TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE GREAT NON SEQUITUR.
MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL, doubtless with good cause, is afraid of the Germans, but he is more afraid of the Daily News, the Nation, and the Manchester Guardian. That is the position in a nutshell, and that is why we find ourselves in a situation so paradoxical, and therefore so dangerous, as that disclosed by Mr. Churchill last Monday. If the welfare of the Empire were not at stake there would indeed be something supremely ridiculous in Mr. Churchill's speech. It is the greatest example of a non sequitur on record. With all the oratorical ability and finesse which he possesses in so high a degree he set forth Germany's bold and businesslike bid for the command of the sea, and with an unerring instinct for rhetorical effect he piled up the tale of peril. There was the crisis and the entrance to the path of duty indicated by a master band. But just when we were expecting to be told to enter that portal and tread that path, just when we looked forward to being nerved to a high endeavour, the unexpected happened. Instead of Mr. Churchill asking us for a great sacrifice to meet a great menace, or for a manly effort to cut through the toils which were gradually closing round us, we had the lame and impotent conclusion of his practical proposals. To ward off the dangers, terrible and imminent, which he had disclosed we were told that next year we must build five battle- ships instead of three, the year after no more than we had always intended, the year after that one more than we had intended, the year after that no more, and in the fifth year one more. That was all except that we are to supplement a policy of piecemeal addition to the Fleet by a piecemeal addition to our bluejackets.
Never, as we have said, was there such a non sequitur.
Consider the premises. Never was the peril greater ; never was naval competition so keen; never had any Power shown such deadly and deliberate persistence as the Germans in the attempt to outbuild us ; never was " the awful sudden- ness with which naval warfare can reach its decisive phase " so manifest ; never was it more clear that " cool, steady, methodical preparation prolonged over a succes- sion of years can alone raise the margin of naval power." Such was the syllogism. What we have just described was the conclusion. It was as if a doctor had told a patient in his most awe-inspiring and faithful manner that his condition was most serious; that no mere palliatives could be of any avail ; that the only treatment promising recovery, and therefore the only treatment that an honest man could advise, must be radical and fundamental, involving great sacrifices—and then, when he had worked his patient up to expect a demand either for an operation or else for some cure which would cause a dislocation of the patient's whole business and an exclusive devotion to a cure, had wound up with the recommendation that the patient should spend a Saturday to Monday at Margate ! What should we say of a doctor who prefaced such advice with talk of the deliberate and insidious march of the disease and of the absolute necessity for meeting it with all the energy at the disposal of the patient ? What are we to say of Mr. Winston Churchill ? What are we to say of a man who draws a blood-curdling picture of suddenness of attack and then recommends slowness of preparation ?
In the case of the doctor we should say that in all probability ho had met a selfish, reckless, and tyrannical wife on the stairs — a woman who cared more for her own plans than for her husband's welfare — and that she had told him in peremptory terms that he might say what he liked, but that she was not going to agree to any plans or any system of treatment more heroic than Saturday to Monday at the seaside ; that if he chose to upset the whole family and household by recommending anything beyond that, she could find plenty of doctors who would give different and better advice, and who would not interfere with her arrangements in the ridiculous way which he proposed. Mr. Winston Churchill, we suspect, met an equally reckless and deter- mined person on the stairs, and with a similar. result. Accordingly be determined to ease his conscience by making an alarmist speech, and, to retain his position as medical adviser, by recommending, not the treatment in which he believed, and to which his words plainly point, but one which would not upset the plans of the most important member of the family.
We have called Mr. Winston Churchill's practical pro- posals the greatest non sequitur on record, but his calculated failure in ratiocination did not stop there. Within the great non sequitur lurks another false conclusion almost as great. In the spring Mr. Winston Churchill alarmed the nation by letting it be known that he considered that we were spending more naval strength in the Mediterranean than we were justified in spending, considering the situation in the North Sea. Accordingly he withdrew his battle- ships from the Mediterranean and brought them into home waters. In doing this, however,it was clearly suggested that the Admiralty were not abandoning our control of the Medi- terranean because they liked doing it, or because they were indifferent to the sacrifices involved, but solely out of dire necessity and because they dared not sacrifice the greater need to the lesser. But now, though nothing has hap- pened but newspaper criticism—newspaper criticism, of course, which was thoroughly justified—Mr. Churchill has reversed his policy, and is going to place in the Mediter- ranean ships which will make our position there far stronger than it has been for many years. Further, he is doing this by taking away powerful ships from the North Sea—that is, from the place where so short a time ago we were told their presence was essential. In other words, though the situation in the North Sea, on Mr. Churchill's own showing, has become in the last three months not less, but more, menacing, the conclusion from the premises has been absolutely reversed. We are no great believers in.
strict logic as applied to human affairs, and we hold, in this particular instance, that the last conclusion is better than the one before last ; but we are bound to say that changes so rapid, even when sound in fact, do not inspire us with confidence in the judgment or steadfastness of the changer. Such quick changes may possibly be condoned in the field of pure party politics. They represent a state of mind which cannot be tolerated in a Minister who has the fate of the Empire in his hands.
In our opinion nothing has done more to discredit Mr. Churchill as a statesman than his handling of the Mediterranean problem. A good deal might be said for holding firmly to either of the policies he has adopted within the last three months. Nothing can be said for bolding them both. In our own opinion Mr. Winston Churchill misjudged the Mediterranean problem so help- lessly because he considered it in isolation and not in accord with our foreign policy as a whole. As must be clear to any one who engages in the task, now so fashion- able and indeed so necessary, of counting up Dread- noughts, what we want to avoid is a combination of fleets to be used against us. In plain language this means that we want, in the case of war, to avoid having to meet the Italian as well as the German and Austrian fleets.
which are certain to act in combination. Now, to put it bluntly, the question whether the Italian fleet will be used to turn the scale against us or will remain neutral depends upon our naval strength in the Mediterranean. It depends, that is to say, upon whether Italy can be given a good excuse, or will have no excuse, for saying to her allies —allies, remember, who are capable of putting very great pressure upon her by land : " We cannot take hostile action against Britain unless you can guarantee us the command of the sea in the Mediterranean. Our commitments on its African shores are so great that unless a free passage from our coasts to the coasts of Tripoli is guaranteed to us, and our army in Tripoli is thus secured from starvation, we must remain neutral." But, if we are weak in the Mediterranean, Italy cannot say this, for Austria and Germany would. reply : " You must stand by the Triple Alliance or if you do not we will compel you. You have nothing to fear from Britain. We provided against that contingency by forcing her to abandon the Mediterranean."
If we are the strongest naval Power in the Mediter- ranean there will be sufficient excuse for Italy to remain neutral—a neutrality, by the way, which will be consonant with the natural impulses of her people. In other words, the maintenance of our sea-power in the Mediterranean will increase our strength and decrease the strength of our enemies indirectly as well as directly. Weakness in the Mediterranean will bring on still greater weakness, or, rather, will bring into being a still greater force against us. " To him that hath shall be given ; but from him that hath not shall be taken away, even that which he hath." This is a point of foreign policy which must never be forgotten in regard to the Mediterranean. Mr. Churchill ignored it when he made his ever-to-be- regretted plunge for abandoning the Mediterranean. Happily the Cabinet as a whole, or the Imperial Defence Committee — we know not which — remem- bered it, and insisted upon the false step being as far as possible retraced. But though this has been done there is still a huge remainder over of injury and weakness. Our position as regards Italy has received a shock from which it will take a long time to recover. Up till last May the Italians believed that our sea-power would always be maintained in the Mediterranean, and in private, if not in public, recognized that some day it might have great consequences in the shaping of their ultimate policy. Now it is to be feared that they have not the same confidence that they had before, but are haunted by the thought that supremacy in. the Mediterranean is not a fundamental of our policy, but that a change once made so recklessly and so unnecessarily may be made again.
Mr. Churchill's blunder was probably the worst false step we have made in naval policy for a century, and it will take us many years and much expenditure of naval strength to live it down. In other words we must now, in order to reassure Italy, keep many more ships in the Mediterranean than we should have had to keep there had Mr. Churchill been content to hold his tongue, or, rather, not to speak till he had consulted. his colleagues and the Com- mittee of Imperial Defence. It is the old, old story : the politicians blunder, and the people have to pay for it—and very dearly.
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