DR. BUSST ' S OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS IN SCINDE AND AFGHANISTAN.
DR. Buis-r is editor of The Bombay Times : his position induced a very close attention to the minutest affairs connected with the Afghan war ; and he appears to have derived much information front private and confidential sources, independently of a careful perusal of the official documents that have been permitted to ap- pear, the publications of the officers attached to the army, and the general correspondence and "news" of the Indian press. Attend- ing to events as they occurred, he had that familiarity with the subjects treated of in published works and " Blue Books," which enabled him at once to see the full bearing of all the points evolved, suggested, or tried to be hidden by the official or demi-official pub- lications. With these advantages, he drew up for the Monthly Times, (a resume of Indian intelligence for circulation in Europe, which he also conducts,) a series of chapters from the origin of the Afghan war up to the outbreak at Cabool ; and the book before us is a reprint of these papers, or a reissue in a different shape.
The arrangement of the Outline is very good in its leading features. It commences with a geographical sketch of the country; a notice of the people ; and an account of its history, and that of its neighbours, so far as is needed to make our Indian policy under- stood. The proclamation of Lord AUCKLAND justifying the war is elaborately discussed; its dissection involving a full review of our Indian and home relations in reference to Russia, Persia, and Afghanistan. The preliminary musterings of the Calcutta and Bombay divisions, with that embodied falsehood the " Shah's army," are described at length ; as well as the civil mismanagement with respect to supplies and means of conveyance. The narrative of the campaign is regularly carried on through the advance to Can- dahar, the capture of Ghuznee, the defeat of Dost MAIIOMED'S attempts at defence, till the entry into Cabool, the establishment of Shah SoojAst, and the surrender of the Dost. The collateral or subordinate events—as the Kelat episode, with the capture of the town and the slaughter of its ruler—are then described, as well as the financial difficulties felt in India, and the insurrectionary move- ments throughout Afghanistan preliminary to the Cabool outbreak. The execution is not equal to the general design. Dr. BUIST seems to have been influenced by his Indian position, and to have regarded every thing as upon the same scale of importance. An attack upon a convoy, or some affair forming but a single link
in the chain of action, is described at the same length as the passage of the Bolan Pass or the capture of Ghuznee. This, however, would have been of little consequence had the minor matters been described with distinctness; but the author appears to have been overpowered by the multiplicity of his materials, and the pressure of working against time. His book is less like a narrative thrown off by the possessor of digested knowledge, than a dovetailing and condensation of paragraphs drawn from various sources. There is something too much, also, of a personal animus displayed. Prominence is given to individuals, less, it appears to us, from their influence on the action of the drama, than from some idea of their personal merit or demerit ; a failing which operates to such an extent as even to injure the effect of the plan by stopping the progress of the narrative. The same defect is visible in the general judgments ; not, we think, to affect their soundness, but to vitiate their tone. For some of these faults Dr. Bum. apologizes in his preface, on the score of rapid composition, want of time for revision, the pressure of other claims, and the relaxing nature of the climate : but, though all these are valid excuses, they only point to the cause of the faults, without in a critical sense affecting the work.
Measured, however, by the unpretending claims of the author on its behalf, the book has considerable merit, and in any point of view its uses. The reader who wishes to acquire a knowledge of the minutiae of the war, especially of its unprincipled impolicy—its financial effects, exhibiting themselves before the outbreak at Cabool—and the conduct and character of the Anglo-Indian politicals"—may learn a good deal from this one volume, (where so many volumes have been already written,) if he will be at the trouble of carefully studying it. Single events, taken by themselves, are also well described ; and powerful passages are frequently met with,—though less, it strikes us, where the writer is dealing with events as a compiler, than where he is throwing out previously- formed opinions upon questions of policy and so forth. Of these we take a few specimens.
TRADE OF THE INDUS.
The glowing descriptions of Burnes appear to have given a very exaggerated idea of the value of the internal traffic of the countries beyond the Indus. It was forgotten that where there was no industry, no manufactures or mineral wealth, no sea-coast or rivers to permit exportation, there could be little or nothing to give in exchange for imports; and that the wants of a population purely no- made must at all times be simple and singularly few. The whole of our com- merce with Persia has never exceeded two millions sterling a year—rarely above one; the total of our trade with Afghanistan certainly never exceeded a million annually, and has very rarely amounted to much more than the half of one. Besides this, the Lulus in reality was never closed save by its own dangerous entrances and shallow depth of water. Lord Ellenborough has opened the Indus as far as Mitlien Kote; and the Sutlej, in continuation of this, to the Markunds, where it ceases to be navigable for the smallest craft. Yet the gross value of the British goods consumed by the countries adjoining does not at present amount to a quarter of a million sterling, and will not in all likelihood be doubled for ten years to come; the expense of maintaining troops betwixt Kurrachee and Bukkur, both stations included, exceeding 600,0001. a year: with a less force it would be unwise to think of keeping these stations at all. The great line of traffic was not along but across the Indus, by the Delhi frontier, or parallel to it at a distance of 100 miles, by Sonmesnee and Kelat. The countries beyond the Indus, besides, have always been open to the free admission of every variety of foreign imports on irremedi-
able a
moderate fixed duty. The chief obstructions in reaching these are Irremedi- able by treaty ; and arise from the attacks of the plundering tribes in the passes, which cannot be restrained save by the payment of a black mail or subsidy.
SUBSIDIZING BARBARIANS.
The manner in which Kamran Shah has manifested his gratitude towards us since 1837, might furnish a salutary lesson as to the nature of these treaties of amity; • bow hopeless it is to attempt to establish an alliance betwixt barba- rous and civilized nations, which can be made agreeable or advantageous to either ; and bow worse than wasteful to fling a nation's wealth away on wretched chiefs who can never be satisfied or enriched—who cast us off the moment we stop our subsidies—whose gratitude extends not beyond the boar of their receiving our gifts into their treasury—and who cmp'oy the bounty we bestow on them for the basest and worst of purposes. It has been seen how incessantly Messrs. Ellice and INPNeil laboured to dissuade fie King of Persia from advancing on Herat, and bow anxious they were to j to note negotiation. When this failed, and an army of 40,003 men appeared under its walls, Herat was first defended by the prowess of an English officer, and then relieved by the descent of an English force on the shores of Karrack. Their requital was, that within two months of the Persian retreat, Major Todd and Lieutenant Pottinger were ordered to quit. The following year another deputation was sent from the army, then at Candahar on its way to Cabool. They remained for nearly two years, and spent 300,000/. in bribes, and in endeavouring to re- pair the fortress. The moment they began to shorten their expenditure, they were dismissed with contumely. The British Miuisters had laboured inces- santly to obtain from Persia the cession of Ghorian, and its annexation to Herat, with a view of establishing it as an independent princedom. They had no sooner succeeded in this, than the object of our solicitude, being now no longer in our pay, made his submission to the Shah spontaneously, and restored to him, under certain conditions as to which we never were consulted, the very possession we had just before procured for him ! These things all stand on official record ; the oldest of them have occurred since the year 1836. Yet we go on wasting millions annually on embassies at the courts of wretches who only hold to us while we bribe them ; when we could purchase them for any service they could perform, for one-tenth of the sum we pay them annually; and for whose hostility, aided by all the assistance all the nations of Europe could. conveniently supply, we need not give ourselves the slightest disturbance I FOLLY OF nussopliortia.
The uniform testimony of travellers had speculatively shown that which the expedition to Khiva practically demonstrated—that for Russia to send an army as far as the Eastern border of Persia was impossible. Our own experience is now sufficient to convince the most sceptical, that were they there, the moun- tain-tribes would cut off their supplies, destroy their cattle, and appropriate their baggage, before they reached the Indus, without our intervention. We could, any day, cut an expedition from the Westward to pieces, by landing a force at Bushire; where the coast-country, with our fleet and supplies, would furnish a base of operations from which Europe and Asia together could not drive us. A Russian army would take twice the time to march from her fur- thest to our nearest frontier that the armies of England would occupy in being transported from the banks of the Thames to those of the Indus.
A NEW IDEA OF INDIA.
It seems throughout to have been assumed by the Melbourne Administration, that such was the policy of Russia that no faith whatever was to he placed in her professions. This postulate has already been adverted to above. We had no right to assume that Count Nesselrode and his colleagues were fools as well as scoundrels. Yet nothing short of fatuity could ever have induced the Cabi- net of St. Petersburg to believe that Russia could have possibly maintained her- self in India, had Britain made her a gift of it ; that she could ever have reached it, even had she attempted to do so; or that, if having succeeded in the inconceivable exploit of placing a hundred thousand men on our frontiers, she could have maintained them on British ground for a single campaign. To any nation in Europe less used to enlightened, liberal, and honest government, less blessed with commercial enterprise and perseverance than our owo, India would prove a ruinous possession.
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