RUSSIA AND FINLAND.
IT is a situation of pathetic interest,—this clash between one of the clearest claims of national and constitu- tional Right which the world has ever seen, and the Most tremendous embodiment of Might, at any rate for purposes of suppression, that exists, or, with the possible exception of the Roman Empire, ever has existed. To Western eyes there seems to be no imperfection whatever in the case of Finland for the maintenance of her traditional political privileges. When, in 1808, the troops of the Czar Alexander I. overran the Grand Duchy of Finland in such overwhelming strength that any hope of its recovery by Sweden became obviously futile, it may be said to have been open to him to incorporate the conquered territory in the political system of the Autocracy. From that step he deliberately, and in the most emphatic manner, refrained. The circumstances under which, in 1809, he assumed the sovereignty of Finland, not as Czar, but as Grand Duke, and received the oaths of allegiance taken by the members of the ancient Estates of the Realm, amounted to one of the clearest and most solemn contracts ever entered into between a Monarch and his people. In the Emperor's "Act of Assurance" to the Finns, of March 15th (27th), he avowed that he had been pleased to "confirm and sanction the religion and Constitution of the country, also the rights and liberties hitherto enjoyed, according to the Constitution, by each Estate in the said Grand Duchy in general, and by all its inhabi- tants, high as well as low, in particular" and pro- mised to "maintain and keep firm and int.;,ct all these privileges and statutes in their full force." And, what is, if possible, even more significant, he accepted, as an entirely satisfactory -pledge of fealty, an oath in which, while swearing, on March 29th, to have him as their Rightful Sovereign, the Estates swore also "to maintain unflinchingly the fundamental laws and the Constitution of our country, such as they are at present accepted and valid." Having entered into the contract embodied in the mutual declarations we have quoted, the high-minded Czar not only loyally acted up to its spirit, but did his best to debar those who should come after him on the throne of All the Russias from behaving as if they were anything but constitutional Sovereigns of Finland. In an edict of 1816, quoted—as are the above extracts—in the excellent article on the subject by Dr. J. N. Reuter, of the Helsingfors University, in the current number of the Nineteenth Century, his Majesty inti- mated his wish "both to disclose the maxims that have been and henceforth will be Our guides with regard to Our Finnish subjects, and also for all perpetuity to confirm the assurance granted to them by Us as regards the maintenance of their separate Constitution during Our reign and the reigns of Our successors." The successors of the Czar Alexander I. have, in each case, solemnly renewed, at their accession, the pledge under- taken by that distinguished Sovereign. Not only so, but under Alexander II. the Constitution was spontaneously strengthened by the enunciation of the principle that the Diet should not wait to be summoned by the Grand Duke, but should always meet at least once in five years. And, as a matter of fact, it has met every third year since 1882. More- over, Alexander III. gave the Estates the right of taking the initiative in legislation to an extent far beyond what they had previously possessed. ( It is pointed out, indeed, by Mr. Nisbet Bain in the current number of the Fortnightly Review, that the late Czar, under malevolent advice, dis- regarded in some respects the constitutional rights of the Diet. But the matters affected by this action of his were not such as came home "to the business and bosoms" of the people generally ; and, on the whole, down to the other day, there can be no doubt that Finland enjoyed a prac- tical, and in some respects a distinctly enlarged, fulfilment of the contract under which it became subject to the House of Romanoff. Profound indeed, then, is the national mourning—that is the word used by the Times corre- spondent, and apparently with no exaggeration—at the position in which the Finns now find themselves./ A scheme of "Army reform" is being relentlessly pressed forward which proposes that the annual draft of young men for the Army shall be increased from a little under two thousand to seven thousand two hundred, and further that the surplus con- tingent thus raised shall serve, not, as is the case with the present Finnish army, within the borders of their own country, but in any part of the Russian Empire. The period of active service is by the same measure proposed to be raised from three years to five. No words can be necessary to illustrate the crushing character of the military burden with which the Finnish people are thus threatened. But that is only a part of their grief. In order, as it seems, to prevent, if possible, the danger of a direct conflict on the military question between the Finnish Diet and the Imperial Government, there was issued in February last a manifesto by the Czar, which involves the gravest changes in the Finnish Constitution. The document in question, while affirming the Emperor's intention to maintain in their full force the existing statutes affecting the promulgation of laws "touching exclusively the internal affairs of Finland," stated that his Majesty had found it necessary to reserve to himself "the ultimate decision as to what laws come within the scope of the general legislation of the Empire." And it is further conveyed, by reference to an accompanying draft of "Fundamental Statutes," that all such cases of general Imperial legislation will be decided upon, so far as they affect Finland, by the Russian State Council, after communicating, indeed, with the Finnish authorities "in order to ascertain their opinion," but, as is clearly understood, not in order to be bound by that opinion.
A very little reflection will show that the discretion claimed by the Czar in regard to the classification of public questions affecting Finland, coupled with the power to be assumed of overriding the Diet on such matters, may involve, and probably would involve, the virtual nullification of the constitutional privileges of the Grand Duchy. It is in the interests, as they read them, of the Empire at large that an influential party in Russia have for many years set them- selves to bring about the abolition of provincial and other differences within its boundaries ; and there are few public questions—whether of education, of religion, of coinage, or of taxation—on which ingenious Slavophil bureaucrats would not be able to make a plausible case, from their point of view, against the pregrvation, without change, of existing Finnish institutions. cm these circumstances, it is by no means surprising to learn through the Times correspondent at Helsingfors that the two Committees of the four Estates -- of the Finnish Diet, which have been examining the situa- tion, report to the Diet in terms of the utmost gravity. On the military question a compromise is suggested. But the principle of the necessity of Parliamentary assent to any settlement of the matter is absolutely asserted. Arid on the general constitutional issue it is expressly and unmistakably laid down that the Imperial manifesto of February last, and the statutes annexed to it, "having been issued without the approval and consent of the Estates of Finland, and also in other respects contrary to the order prescribed by the funda- mental laws of the country, cannot in consequence have in Finland the sanctity of law." It is recognised that the Czar may find it necessary to adopt some special method of making laws common to the Empire and Finland, but the Estates humbly " expect " that, if so, his Majesty "will graciously submit to them for treatment, according to the fundamental laws, proposals in view of such alterations as may be necessary." And, in conclusion, it is advised that the Estates declare it their "imperative duty to hold fast to the law and right which in 1809 were solemnly guaranteed to the people of Finland to be irrevocably maintained."
This does not mean a menace of overt resistance. Of that, we believe, there is no question whatever. But it does mean an appeal, perhaps, to European public opinion, and certainly, above all, to the conscience of the Czar and of the Russian people. There is no doubt as to the success of the first appeal, if it is intended. But may we not hope that the second and principal appeal will be successful ? We do not pretend to treat with contempt the desire of Russian politicians of influence to bring about the greatest possible political and religious unification within the Russian Empire. It is quite possible to understand the attraction of such an ideal to the minds of statesmen brought up in a non-consti- tutional school. But it is surely an ideal the realisation of which may be pushed too far, and purchased at too great a sacrifice of human happiness, and, we must add, of Imperial good faith. In the case of Finland, there is no pretence that constitutional privileges have been abused. A distinct but quite loyal and wholesome national life has been developed, in accordance with the declared aims of Alexander I. We trust that his young and large-minded successor will see the wisdoikand the equity of falling back upon those far-sighted aims. Finland cannot be Russified. Its people will not accept existence without those liberties in the hereditary enjoyment of which they have always lived. They will not rise in insurrection against their Grand Duke if lie destroys their liberty. They will simply, though very sadly, turn their backs on him and his overwhelming bureaucracy and Army, and cross the seas to lands where, under the Union Jack or the Stars and Stripes, they can recover, with interest, the freedom of which they have been deprived. It can hardly be in accordance with the views of any rational school of Russian statesmanship thus to lose what was until a few months ago a contented, loyal, and prosperous principality.
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