U2, JACK SIR,—Your comments on the U2 flight and the
Sum- mit fiasco have been profoundly disappointing. The size of the issues alone warranted your more serious concern and the fact that virtually no major develop- ment in Russian policy since the war has been anti- cipated in the West should have prompted more humility and a lot less smart-Aleck conjecture.
Whatever the reason, the Russian attitude changed and hardened with Eisenhower's assumption of over- all responsibility for the flight. Adlai Stevenson's view that 'Khrushchev could hardly ignore threats to continue to violate Soviet air space and preserve his leadership at home' is at least a valid explana- tion of his behaviour.
Had the State Department confirmed instead of denying James Reston's disclosure that further flights had been banned the course of history might conceivably have been changed.
It is clearly possible that Khrushchev was more disturbed by 'the betrayal of the Camp David spirit' than you are ready to believe. It may well be that :n order to gain the maximum propaganda value from their action—and to refute beyond argument any State Department protestation of innocence—the Russians allowed the aircraft to penetrate 1,500 miles into their territory before shooting it down.
Of course Khrushchev destroyed whatever hopes we had for the Paris meeting; obviously he will grab what opportunity he gets for driving a wedge between America and her allies; and it goes without saying that he no more expected President Eisenhower to walk the streets in a white sheet than did anyone else.
But the Western world must have leadership and the President of the United States, whoever he is, will have to exercise it. We all have the right to ask that he should show better judgment, be more in control of events and be less indecisive in the face of
crisis than President Eisenhower has been at this time It would have done no harm if you had said 50.—Yours faithfully,
12 Si. Ethelbert Street, Hereford
PETER BROWN
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