BOOKS.

THE LATE BARON STOCKMAR.• [THIRD NOTICE.)

WHEN that pet creation of the Vienna Congress, the German Diet, was already in the very throes of death, Stockmar appeared in the old Frankfort Palace as accredited Minister from Coburg,— the only official character he consented to clothe during the German phase, though once, in a critical emergency, he did offer to accept the Premiership, as a possible inducement for Bunsen to act as Foreign Minister. On the day that worn-out institution actually pronounced its dissolution, Stockmar suddenly broke his habitual taciturnness by an emphatic declaration, which must have grated harshly on the ears of his old-fashioned colleagues, " that the time had come when the different, and particularly the minor States, must needs recognise their superfluousness, and voluntarily merge themselves into an Unity, and that this was a last deed of patriot- ism with which alone they could wind up their existence." In this sense Stockmar continued to exert himself with indefatigable activity, by his extended personal acquaintance, in the vain hope that Prussia would yet ultimately have the energy to respond to the exigencies of a policy which he professed to advocate, " because I am a German, and do not know how to separate the weal of Germany from that of Prussia." He transmitted to the King a draft German Constitution, which, indeed, remained unacknow- ledged, but still, on Stockmar visiting Berlin at a moment when some popular tumults occurred in connection with a Radical motion before the Legislature, the King addressed a characteris- tically excited appeal for advice "to a faithful and true German, one well experienced in the world's dealings, and cherishing Prussia's honour and might," as to whether the Cabinet should resign or the Chamber be dissolved ? Stock- mar thought much less was needed. It would suffice to keep order through a trustworthy body of soldiers, and address a short explanatory proclamation which, in reply to the King's observa- tions, he at once drafted on the spot. " And what then ?" inquired the King. "Nothing for the first," answered Stockmar ; " the course of events alone can designate the measures your Majesty may have subsequently to adopt. It is your duty to establish quiet order and security in the capital. That done, it is for the Chamber to continue discussion of the Constitution." The King exclaimed, " Ah, I am in a terrible plight ! My Ministers are all of them,—except Schwerin, who is brave, and Camphausen, who treats me decently. But there are two cases in which I am resolved to abdicate,—the one, if it is sought to drive me to war with Russia, and the other, if I am pressed to accept the Constitution now being hatched in Berlin." Stockmar's note appended to his record of this conversation is, " When I saw the King could not make up his mind, I cut my stay short, and the following morning left Berlin." The allusion to Russia is signi- ficant of an influence which then exercised a fatal ascendancy, and contributed in great degree to that humiliation of Prussia before Austria which was accomplished at the interview of Olmiitz. As Schwarzenberg, in his cynical manner, trod under the brutal heel of despotic repression one recalcitrant limb after the other of the Austrian Empire, he also made the rival German State shrink timidly withiu those limits he arrogantly assumed to assign it. So completely was the vacillating mind of the Prussian King cowed by the bullying tone of the Austrian Minister, that we here learn how Frederick William suddenly excused himself a few days before the appointed time from attending the Congress of German Princes in May, 1850, at Gotha, after having distinctly accepted the Duke's proposal, " in consequence of a threatening note from Austria." In all this policy Austria was acting as Russia's henchman.

Stockmar, certainly no fire-eater by disposition, was clearly of opinion that in spring, 1850, Prussia should have preferred an appeal to arms rather than to perform the miserable part it stooped to. "The pretensions advanced against Prussia by Austria," he wrote in May, " the threats it ventures to address, are the consequences of Russian inspiration. But the Austrian menaces are hollow, for Austria is certainly not in a position to make war on Prussia by itself Russia promises aid because it deems itself assured that menaces will suffice Prussia cannot give

way without letting the worst possible conditions arise for Ger- many and the well-being of Europe. For in hindering the re- organization of Germany, Russia is on the road to assume the same supremacy that enabled it to partition Poland in the last century." In these words we have the keynote of a conviction deeply • DenYwardigkeiten ass den Aspic= des Freiherren Christian Friedrich von Stockmar. Braunschweig. 1872.

stamped on Stockmar. He looked on the kind of dictatorial Pro- tectorate Nicholas had contrived to usurp over Continental Courts as an influence not less noxious than what had been exercised by the First Napoleon, and which, like his, must perforce be thrown off by a combined effort, if the world was to breathe freely. Accordingly,. he sympathised with all genuine national movements. " As a German," he wrote in 1849, " I deplore the Austrian rule in Italy,.

because it will not be able to preserve its provinces without wield- ing the preponderance of a supreme power in all Italy." But for this very reason he was not satisfied with the temper of Lord Palmerston's policy at this period, because he considered it to have overshot the mark, and thus practically contributed through irrita- tion to the check of purposes desirable in themselves :—

" The fundamental axiom of his policy, in which all his colleagues sin- cerely concur, is never to allow the political influence of England abroad to bo applied for oppression of the governed by the governors. He saw the crisis coming in Italy, and hoped by counsel to obtain from Governments timely concession,—from the populations moderation and thankful acceptance of what was offered. Hence, Lord Minto'a mission, which failed in both purposes From the moment the Austrian Government in Italy and the Neapolitans in Sicily had fallen, Palmerston looked on their resurrection as impossible, and conducted English policy as if no human being could ever prevent the erection of a great kingdom in Northern Italy and the separation of Sicily from Naples Though am of opinion our man will remain the same at bottom, I yet am hopeful that his practical good sense will induce him henceforth to proceed with more prudence and moderation in the application of his theories."

The political dangers arising from Russia were at that period aggravated by the contemporaneous existence in France of an element at once mysterious and adventurous. Already in 1849, the ultra- conservative Czar had held particular conversations with the Ambassador of the French Republic, General Lamoriciere, on the latter's return to Paris, concerning the state of Germany, and the Prussian King's doings in a direction tending towards a consolida- tion of the country under his ascendancy. " The Emperor and the General were completely in accord about German unity. The latter has no particular sympathy for Russia, but his hatred of Prussia is unbounded ; he will do all he can to undermine

the German designs of Prussia, and rejoices that on this point the interests of Russia should concur with those

of France. The General seems even to wish a war because in his opinion it would be the best means for relieving France of its internal difficulties." These advances were followed up by subsequent friendly communications, as when Russia privately informed Louis Napoleon in 1850 it would by force oblige Prussia to execute the Danish Treaty. With the ambiguous policy of his whole reign, Louis Napoleon sought to pick advantage by craft out of the quarrels of others, without himself running bold risks, and so sent Persigny to Berlin in 1850' on a mysterious mission, the nature of which is now revealed by a communication of the Grand-duchess Stephanie of Baden—Louis Napoleon's cousin—to a friend of Stockmar's. This princess said,, "The annexation of the Hohenzollern States to Prussia was my doing. I said to my relatives, The small German States, particu- larly Baden, are rotten ; do what you will, you will not maintaia yourselves ; Prussia alone has vitality, and whoever would make himself a fair bed, must hold together with Prussia. If France wishes to be friendly and at peace with Germany, this can be only on the basis of an alliance with Prussia, for nothing else can furnish support. All this I wrote at the time to my cousin, the President: It was I who suggested Persigny's mission, to ascertain what Prussia on its part could do for the President. For you under- stand that to make France disposed to such an alliance, the Presi- dent must be enabled to present it with a gift, even though this be a small one. Could not at least Landau be ceded ? " Stockmar's anonymous friend reminded the Grand-duchess how completely Persigny had failed in finding an ear at Berlin, and that such " plans were built on a policy the age for which was entirely gone past." But what evidence can be more illustrative of the tortuous underground policy pursued by Louis Napoleon through- out his reign than these words from the mouth of his trusted relative, and what can be more striking than

to find here named, as the price of collusion, the identi- cal territory for which in 1866 a demand was actually made ?

Immediately after the Coup d'Etat, a very prevalent impression was abroad that Louis Napoleon would pounce down on Belgium while conniving at the conquest of Piedmont by Austria. Stockmar, though fully alive to danger from this quarter, did not think that the material force of France for such projects was increased by

the success of his deed. " I do not see the possibility of openly attacking Belgium and Piedmont. What I fear is that it may be held good policy to wage a covert and underhand war against these two States. In hostility to constitutionalism on the Continent, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Louis Napoleon concur. It is there- fore more than probable that the latter has already sought at Petersburg to concert with the absolute Governments." And again he writes, " On one condition alone can Louis Napoleon preserve the insecure friendship of the absolute Powers; it is that he rules France despotically within its present boundaries. If he attempts to over- step them, they will every one become his enemies. But despotic governments will be permanently put up with in France only if Louis Napoleon's foreign policy brings a palpable advantage, that is, extension of territory." The effects of the Coup d'Etat were, how- ever, not confined to-foreign circles. In this country it stood directly connected with Lord Palmerston's dismissal from office, and on this matter our volume contains what may to many among us be its most interesting, but also its most disputed pages. There are in this por- tion passages which may appear indiscreet. For us these passages have an especial value as conveying the indisputable guarantee that the volume is no garbled memorial, clipped by the timidly reticent fingers of a courtly fellow-worker, and that the compilation is solely due to inspiration that had no official origin. This fact, therefore, heightens the value of the testimony borne freely throughout the volume to the merit of illustrious personages, and notably of Prince Albert. We saw Stockmar before dissenting in some points from Lord Palmerston's policy, and it is nothing new that ever since the Pacifico affair Prince Albert was far from satisfied with his general tone. In August, 1850, the Queen wrote a Memorandum, which was at the time communicated by Lord John Russell to Lord Palmerston, and accepted by him, wherein she in- sisted on having points of policy distinctly submitted to her before action was taken, and on the Minister not presuming arbitrarily to modify, of his own authority, a line of policy that had been agreed upon with the Queen. It was in consequence of Lord Palmerston having presumed to express his direct approval of the President's action to Count Walewski, after the Cabinet had concurred in the propriety of nothing being done which could be construed into any kind of interference in the internal affairs of France, that the Queen wrote to Lord John Russell for explanation. Lord Palmerston gave none for four days, during which he reiterated his views in a despatch to Lord Normanby, and then the Queen called on the Premier to act in accordance with her Memorandum of 1850. It appears from a notice of Stockmar's that Lord John at first showed hesitation, and sought to evade the necessity of so extreme a measure as the dismissal of the renowned Foreign Minister. The part ascribed in bringing about this event to an influence traced back to Prince Albert was soon known, and caused much public comment. The circumstances, distorted through the exaggerations common to popular report, tended to bring on the Prince unpopularity, and to represent him for a while in the invidious character of one using the advantages of his position to meddle unduly in the political concerns of this country. It will be remembered how the subject of the Prince's position came under discussion in both Houses of Parliament, when the leading men of both parties concurred in testifying to his uniformly and strictly constitutional action in language be- yond suspicion. Time has since dissipated a cloud of absurd stories that then attracted public credulity. It is interesting, how- ever, to read in a letter, dated October, 1851—therefore after the commencement of the Crimean war—Stockmar's candid ad- mission that there had been political justification for Palmerston's policy in regard to the Coup d'Etat :—" It had been long Palmer- ston's maxim that an alliance between France and England could keep Europe in check ; out of this maxim, and his passionate dis- like of the Orleans, I explain his adventurous action in having publicly approved Louis Napoleon's deed of violence immediately on

its perpetration To be fair, I must admit that he then saw more clearly into futurity than all of us who viewed the Coup d'Etat through the spectacles of ill-humour. For Russian frenzy made of the Anglo-French alliance a political necessity, and Palmerston can justly say he recognised this necessity before any of us. In truth he over-shot us all." During the opening period of the Crimean war the British public was still under the full impression of the erroneous notions arising out of Lord Palmerston's dismissal from office, and misjudged men and things accordingly. Prince Albert was believed to be exerting a backstairs influence to paralyze in the interests of foreign Courts the British arm which the thoroughly English Palmerston was eager to strike out against the Russian autocrat. We have quoted enough to convince any reader that Stockmar, for one, was certainly not open to the charge of Russian sympathies, and the evidence is conclusive that in these views he was in thorough accord with Prince Albert. When Lord Aberdeen kept saying "that even though Russia were not in good faith, it yet behoved to treat enemies as if they were sincere folks, the Prince replied that this was right in a certain sense, but that it was not necessary to believe in this sincerity and act according to such faith." What the Prince and Stockmar throughout strove to bring about was not a policy of faint-hearted subserviency to Russia,, but a combined action on the part of the four Powers so as to avoid war on the part of England with no ally but France. It was the danger involved in getting dragged into an arduous enterprise, with none but the slippery Napoleon to back us, which was present to their minds, and therefore they did look with some uneasiness on the almost reckless impetuosity which Lord Palmerston rather ostentatiously manifested, because it tended to commit England to a perilous partnership, and hindered the consummation of that political combination, in conjunction with Austria and Prussia,. which if brought about would have effectually curbed Russia, and done for the welfare of Europe the inestimable good of cementing these central powers in alliance with England. This, they thought, would have afforded a better guarantee for peace than any to be obtained through a risky war in single conjunction with a doubt- ful ally. Events have partly justified these views, for the results of the Crimean war certainly were not what they might have been, and that this was so is certainly due to Louis Napoleon.

And here we must bring to a close our notice, which, though unusually long, is still too short to give a full summary of this. most interesting volume. In 1857 Stockmar left England for good. "I shall be seventy this year," he wrote to Leopold from Windsor ; "I am no longer able, mentally or bodily, to fulfil the arduous and exhausting duties of a paternal friend,—of a tried, confessor. I must take leave, and this time for ever. The laws of nature will have it so. And well for me that this I can do with, a clear conscience, for as long as I have had strength left me I have striven to conscientious purpose. The consciousness of this is the only reward I deserve, and my dear master and friend, with- full knowledge of things and persons, gives me spontaneously and gladly, from the bottom of his heart, the testimony that I am deserving thereof."

To Coburg Stockmar retired, where he died in 1863, having survived the Prince Consort and seen King Leopold struck down by mortal disease. The year before he had seen the Queen at Coburg, and the interview was painfully touching. Over his grave a memorial has been put up to his memory, " by his friends- in the Royal houses of Belgium, Coburg, England, and Prussia." But the beat monument will be found in these pages. There are not a few in this country, though the number is being lessened by the inexorable scythe of Death, who had the advantage of being brought into intimate relations with Stockmar. The present writer has had the opportunity of hearing some of them talk over their recollections about him when stirred up by the perusal of this. volume, and it has been to him matter of deep interest to note how all, without exception, concurred in speaking of his character with that same tone of unbounded affection which made Lord, Palmerston say to Bunsen, "I have come in my life across only one absolutely disinterested man,—Stockmar."