TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE NEW GOVERNMENT — ITS WEAKNESS AND STRENGTH. FEW Governments act precisely as they promised to act, or end as they were expected to end-, and this one may not. On the surface it appears to start as a weak Government, not remarkable for ability, with many elements of division, hampered by many indiscreet speeches, and with strong temptations, particularly in foreign affairs, towards an unpopular policy of surprise. The delay in accepting power, the demand for assurances from Mr. Gladstone, the excessive size of the Cabinet resulting from unwillingness to offend anybody, the deference paid to Lord Randolph Churchill, and the arrangement made with Mr. Parnell, are all signs of weakness, —weakness in the very centre and heart of the Administration. There is a palpable lack alike of the energy and the fixed purpose which could alone enable Lord Salisbury to overcome the external difficulties in his path, such as the want of a majority, the absence of commanding minds within the Commons, the advancing shadow of the first Democratic Election, and the temporary character of the whole Administration. Only a grand stroke can give the Cabinet weight in the country, and a weak Cabinet searching about for the opportunity of making a stroke usually falls into sometrap, and often encounters some disaster. Moreover, there is no latent approval of the new Government perceptible in the country. So far as we can perceive, the sentiment of the majority is one of amused watchfulness, which would deepen into suspicion were it not felt that the substance of power still rests with Mr. Gladstone, and that he could at once arrest the Government on any dangerous or highly unpopular course.
Nevertheless, as we have said, expectation is often wrong, and it is just possible that the new Government may display an unlooked-for efficiency. It is almost sure to be moderate in internal affairs, partly from want of time, partly from fear of Mr. Gladstone, and partly from the danger of provoking internal divisions. There must be compromises if the two sections are to work together, and immoderate men reduced to moderation by pressure are sometimes strong, doing in a vigorous way the things they think too small to be worth doing. If the Government is thus moderate it will content the country, which fears escapades, and it will for a time be unusually safe. To turn it out again and go through another crisis before the elections would be most inconvenient and irritating, even if it were not practically difficult, for the Government will, for the time, have the support of its own party, of the Parnellites, of the malcontents who have always voted with it, and of a majority of the Members who have abandoned all hope of sitting again,—altogether making up at least a formidable minority. This sense of safety should inspire the Government with both courage and calm, more especially if it awakes to the truth that it has no chance of escaping dismissal by the new Parliament ; and if it is courageous, calm, and moderate, it may yet aclieve a position such as we describe below, not entirely satisfactory to it, but still far from discreditable. Of course, its appreciation will depend also upon its action in foreign affairs ; but here also its position is not hopeless. Those affairs, though they do not weigh upon the popular mind so much as Tories think, have of late produced in the people a certain sense of worry, and a mere escape from worry will be regarded with satisfaction. So much Lord Salisbury may be able to secure both from the German Governments and from France, as well as possibly from Russia ; for it must not be forgotten that all those Governments have wishes which would be forwarded greatly if the British Government quietly admitted them to be unobjectionable, or outside its sphere of action. Such assurances require no Parliamentary sanction ; and as Lord Salisbury cannot do great or venturesome things—as he cannot, for instance, threaten Russia needlessly, or require Germany to quit the Pacific, or annex Egypt—he may obtain, especially on the Valley of the Nile, a partial and temporary freedom Of action which will seem to Englishmen an improvement on the present situation. Indeed, it will be an improvement, for we have not succeeded there ; and any working compromise which would make Egypt safe for a time, yet not make a heavy addition to the permanent liabilities of the Empire, would be acceptable to the people, who, though probably not wanting' Egypt, and certainly not wanting it in defiance of Europe, are fretted with a sense of partial failure in Egypt till they are growing sick of the very word. We doubt Lord Salisbury succeeding in any project of the kind, for he is essentially a litterateur, and fond of dramatic surprise.; but he may. He has the advantage as well as the disadvantage of lying under a political sentence to be executed next November—a position which, like a mortal disease, deadens one's sense of the value of fame or popularity—and he has one other of which the world takes too little heed. He is relieved by his position from some penalties which he would otherwise have incurred by his party passion. No one is blamed for not performing impossibilities ; and it is open to Lord Salisbury, whenever he has arranged a plan for Egypt, to say frankly that this is not the plan he should himself have most preferred, but that it is the best working compromise open to a Premier who is not master of the Parliamentary legions. In other words, if he is extremely moderate, and can deepen the Conservative bias of the German Powers, and can conciliate France, he might have a comparatively free hand, drawing strength from the very pressure which in appearance makes him so weak. The situation itself is not as complicated as it was ; for Lord Granville, whom it is the fashion just now to scold, though unsuccessful in Egypt, has brought negotiations with Russia to a working compromise ; has arranged an excellent and advantageous modus vivendi with Germany in South Africa—an arrangement unnoticed here in the din of the crisis—and has so settled the New Guinea affair that Australia will have time to grow before that trouble is on us again. When she has grown, say, into her teens, it will not matter much what Europe may think about the reversionary rights to New Guinea. An eagle does not quarrel long with a kangaroo, at all events for grass. That dangerous complication, moreover, the informal war between France and China, which threatened to revive the old question of the right of search, is over, and so is our perennial quarrel with Pekin about the taxation of opium. The clouds are clearing, and Lord Salisbury may possibly, if he allows his wilfulness to be controlled, reap the benefit of the quieter air, and be able to say in November that his party, with its "firmness," and its patriotism, and all that, is successfully unravelling the ravelled skein.
Will that measure of success, if it comes, secure it a reward at the elections ? Not one whit ; but it may secure one after them. We are endeavouring to write quite frankly, and will try to state clearly our impression of the position. Nothing will alter the result of the election. The great majority of the English. householders are just now moderately Radical—in regard to the House of Lords strongly Radical—and as the Reform Bills have so rearranged the electoral districts that an election will be almost a plibiseite,—that is, will express the opinion of the total majority,—the new House of Commons will be moderately Radical, and that in a proportion which will make Mr. Parnell's action comparatively unimportant. No question of foreign affairs, however much it may influence the cultivated, will seriously modify the Radicalism of the five Millions of voters, and scarcely any question of home affairs, unless it be an outbreak of crime in Ireland, which might drive public opinion into a repressive mood. We see no escape from that conclusion, and regard any attempt of Lord Randolph Churchill to steer policy in the hope of catching votes with entire tranquillity. But English Radicals are curious people, and want at heart, while keeping power and using power pretty continuously, to see somewhere or other a decently trustworthy alternative Government which they can employ upon occasion, the frequency of the occasion being regulated partly by accident and partly by the character of the head of the alternative Administration. If he is a Peel, he will be called in often ; if a Lord Salisbury, much seldomer. If the Tories are successful during these six months they may occupy the position of that alternative Government, which is a dignified one, for they will have removed the impression of moderate men that they are " unsafe " even in administrative work, and the impression of immoderate men that they are reckless rowdies. This last, which has been excited by the reckless abuse of Mr. Gladstone, operates more strongly North of the Trent than we can expect Lord Salisbury to believe ; but it would be removed by. a period of moderate, and, above all, calm, administration. The English people have a pretty steady belief that office sobers, and if they find it is so they will overlook, or rather forget, a good many of the lawless outbursts which have preceded the period of sobriety. This is the best position to be obtained by the Tories during their short lease ; but we are not sure, if they yield to the pressure upon them instead of growing irritable under it, that, with all their apparent disadvantages, this is unattainable.
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