THE REAL OBSTACLE TO UNIVERSAL PEACE. T HE Mug correspondent at
the Hague tells us that there was one phrase in M. de Staal's opening speech at the Peace Conference which was very much remarked on by his colleagues. It was the reservation that the system of arbitra- tion to be introduced would be entirely optional, and that the Powers could accept it "sans run saerifier de nos esperanee,s ultirieures." We do not wonder that this sentence excited special interest and comment, for in it lies the spell that 411 must shrivel up and bring to naught all the highest and most sanguine hopes that have been entertained in regard to the Congress. Within the narrow compass of that little parenthesis lurks the true reason why the Congress, though it may, and we trust will, do a great deal to stop wars on mere points of pride, on boundary disputes, or on foolish mis- understandings, will never be able to put an end to war or bring in the reign of universal peace. When the Emperor of Russia made his proposals last autumn' we ventured to assert that they could not accomplish anything heroic because they were inconsistent with the fundamental aspira- tions of the nations of the earth. If, we argued, every one was not only at this moment content with the status quo, but would also be content with the present status quo in the yews to come, there could be no sort of difficulty in agreeing to disarm, and to make peace the law of the world. But to say this is to assume that none of the Powers have designs for the future,—i.e.' entertain those "ulterior aspirations" of which M. de Stag speaks. Yet we all know perfectly well that all the Great Powers have "ulterior aspirations,' and that those aspirations are the things to which they are most devoted, and to which they cling most passionately. For example, the hopes of France (not immediately, but for the future, that is, her ulterior hopes) are fixed on the restoration of the provinces, the acquisition of the hegemony of the Latin race, and the creation of a great Colonial Empire. Germany, again, believes that she will lead the Teutons to a place of power far higher than has ever yet been achieved by them, and will hold Asia Minor, and perhaps Mesopotamia, as her subject provinces. Russia, on the other hand, looks forward to a Slav leadership in Europe and to the triumph of the Greek Church. The Empire of the Slav when it comes is to be the greatest that the world has seen. England, on the other hand, looks forward to consolidating her Empire, and to allying it with the other great Anglo-Saxon State, and so giving the keys of the world into the hands of the English kin. But carry out these aspirations to their necessary con- clusions, and it will be seen that they conflict at a hundred points. Looked at closely, the ulterior hopes of one Power cannot be satisfied without defeating the ulterior hopes of others. But,' it may be said, these ulterior hopes are mere dreams, and need not concern practical statesmen.' Agreed that they are dreams, but it is just such dreams as these for which men will most willingly die. Look at the case of the Monroe doctrine. One of the ulterior hopes of the United States was to keep European in- fluences out of the New World, and to possess a new uni- verse, as it were, untouched by the old animosities. That was a dream, no doubt, but it was one for which the people of the United States always have been willing to fight. To say that a thing is a dream is, indeed, not to banish it from the theatre of human conflict, but to do the very reverse. The one thing that man will never willingly allow is the deprivation of all possibility of fulfilling his dreams and aspirations. It is the same with nations. When, then, the nations agree to plans of arbitration, subject always to M. de Steal's proviso that they are to sacrifice no part of their ulterior aims and aspirations, they really take back with one hand what they give with the other. They may agree to arbitrate about certain dull and ponderous questions of high policy, but they will jealously guard their freedom in regard to 'the little things a man cares about,"—to borrow Mr. Kipling's happy phrase. We may expect, then, that a scheme of arbitration will be readily agreed to, and that it will be used in regard to all the things which nations do not really care about, but that when the esperanees ulterieures are touched there will still only be one arbitrament left, the arbitrament of the sword. In a word, M. de Staal's reservation has shown the world clearly, and in a flash of lightning, whit we essayed to put forth in detail last autumn,—namely, that the only really effective way of securing the reign of peace would be to persuade the nations to give up their national aspirations. Once persuade Russia and Germany, France and Italy, England and America, that all their hopes and aspirations for increased national power are vain and useless things, and that they had far better remain as they are, and war will be banished from the world. Till that is done the cannon and the sword will always menace the earth. Look at the wars of the past. In almost all cases they have arisen from a conflict of national aspirations.
But though we feel obliged to point out that M. de Staal's necessary, nay, inevitable, reservation shatters so many of the hopes conceived for the Peace Congress, we do not in the least desire to deny that the Congress will do some, nay, a great deal of, good. If the proposals it adopts were to stop one small war a century they would be a real benefit to civi- lisation. As we suggested last week, it is quite possible that the mediation scheme will enable certain not very bitter quarrels to be settled without war. Even in the case of a conflict arising out of the clash of national aspirations, it might happen that mediation would be successful. The mediating Powers, for example, might be able to show that a national aspiration was only apparently, and not really, threatened, and might be able to obtain guarantees against any injury to the esperanees ulterieures of the alarmed nation. This power of explaining matters and of putting them in their true light which will belong to the mediating Powers--i.e., the Powers acting as seconds—may indeed prove of immense value. It will, at any rate, do a great deal to prevent the panics that arise when nations grow em- bittered. Where people now say : That means war,' they will only say : That means appointing seconds to consider the cause of quarrel and suggest a way out.' To put the matter shortly, we believe that after the Congress, as before, the real sources of great wars—conflicting national aims and aspirations—will remain with us, but that something will have been done to stop wars on trivial disputes, wars on so- called points of honour, and guerres des elections. The system likely to be agreed to at the Congress will, for instance, throw a good many impediments in the way of a despot who, like Napoleon III., conceives that he must make war in order to give stability to his throne, and to interest anci amuse the people of his capital.
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