THE WAR IN INDIA.

TlIE current number of the Quorterly Review has an elaborate paper on Russia, Persia, and India ; distinguished by a tone of friendliness to the Government and its agents, and what is more, a substantial vindication of recent British policy and proceedings in Asia, which few would have expected at the hands of that stanch organ of the Opposition, even in charity. To us, indeed, it seems that the Reviewer is, for once, too charitable : for a pretty careful examination of time file of papers laid before Parliament in the passing session, leads us to conclusions considerably at variance with his ; and at the same that it has confirmed some of our pre- vious opinions and speculations, it enables us to correct or qualify others. In short, we rise from the perusal of the Eastern Corre- spondence with a persuasion, that our present war in India, or rather outside of India, is more questionable in its objects and suspicious in its pretexts, and likely to be more extensive and perilous, than any which the British Government of that country has ever yet waged with any Asiatic power.

An army of not less than fifty thousand men, including regulars, irregulars, and auxiliaries, with, probably, not less, according to Indian usage, than ten camp followers for every fighting man, is at the present moment in full march, through a country thr the most part sterile, geographically almost unknown, yet sufficiently known to be inhabited by a robust, warlike, and independent race of men, and distant, by the route which the army pursues, at least fifteen hundred miles from the British frontier.

Let us begin by examining the pretext for the war. For thirty years and upwards, we have maintained, without interruption, an embassy at the Court of Persia, and paid in salaries, in sub- sidies and gifts, in arms and ammunition, between three and

four millions sterling. The object of our Persian diplo- macy was to secure India against French and Russian invasion.

The upshot of our thirty years' expenditure of money, protocols, and despatches, is, that Persia, on our own admission, instead of being a bulwark against the aggression of an European power, has become a stepping-stone for Russia. In a word, by our own show- ing, all our Persian diplomacy has been worse than useless—it has been highly detrimental.

With the Shah of Persia we have three respective treaties, every one of which contains the following article—" If war should ensue between the Persian and Afghan Governments, the English Go- vernment shall take no part in it ; nor shall it give assistance to either party, except as a mediator, at the solicitation of both par- ties, for the purpose Of producing peace." Well, a war arises between the Persian King and the Afghans—as just, upon the part of time thriller, as any ever waged by an European govern- ment, and far juster than most of them. The Prince of Herat, time most westerly state of the Afghans, taking ad- vantage of a moment of anarchy, invades a Persian province, burns its towns and villages, and, carrying oil' twelve thou- sand of its inhabitants, sells them, man, woman, and child, as slaves. The King of Persia, naturally indignant at this out- rage, marches an army to chastise time public robber, and in- vests Herat. According to the admission of the British Envoy, (a man of mark and talent,) twice repeated in the papers laid. before Parliament, the King of Persia has right and justice on his side. Well, then, arc the English Minister, the Envoy, and the Governor-General of India, neutral and quiescent, as in good fiuth became parties to the treaty we have just quoted ? Quite the contrary. They are not only not asked to interfere as

mediators by both parties, but one party expressly repudiates their interference ; while the other does not solicit it, and only accepts it when it has been often obtruded ; as we may see from the follow- ing curious passage of a letter from the Prime Minister of Herat to the British Envoy—" With regard to the coining of the Kujur (Persian) army to this country, I am not, and never shall be, in any way willing to give you trouble or annoyance. Should the Persian Government evince any great desire to come to Herat, do not prevent time advance of the army, or take any trouble in the matter. It is an affair of no consequence. Let them come, in order that they may prove what they are able to do. May it please God the merciful, by the grace and assistance of the Almighty, the steed of their wishes shall not accomplish the journey of their design." This is time polite Oriental fashion of saying " laissez nous faire" to a meddler ; and the recent obstinate refusal of the Prince of Herat to accept a British subsidiary force for his protec- tion, shows that our interpretation is the right one. The English Government is not only not neutral, it directly interferes, and with- out being asked. It is far from stopping even at the point of impertinent negotiation. A roving agent of the Governor- General of India, a skilful engineer, throws himself into the

fortress of Herat, and assists in its defence against the Per- sians ; a squadron of men of war is sent and takes possession of a

portion of our allies' territory on the Persian Gulf; and a great army is marched to dethrone an Afghan chief suspected of pre- ferring a Persian to an English alliance, (some alliance or other being indispensable, and we having expressly refused him

ours except on terms intolerable,) for his protection against a fourth party, the Seiks, who had wrested from him, by a series of

aggressions, a large portion of his dominions. In reference to this conduct, the Persian Minister lbr Foreign Affairs has the following pertinent remarks—" We are ignorant by what evidence the Bri- tish ,Government considers our interference in the affairs of Afghanistan as a mark of hostility against itself. Besides the aus- picious treaty, time observation of the stipulations of which is the foundation of the friendship of time two states, are there any

other treaties or engagements between l'crsia and England relative to which any neglect or non-observance has proceeded from us?

or did time plenipotentiaries of both states forget this point at the time of forming the treaty, that they omitted any allusion to it ? or have new rules of friendship been instituted in this world, with which we arc not acquainted? or does the party which considers itself strongest consider also that the observation or violation of treaties rests on its discretion ?" Here is a shocking charge of Punic thith, made against the government of a civilized country by a people whom we have been accustomed to look upon as faithless barbarians; and the only reply we have made to it, virtually amounts

to this, that out original intention in making the treaty was not accomplished,—that is, that Persia did not turn out to be the

bulwark against Russian aggression which we mistakingly supposed it would. In short, we talk of time " spirit" of the treaty, care- fully avoiding to say one word about its plain and obvious letter.

Against the fimith of treaties, then, we set up necessity and expe- diency. Now let this plea be looked into. Herat is declared to be

the key to the British dominions hi India—the key which is to open the door to the Russians and their allies, the Persians, to libidos- tan. The supposed key, in this case, is surely at a vast distance from the door. Our own army has been already five months on its march from the frontier, backed by all the resources of India and without firing a single shot, unless at a few freebooters ; and there is no trust- worthy intelligence* that it has yet reached the first spot where there

is any probability of its meeting with resistance, viz. Candabar ; in the neighbourhood of which, by the way, it is proposed that we should canton for the whole summer,—by which (for Cabool, the main point, and a month's march through snowy mountains and * This paper was in type several weeks ago ; but even if the Erzcroom news of last week had been confirmed, we should nut have thought it necessary to modify our general view of the subject. narrow defiles, remains untouched) it is plainly pronounced that the affair is to cost us two campaigns. From Candahar to Herat, allowing for halting-days, and supposing no interruption from an enemy, is at least a month's march.- Thus, therefore, with- out meeting an enemy—and, supposing the barren country which it had in its rear and along its line of march could afford it the same supply of food which fertile, populous, and peaceful India affords us—it would take a Russian army five months to march from Herat to the nearest British frontier, with many a " key" to get possession of, and many a door to unlock, between ; and, after that, there is a march of at least fifteen hundred miles further to the chief scat of our power and resources, Lower Bengal and Calcutta ; which would take at least fbur months more, sup- posing the climate, our armies, and our fortresses offered no resistance, and that John Bull (who in one half the whole time mentioned could send an army from the banks of the Thiunes) were to look on with his hands in his breeches-pocket doing no- thing. But to reach India, is not to conquer India, (never so powerful and united as under our own administration,) as any one who will take the pains to read, may learn from the history of its invaders from ALEXANDER to AHMED SIIAIL Most of them never penetrated much beyond the frontier, and the few who established themselves in the North-west, took not months or years, but from one to two centuries, to conquer the East and the South. The truth is, that a Russian invasion and conquest of India is but the dream of a troubled and uneasy conscience. No man in his waking moments and sober senses imagines the possibility of the thing, or fancies it even probable that any nation whatever, without. the command of the sea and of immense pecuniary resources, would be mad enough even to make the attempt. "At the conclusion of your letter," says the Persian Prime Minister to OM of our agents, " there are some remarks about alarm. I am in great astonishment at this declaration, considering the distance of ibur months' journey and the great friendship between the two states, which, during this length of time, has never been interrupted by a hair's breadth on either side. What cause is there for alarm, or for these remote specu- lations, which have never entered into the mind of any one, nor ever will? " It is clear, from these remarks of the Persian Vizier, that his Excellency had, no personal acquaintance with Lord AUCKLAND or Lord PALMERSTON, or he would not have expressed himself so rashly. What, after all, does the reader fancy has thrown the Indian Council

Chamber and the Foreign Office into a turmoil ? The Russian Envoy at the Court of Persia is supposed, contrary to his instruc- tions, to have advised the Shah to attack Herat ; and a Russian Lieutenant of Infantry goes on a commercial mission to an Afghan state ; and this has sufficed to frighten the Foreign Secretary and the Governor-General from their propriety. At the very moment we are making this charge against Russia and Persia, our English officer of Engineers, being the agent of the Governor-General, is fighting in the ranks of the Herattees; and there is a diplomatic agent at Cahoot, and another at Candahar, endeavouring to force treaties on the chiefs of those two places, by which they are to break off all connexion with Persia and Russia. Where is our sense of political justice ? There is not the least doubt but the very measures we are pur- suing lead us into far greater difficulties than the actual invasion of the Persians and Russians themselves could produce. The war with the Burmese cost us fifteen millions. If we escape from the present more difficult contest with a penalty of double the amount, we may look upon ourselves as fortunate. This will add just one.half to the national debt of India, and an annual interest of mi million and a half will add a tithe to the taxes of the already over-taxed I lin- doos. Is it not better to stay at home, administer justly, tax lightly, and thus gain the support of the conquered millions, than squander their money in so dangerous, extravagant, and Quixotic an enter- prise ? The very undertaking itself proves that we arc ill at ease at home, conscious of the instability of our power, and suspicious that we have misgoverned India to the dissatisfaction of its inhabi- tants.

Hour diplomatists and politicians would only keep their hands out of mischief, it is astonishing how perfect a bulwark nature and for- tune have opposed to the possibility of a successfill invasion of British India from the westward. The country lying between Persia and British India is one either of rugged mountains or of uncultivated and almost impassable sandy deserts. On the side of Persia, all but on one narrow quarter, it is a sandy desert two hun- dred miles broad. On the side of India, there is a for more exten- sive one, generally of double that breadth, except at one point also. Even at this last point there is, according to Mr. ELVIIIN- STON, one hundred and sixty miles of " the strongest country " he had " ever seen." The people that an invading army would have to encounter, if not alienated by our ambition, is as formidable as their-country is strong. They are estimated at fourteen millions ; a fourth part of whom, probably, are in that shepherd or noniade state in which men have little to lose and much to gain by war. The ruling people exceeds four millions in number ; and in their manners, habits, and customs, are rather Europeans of the middle ages than Asiatics. " An European," says Mr. EL- PMNSTON, " coming among them, would scarce fail to ad- mire their martial and lofty spirit, their hospitality, and their bold and simple manners. He would admire their strong and active forms, their fair complexions, and European features ; their industry and enterprise, the hospitality, sobriety, and con- tempt of pleasure, which appear in all their habits ; and, above all, the independence and energy of their character. The Afghans

themselves (he adds) exult in the free spirit of their institutions. They endeavour to maintain that all Afghans are equal. I once strongly urged on a very intelligent old man, of the tribe of Mean. khail, the superiority of a quiet and secure life, under a power. ful monarch, to the discord, the alarms, and the blood which they owed to their present system. The old man replied with great warmth, and thus concluded an indignant harangue against arbi. trary power—' We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we arc content with blood—but we will never be content with a master.' "

Here is a broad hint, which, however, we have by no means taken ; on the contrary, one of the main objects of our present expedition is to restore (ominous word ! ) a sovereign defeated and expelled by the Afghans just thirty years ago, and who has for many long years lived within our territories as our pensioner. here is the character of the individual in question, drawn by the shrewd and intelligent Sir ALEXANDER BURNES, at the present moment, by the accidents of position, the most active agent in his restoration ; and the very same estimate of his qualities, it may be added, is given by Mr. ELPIIINSTON, ill his authentic and excellent narrative, thirty years ago. "'The fitness of Shah Soojah for the station of sovereign, seems over to have been doubtful. His manners and address are highly polished, but his judgment does not rise above mediocrity," By the same hand, we have the character of the man we are proceed- ing to dethrone, in order to make way for our man of mediocrity. " The reputation of Dost Mahonmed is made known to a traveller long before he enters his country ; and no one better merits the high character he has obtained. He is unremitting in his attention to business; traders receive the greatest encouragement from him; one in forty, or 24 per cent., is the only duty levied in his territory ; and the merchant may travel without guard or protection from one fron- tier to another,—an unheard of circumstance in the time of the kings. This chief affords a constant theme of praise to all classes ; the peasant rejoices at the absence of tyranny," &e. &c. The man whom we purpose to dethrone has two millions of Afghan subjects, with a military force of twenty thousand horse, ten thousand foot, and fifty pieces of cannon. But the great danger to us, as in- vaders, is not from the power of this individual, but from what Mr. ELPIIINSTON calls " a number of organized and high-spirited republics ever ready to defend their rugged country against a tyrant." These are men who will, unquestionably, not bear a master in the person of our puppet, nor dictators in our own. There may, and probably will be, an apparent submission in the first moment, in the presence of a great army ; but how is future insurrection to be guarded against, but by the constant presence of that engine of unbearable expense ? The Afghans, in fact, have never had a master ; but, on the contrary, have re- peatedly given masters to their Persian and Indian neighbours. No foreign invader of India has ever passed through their country, front ALEXANDER to JENGIIIS KHAN, or from TIMOUR to NADIR, without being attacked and harassed by them. In religion and manners they differ from the Persians, and cordially hate them. They differ still more from the Russians, and do not love them. They would, unquestionably, if not provoked and estranged by our ambitious and domineering policy, have attacked both, in the very remote event of an invasion. But have we any recent proof that the Afghans have not degenerated ? The siege of Herat affords abundance. This one fortress was attacked by the whole disposable force of the Persian empire, with the King at its head, while the besiegers had a regiment of ItiNsian deserters, the flower of' the army. This is our OWII EllVOy'S statement of the attempt to storm--"Tine Persian troops are represented to have assaulted with gallantry, and to have planted their standards three several times in the breach ; but they were unable to maintain their position. The Afghans attacked them sword in hand, with an energy and determination that are represented as having been irre- sistible, and drove them, with great slaughter, across the ditch. Of the killed and wounded its the Persian ranks, more than three- finirths are stated to have received sabre-wounds." These, it must be confessed, are ugly customers : and the matter is assuredly not mended when it is considered that the majority of our army con- sists of Sepoys—of a race, the idea of considering whom as soldiers, would, according to Mr. ELPIIINsToNE, be " thought ludicrous" by the

Afghans. The plain truth is, that we are breaking down, by our as the most formidable portion of the bulwark that lies between us and invasion to the West. We are making, in fact, the flase move- ment of a general, who, finding a broad marsh between himself and his opponent, wantonly crosses it, with great loss and inconveni- ence, posts himself on the opposite margin, and, cutting himself off from his supplies, affbrds his opponent, at the first favourable moment, an opportunity of driving him into the swamp, or starving him to death, or compelling him to surrender at discretion. Such is a fair view of our present adventure ; nor can we sec any ter- mination, utter discomfiture excepted, to the course into which it leads, until it bring us to the very thing we deprecate—contiguity and collision with the power of Russia in Persia.