MODERN CAVALRY.* THE progress of military science has always been
unusually rapid in the years immediately following the great wars. This is a natural result of the leisure afforded by the return of peace to active minds, which have learned under the teaching of experience the defects of the existing systems of armament and field operations. Thus, after the close of the Crimean War, the science of gunnery and the improvement of projectiles advanced with tremendous strides. The French Army that fought at Solferino was in almost every particular of efficiency and equipment superior to the French Army that captured the Malakoff ; and the lessons of the Italian War, in their turn, were not lost upon the conquerors, though apparently they were unheeded by the conquered, of Koniggratz. But of all the wars of modern times none seem to equal in fertility of original suggestion the great Civil War for the maintenance of the American Union. That momentous struggle differed so widely in its conditions from the scientific warfare of European Captains, that it called forth of necessity expedients and inventions which a campaign in Saxony or Flanders could not have discovered. In the Seven Weeks' War the Prussian commanders availed themselves to some small extent of the lessons of the campaigns on the Potomac and in the Shenandoah Valley. But the full extent of the obligation under which military science rests to the unfettered and plastic genius of some of the American officers who commanded on one side and the other in the Civil War has yet to be appreciated in Europe, and especially in England. Choked by red tape, and blinded by the dust of old prescription, our officers have shown a somewhat arrogant contempt for the novelties in field operations introduced during the American War, and are inclined to talk of the Generals, especially on the Federal side, as mere amateurs in their art. The first systematic attempt to apply the new principles of military science to the organization of the English Army comes not from an English officer, nor yet from a soldier of the Civil War, but from a Canadian Colonel of Militia. LieutenantColonel G. T. Denison does no discredit to the military organization of the infant State of British North America. Though it has not been his fortune to see much service in the field,—which is all the better for his country,—he has studied his profession with the zeal of an enthusiast. From an intimate friendship with some of the most famous officers of the extinct Confederacy, Colonel Denison is able to speak with authority of many important operations of the Civil War, and his work deserves the consideration of English Cavalry officers because it presents a familiar subject in a new and suggestive light.
The object of Colonel Denison's volume is no less than to propose a revolution in the organization of the Cavalry arm. Some of his suggestions have been anticipated by Sir Henry Havelock, but the remainder are drawn from the unexplored tactical experience-a of the American War. He has been assisted in the compilation of material for his courageous attack on the existing system of Cavalry organization by several distinguished commanders the Confederate armies, by General Early (Sheridan's antagonist). General Fitzhugh Lee, General Stephen D. Lee, and General Rosser. Colonel Denison's criticisms and proposals of reform extend over the entire field of a cavalry officer's duties, Manilation, drill, equipment, and tactics. Only two main points are likely to attract general attention, but these deserve notice. Tile first relates to organization, the second to equipment. The first is the substitution, to a large extent, of "Mounted Rifles, or light dragoons, for cavalry, in the strict sense, or "cavalry of the line." The second is the substitution of the revolver for tla sword in charges of cavalry. The former suggestion means nothing more than a return to th° old ideal of "dragoon regiments." These, which originallY Iver` intended to supply a farce of cavalry prepared at any time to dismount and fight as infantry soldiers, have now come to be merely 41 cavalry of the line." A dismounted dragoon nowadays would be little better off than a sailor on a lifeguardsman's charger. But in the American War, when the organization of cavalry regiments had to be hurried on rapidly and roughly, it was soon discovered on both sides that heavy dragoons and lancer regiments of
untrained men were practically useless. For the guerilla warfare of Virginia and Tennessee, accordingly, "mounted rifles" were adopted on both sides as the favourite arm. With mounted rifles both Stuart and Morgan, as well as Availl and Sheridan, fought for four years. The advantages of mounted rifles are supported in Colonel Denison's book rather by examples than by arguments ; he gives the following summary, however, of their merits :—
" The services performed by the dragoons or mounted rifles were very -valuable all through the Confederate war for independence. And with-out doubt this force was far more available and useful, as well as suitable to the natural features of the country, than regular cavalry would have been. Another great advantage in mounted -rifles is that they do not require the same amount of training and instruction as the regular cavalry, and very often the recruits are more adapted to the service, as -well naturally as by habit, than to tho cavalry of the line. If armies are -raised hurriedly, or new levies are called out, the mounted force should be composed of riflemen or dragoons. Men in civil life learn nothing of the use of the sabre, but most men know a little about the use of firearms ; at any rate, the same time is not required to create the same ,skill in the use of the rifle, and under any circumstances it is not so -important."
With all its readiness of organization, however, the growth of the cavalry arm in the Northern armies was slow. At Bull's Run, in General McDowell's command of 40,000 men, there were only 4' seven companies, hardly one small regiment," of cavalry. Towards the close of the war the Federal Generals had under their command "80,000 mounted men, almost all mounted riflemen."
The mounted rifles were generally organized in considerable compact force, and had usually attached to them a small train of horse artillery with their adjuncts. Each command formed an army in miniature. Colonel Denison gives some interesting examples of their operations :
"Just before the battle of Chancellorsville Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, and a battery of horse artillery under Major Pelham, were at Culpepper, with pickets along the Rappahannock watching the fords, when General Averill of the Federal Army advanced, and attacked the picket at Kelly's Ford, overpowered it, and captured more than half of its number. He then moved on in the direction of Culpepper Court House. He soon encountered Fitz Lee coming down to meet him, a stubborn and 'desperate fight at once began, and it was only by extraordinary valour, and with severe loss, that Fitz Lee was able to maintain himself until the Confederate cavalry being dismounted, and placed in good position perpendicular to the road, enabled him effectually to check General Averill's advance. The battle raged until late in the evening. Averill then withdrew and recrossed the river, the Confederates closely pursuing him. In General Stuart's celebrated raid around M'Clellan's army through Pennsylvania in October, 1862, the tactics of his mounted rifles proved their value. He had an encounter on his return with the enemy near Poolesville in Maryland. He thus describes it in his official report : I ordered the charge, which was responded to in handsome style by the advance squadron (Irving's) of Lee's brigade which drove back the enemy's cavalry upon the column of infantry advancing to occupy the crest from which the cavalry were driven. Quick as thought Lee's sharpshooters sprang to the ground, and engaged the infantry skirmishers, held them in check till the artillery in advance came up, which under the gallant Pelham drove back the enemy's force.' In this raid General Stuart at the head of 1,800 cavalry marched from Chambersburg to Leesbargh, 90 miles, with only one hour's halt in 36 hours, including a forced passage of the Potomac—a march without a parallel in history. On another occasion a squadron of Federal cavalry dashed up against Pelham's guns at a gallop, and having dismounted and placed a number of men behind a stone fence, not more than two hundred yards distant, poured in such a fatal carbine fire upon the gunners and artillery horses as to seriously endanger the battery. Two squadrons of Southern horse endeavoured to dislodge them by a mounted charge, but -could not succeed, being broken by the murderous volleys of dismounted cavalry : it was only by a vigorous cannonading with round shot against the stone fence that Pelham was able to dislodge them, the solid balls scattering the fragments of stone with terrible effect among the men behind it."
The favour shown by Colonel Denison to the revolver as compared with the sabre as the weapon for cavalry charges will startle English military critics even more than his preference for 41 mounted rifles." He supports his view by the avowal that he Was originally an admirer of the sword, but abandoned his predilection before the experience of the Civil War. He further supplies a number of instances in which the failure of the sabre in a melee and the success of the repeating pistol are demonstrated :— _ "In the History of Morgan's Cavalry an account is given by General Duke of a charge by Morgan's men upon a Federal regiment of infantry at Shiloh in 1862. He says : We came close upon them before the Federals fired. They delivered one stunning volley, the blaze almost reaching our faces, and the roar rang in our ears like thunder. The next moment we rode right through them, 807126 of the men hying to cut them down with the salt e, and making ridiculous failures, others doing real execution with gun and pistol.' General Stephen 1). Lee says '!early all the cavalry used by the Confederate States, and in fact by both sides, was nothing more than mounted riflemen. The sabre was done away with by the Confederate States' Cavalry pretty well, and rarely used in action by either party, and in my opinion has lost much of its merit since the revolver has been brought to such perfection The sword is a good weapon, though but little used during the recent war. It has lost much of its effectiveness by the improved revolver, with which the cavalryman will make the dashing charge with more confidence. My experience was that the cavalry man was timid with his sabre in fighting against the revolver, and for the least excuse will drop the sabre for the revolver, and in many instances is compelled to do so in actual conflict by irregularities of ground, obstacles, ct:c. I don't see well how the sword can be dispensed with permanently, as some such weapon is required in case ammunition should be exhausted ; but if any weapon is to be dispensed with, I should say the sabre in preference to the rifle or revolver. These latter two, rifle and revolver, are indispensable. In every instance under my observation, the revolver replaced the sabre with the morale, with the trooper, and against the enemy. Again, in the hand-to-hand conflict, which rarely occurs now (owing to the improved firearms), the momentum or pluck decides the affair before the eighteen rounds in hand are exhausted. And the momentum with good cavalry is as readily obtained with the revolver as with the sabre, my observation being that the sabre is timid against the good revolver. The revolver is the all-important weapon with the cavalry man in motion, and is indispensable in his equipment.'"
The particular weapon which Colonel Denison favours is Colt's old patent, being more serviceable for rough work than any of the European improvements. Of this revolver he thus sums up the advantages :—
"The revolver is apparently the most deadly arm that has ever yet been invented, and experience has shown that in practice this is most certainly the case. The sword, lance, carbine, long rifle, or cannon do not have the same murderous effect • the reasons for this are numerous. In the first place, it is only used at short range, when men are mingled together in close fighting, and most of the shots tell. Then it is not a weapon that is aimed by two sights, requiring care and steadiness in the adjustment. The man merely looks at the object and pulls the trigger, and the sympathy between the hand and eye is much more likely to carry the ball straight, than an attempt at mechanical and mathematical precision of aim under fire, when men do not distress themselves with too much accuracy in bringing the two sights and the object into a right line. If men were taught, even with long-range rifles, to look at the objects, never to mind the sights, but make their own allowances for the elevation of the muzzle for the range, the firing would be much more effective than under the present system ; because men are taught that which, under fire, nine out of every ten will not follow. The best sportsmen are those who look at the objects they fire at without sighting them at all along the barrel. Indeed we have known of splendid shots who always when shooting keep both eyes open, certain proof that they used no sights. Again, in close fighting, the revolver's bullet cannot be warded off like a sword or lance thrust. If it strikes, the wound is severe. It does not require the speed or weight of the horse to give it impetus, as does the lance, or the perfect training of the charger which is necessary for an effective use of the sabre when mounted. Again, it reaches farther thad sword or lance, and men armed with these weapons might easily be shot down before having an opportunity of getting near enough to use them."
Colonel Denison is the Commander of the Governor-General's bodyguard in Upper Canada, the principal regiment of cavalry maintained in the Dominion ; and as far as peaceful drill is concerned, he has had an opportunity for carrying out his theories. We cannot rate his practical experience, which was limited to the operations resulting from the Fort Erie Fenian raid, as highly as he not unreasonably is disposed to do.
Having noted what is valuable and interesting in Colonel Denison's book, we are -bound to protest strongly against the unfortunate element of partizanship he has infused into an argument which should have been kept decorously free from such an injurious combination. Colonel Denison, like many, indeed, we may say like most, of his brother Canadians, is more Southern than the Southerners themselves. He has a true cousinly dislike of the Yankees, and loves the slaveholders almost with a brotherly affection, because they nearly succeeded in breaking the detested Union. He talks throughout the book of "the Confederate war for independence," using the phrase constantly and formally as a sort of phylactery to mark a fixed and ineradicable faith. He loses no opportunity of drawing comparisons between the Federal and Confederate officers in a sense very unfavourable to the former. He seldom takes his examples of successful cavalry operations from the Northern side of the account, but from the exploits of Early, Stuart, Morgan, and Mosby. Take the following spleenful attempt to disparage the military capacity of the men who really crushed the South. Speaking of the utility of "mounted rifles" for dismounted service, Colonel Denison takes up his parable against the Federal commanders :
"It was by adopting this system of using cavalry that Sheridan in 1865 cut off the retreat of Lee's army, and caused its surrender at Appomatox Court House, thereby ending the war. Sir Henry Havelock, in his work on the Three Main Military Questions of the Day, places great stress on this instance as a strong proof of the value of
cavalry dismounted in a pursuit, and to a .certain extent he is right. But it must not be forgotten that the South were completely exhausted at that time, and overpowered by overwhelming numbers, and would probably, although not so quickly, have surrendered from sheer inanition. Sir Henry Havelock also rates Sheridan too high. Sheridan was as poor an officer for the popular reputation he had as ever lived, unless perhaps General Grant. Both these men were lucky enough to come into command after the strength of the South had been worn out in numerous fruitless victories over 31'Clellan, M•Dowell, Pope, Burnside, Meade, Hooker, ex. M'Clellan and Sherman were the only Generals the North had, and they were very fair officers, but of course not to be compared with Lao or Stonewall Jackson. Colonel Hasbrouck Davis seems to have had more of the real cavalry spirit than any cavalry officer of the North, although I have never heard what became of him. I suppose he was not a politician, or we should have heard more of him. General Averill was also a most skilful and efficient cavalry leader, very far superior to Sheridan."
We regret that this outburst of injustice and bad taste, which it is unnecessary to attempt to answer, deforms an otherwise able and instructive work. The prejudice it manifests is apparent through the entire volume. We fear that this will be scarcely a quality unwelcome to the majority of professional readers to whom Colonel Denison appeals ; but we nevertheless could wish it had been absent from a book which, to claim the authority it deserves, should have been able to call itself strictly impartial.
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