THE ROLE OF RUSSIA
By STRATEGICUS HE appeal of the Berlin radio to the German garrisons on the Russian front to hold out at all costs appears to be the iult of the successful Russian stroke below Lake Ilmen nnounced on Wednesday morning. Its terms, however, reflect he culmination of the offensive that has been in operation for [most three months. It was not to be expected that so pro- onged an offensive could be maintained without repeated nfusions of fresh blood ; and it has moved forward in a series spurts that correspond to such reinforcements. The advance uth of Lake Ilmen and the movement in the Donetz area, ough Berlin seems to regard them as the heaviest counter- tfensive of the war, may mark no more than the effects of new urges forward and the deferred dividend of an attack conducted ith so much skill under conditions that must impose upon the ermans, even after the rigours of winter are over, a continuous d increasing strain.
For over a month the two armies have reverted, to the anony- ous war that once beferre marked operations of a critical taracter. The Russians do not wish ,to give any information that might be of service to the enemy garrisons, and the Germans ish to avoid supplying evidence of the extent of their retreat.
e most interesting and important fact in the report of the attic south of Lake Ilmen is the number of German dead left n the field. This would suggest a total casualty-list that might over the whole of three divisions. Staraya Russa is no nearer he main railway communications than Kholm ; but it is nearer eningrad, and should have some effect upon the Germans trying o maintain themselves there. Dorogobuzh, the only other place entioned recently, is some 50 miles south-west of Vyazma and nly 20 miles south of the Smolensk-Vyazma railway line. The position about Vyazma and Rzhev how constitutes a salient that hreatens to be cut off and can only be maintained at intolerable train and increasing cost. And the Germans are less and less a position to meet such a cost.
Besides this, the offensive has succeeded in pushing out the ties investing Leningrad, so that its avenues of supply are mmensely improved, although the Germans appear still to main- am n one or two points uncomfortably near them. Considerable teas in the Donetz basin have been recovered, and mines are cc again being worked. To the south as well as to the north he Germans maintain positions, as far as one can see, mainly cause they fear that to abandon them would be to relax their old upon still greater areas. They have undoubtedly lost heavily. he flower of the armies that overran Europe has gone ; and it seems certain that Hitler has been compelled to encroach very insiderably upon his reserves for the spring. That may affect he whole prospect pf the spring offensive. The results would not be so reassuring if it were not certain at they have been secured as much by skill as by the stolid wage for which the Russian soldier has ever been famous. 'en in the days of the great offensive of Mackensen in the last ar, \k!::m there were arms for only a third of the troops drawn actual fighting, the resistance was remarkable. It is also rile to say that the Russians have been notable in history for a main nrilliance in the conduct of military operations. There rie,..!r been absent a suspicion of ruthlessness in the use of Hich is presumably a reflection of (or possibly a natural °raper, a tion for) the lavish provision of them ; but in the esent war the Russian Staff has without a doubt imposed the enemy several changes in tactics in the endeavour to c°Pe lzh its success in dealing with what was before an yincit-4e machine. - It w4, early notable that the Russians were attacking the Panzer acticsa the way laid down by the German text-boToks. They _t off :he tank spearhead and then held up the infantry that ruled -ae shaft. The tanks were dealt with by Russian tanks d art,Ilery, and at times the infantry seemed as if they would stand long after their resistance was safe or particularly useful. But this phase was so decisive for the Germans that they began to weaken the proportion of tanks to infantry in the Panzer divi- sion. By the use of a number of motorised and light divisions, the attempt was made to base the shock and rupture rather upon the mass than upon the speed. It was hoped, in this way, to increase the momentum and at the same time to avoid the possibility of its being checked so easily. This phase appears to have been reflected even in Libya, where' the number of tanks in the division was heavily cut down. In some respects this expedient was more difficult to deal with than the early form of Panzer attack. But the Russian counter-measures were developing all the time ; and, with the organisation of special anti-tank units and the use of an abundance of fine artillery, it too was broken. There was a later attempt to spread the concentration of tanks even further, so that it should be impossible to divide the spearhead from the shaft.
There is another reassuring factor in the Russian tactics. The Germans have maintained their positions in Russia by clinging to a number of pivots, organised with that painstaking. skill that they devote to defence works. If it were not for these it seems probable that they would now be in general- retreat. But the Russians very soon grasped the implications of this policy. So great is the length and depth of the front in Russia that it would be impossible to multiply such strong points over the whole of the area, and our ally saw that the advance could be continued across the intervals between the pivots. In this way the Russian commanders avoid committing their troops to operations that must have been costly, and confronted the enemy with a dilemma. He could either stand firm in these scattered positions until they were more or less completely encircled and then yield at dis- cretion, or he could evacuate them and so place the whole front in jeopardy. In some cases the Germans waited too long, and at the last, refusing to surrender while there was time, were actually annihilated.. This, apparently, occurred at Kalinin, KIM, Sukhinichi, Andrcapol and Toropets. In each case the garrisons were surrounded and refused when called upon to surrender. This is presumably the origin of the legend that the Russians take no prisoners. The costly and useless sacrifice did nothing to save the general position, except that it secured time for reinforce- ments to be brought up.
The stubborn valour of the Germans at least achieved that ; but On a front of such an extent it could not hold up the Russian advance, and indirectly it led to the reproduction of these encircle- ments, since the Russians, driving ahead between the strong points, inevitably tended to encircle one after another. Mere space has an enormous influence upon tactics, and the Russians have always known how to use it. One or two of these points are mentioned in M. Stalin's impressive Order of the Day. It is clear that the Russians are preparing for the development of their campaign against Germany. There is a sober confidence in Stalin's words that cannot fail to sow conviction. He, no more than anyone, thinks the Germans have yet been routed, "still less have they been finished off." He, as much as anyone, realises. -that the more defeats they suffer, the "more furious" will they become. There is mucb still to do. Whether the Germans will be able to launch a full-blooded offensive in the spring or not, there are months of the heaviest fighting to expect in Russia. It is just possible that the Russian armies may compel Hitlei to anticipate his offensive or to throw in his reinforcements in detail. The present offensive may merge into the spring campaign under the guise of tremendous counter-attacks. But at least Russia has destroyed the legend of invincibility of the German armies and is full of confidence that she can complete the destruction of the armies with it. She even appears to believe she can do all that before 1942 is over.
There is one point in the Order of the Day that has its bearing upon the war in the Far East. Stalin says that "as a result of the unexpectedness and suddenness " of the German attack the Red Army "was forced to retreat and evacuate part" of Russian territory. The turn of the tide came when "the momentum of this unexpectedness and suddenness" was fully spent. He goes on to suggest that the war cannot be decided by such a " secon- dary " factor as suddenness, but by factors with a continuing operation—the moral and industrial strength of the nation and the army. Does not this explain the deepening gloom of the Far East? There is a certain momentum attached to the unexpected, surprise attack that may not be reduced to zero until decisive changes have taken place. It is for this reason that every com- mander tries to secure the advantages of surprise by legitimate means.
It must be admitted that there is little to be said of the situ tion in the Far East that is at present reassuring. But Mr. Roost velt suggests that the Allies' main lines of communication still open or have-been restored. Their maintenance has pros more costly than we hoped ; but it is no small thing that President is able to announce that supplies to Russia will be resumed from March 1st. He, too, recognises that the form which the attack came involves the Allies in a longer or shorter period of the defensive. It could be wished that the defensive were being conducted on lines that make full use of organised positional warfare. In Burma the position continues to deteriorate. Only in the Netherlands East Indies does the livint fire of the fighting spirit glow undimmed. We can only hope that it may yet save Java and a foothold in the Sunda Sea.
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