of real danger, we should be obliged to do some- thing to help our ally. But though we realise this so strongly in our own case, we do not appear to have enough imagination to realise that just the same considerations are affecting, and must affect, the French. They, like us, are most anxious to keep out of the war ; but they, like us, feel bound to ask themselves whether they can, if the worst comes to the worst, afford to let their ally be beaten by the Japanese, or be bled to death by a war both in- terminable and unsuccessful. Here, then, lies the point of danger. Neither we nor the French feel that we need be very much moved by the initial stages of the war, nor by a war which will give complete victory to neither side ; but we both feel deep anxiety at the thought of our ally receiving any grave injury,—one from which recovery would be slow and doubtful. And this anxiety is the more poignant because it does not rest on sentiment or honour, but on self- interest. Neither side thinks that it would be quite safe with its ally badly damaged. No doubt the French are in a sense in a better position to resist being drawn in than we are, because it is inconceivable that Russia's position as a State could be destroyed by defeat ; whereas in the assumed case of a crushing Japanese defeat it is possible that Japan might cease to count as a Far Eastern Power. If Japan had lost command of the sea, she might have been threatened with annihilation. No such dilemma as allowing Russia to be annihilated or else helping her can be presented to the French. The worst that France risks is the weakening of her ally, and possibly the inability of Russia to pay her debts, and she has got to balance against that the risks and dangers of a great war. France can always say to Russia : We should like to help you, but it would be a cruel kindness to bring Britain down upon you, and therefore we refrain.' We could not, were Japan being beaten, make that excuse to Japan, as Japan has politically nothing to fear from France, which is not in a position to deal her any serious blow in the Far East.
But even if we assume that the knowledge that her help to Russia would be worse than useless, because it would only mean fresh enemies for her ally, may be relied on to keep back France, and will satisfy the Russians, and convince them that all that could be done by their ally has been done, there is another element likely to involve France which must be faced,—and one which, in our belief, is far more likely to prove dangerous. The German Emperor has it in his power at any moment to place the French in a most difficult position ; and being the able diplomatist that he is, one may not unreasonably canvass the notion of his using his power. Suppose that later on, say when the war has run another six months, and when the Russians are greatly exhausted and in peril of even worse things happening to them, the German Emperor, after privately sounding the Russians and obtaining their assent, were to say to the French Let us end this horrible and dangerous war by a friendly intervention. Russia is willing, and Japan will doubtless see reason when we approach her, just as she did in 1895. France and Germany acted together then, and with the happiest results, even though Britain sulked and stood aloof, and there is no reason why we should not be equally successful now in maintaining the political equilibrium in the Far East.' If this proposal were made to France by Germany with the full acquiescence and approval of Russia, how could the French meet it ? They could hardly say No, we will not act with you ' ; or rather, if they did say so, they would know that the Dual Alliance was at an end. The Russians would not fail to ask themselves the question : 'What is the use of the Alliance when our ally refuses to help us, while the Power against which the Dual Alliance was formed proffers us her help 9' It may be said perhaps that in that case the French would let the Alliance go. They have never got much benefit from it, they are not bound in honour by it to act with Germany, and they would prefer to let it die rather than plunge into a war with Britain. This is, of course, a conceivable view, but is it not more likely that the French Government and people would argue thus ?—' The German Emperor places us in an intolerable dilemma ; but there is no help for it ; we cannot in such circumstances as these desert the Russians. If we do, they fall at once into the arms of Germany, Germany and Russia become allies, and the Kaiser has us at his mercy. In order, then, to avoid attacks on our Eastern frontiers under conditions which preclude any help from other quarters, we must maintain the Dual Alliance, and show Russia that we are as good friends to her as Germany. We don't want a war with Germany in which Russia would give us no help, and so would allow the full weight of the German Power to fall upon us. We cannot run the risk of giving up our Russian fire insurance. Even though sticking to it involves us in other and great risks, they are not so great as those we run by not being insured at all.' Who could be surprised if the French were to argue in this way, impelled also by the fears of the small French investor for the £300,000,000 he has lent to Russia,—millions which he somehow fancies are guaranteed to him by the Alliance ?
Granted that the German Emperor has the power to place France in a position so dangerous to herself and to us, we must ask,—Is there no way in which the danger can be prevented ? We believe there is. We would take action by a timely and friendly intimation to France that should she have this diplomatic pistol placed at her head, we should be willing to give her guarantees as goqd as those given by Russia, or, to use our metaphor once more, that we should be willing to take up the lapsed Russian insurance, and to insure her against Germany on the same terms that she formerly obtained from Russia. If we made such an offer to France, and she accepted it, she would cer- tainly be no worse off than she is now, but rather better, for we have many ways of helping her which Russia does not possess. We can, for example, do what Russia never could do— guarantee her great and growing Empire in North and West Africa, which is, indeed, imperilled by a Russian Alliance, as M. de Lanessan has reminded his countrymen this week. Except from a British attack, that Empire for which France has sacrificed so much is absolutely secure. Again, an understanding with Britain such as we have described would save France from the terrible drain of a double fightiug expenditure. She would not, of course, be wise to neglect her Fleet ; but if she were insured in the British office instead of the Russian, she would not need to spend such very large sums as she does now. But what she saved from the Navy could be expended in perfecting the Army as a fighting machine. Incidentally, too, we may feel sure that a British policy of insurance would remove all further danger on the Italian frontier. Italy's obligations under the Triple Alliance are already not very exacting, and when once France and Britain were in agreement we may be sure that Italy would be anything but hostile.
So much for the advantages that France would reap from insuring herself with us. Should we get equal advantages? Possibly not, if the ultimate issues are regarded ; but most certainly we should obtain the immediate advantage of avoiding a war against all Europe except Italy, Austria, and Spain; and owing to the Japanese Alliance, the best we can do now is to protect ourselves against its immediate evils, though we have to abandon the only essentially sound policy of non-committal. The moment the Alliance was made the possibility of keeping ourselves in a safe isolation ceased. It must be remembered also that by insuring France against an attack by Germany we are only agreeing to do what we should, in fact, be forced to do if Germany were to attack France with the object of destroying her,—and no attack except one intended to destroy France altogether as a Great Power need be contemplated. We could not, without entire neglect of our own safety, allow France to be overwhelmed by Germany. Germany is too powerful a State, and one that presents too great a menace to us, to permit us to contemplate the possibility of France being over- thrown by her. Therefore, whether we agreed before- hand or no, we must come to the aid of France if she were attacked. In truth, then, we should run no greater risks than we are exposed to at this very moment if we were to agree to do what Russia is now under agreement to do for France. But if this view is a sound one, would it not be a wise precaution to let the German Emperor know that such is our inten- tion? Nay, we would go further, and inform the French that if they were placed by Germany in the dilemma suggested, and were in danger of losing their Russian Alliance, we should be willing to supply the endangered insurance. We should not, of course, expect the French to reply in any way to such an intimation ; but the knowledge of our attitude would, we may feel sure, prevent the suggested German offer being made to France. Germany does not want to bring France and Britain together, though she would be very glad to act with France and Russia against Britain.
We trust that our readers will not think from what we have written that we regard the German Emperor as a kind of bogey-man. He is nothing of the sort, but only a very shrewd statesman who studies foreign relations pro- foundly, and is most properly anxious to secure Germany's position in every possible way and to build up a world- Empire. But granted this, nothing could be better policy on his part than to get the only two Powers he dreads —and he dreads them both very greatly—to join with him in either injuring British prestige, or else in actually inflicting the injury on us involved in a war, and the consequent Continental boycott of our trade. There is nothing in the least wrong from the German Emperor's point of view in contemplating intervention in conjunction with France. It would obviously be a most successful piece of statecraft if it could be managed. Let us hope, however, that it will not be managed, and that France and Britain will have the courage and good sense to frustrate it. Instead, let them make the proposal an opportunity for that complete and lasting understanding which would be beneficial to both nations, and should secure the peace of Europe for another generation.
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