TOPICS OF THE DAY.
ENGLAND AND THE SUEZ CANAL.
THE Government has recovered by a single act of far-sighted courage the reputation damaged by the many failures of the present Recess. The purchase of the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal on behalf of the British Government is a most important step, and one which it required no small courage and decision to adopt. It is no light thing for a British Minister to promise £4,000,000 sterling, and engage in an enterprise which may cost millions more, without consulting Parliament, and that the Cabinet has ventured to do this is an evidence of energy which is as unexpected as it is agreeable. The negotia- tion, moreover, has been managed in the most reassuring way. Its entire history, its suddenness, its complete success, its audacity —for the news will fall like a thunderbolt both in Paris and Con- stantinople—serves to show that on some points at least there is firmness in British counsels ; that our Government can still ensure perfect secrecy in a most important transaction ; and that our statesmen have not forgotten that national wealth, though sometimes an embarrassment, can some- times also be used as a most potent weapon. The country would, we believe, applaud the act even if it were less wise than it is, in its satisfaction that the Govern- ment had acted in one foreign affair with energy, speed, and secrecy, and its content will not be diminished as it reflects on the wisdom of the act itself. Mr. Disraeli has purchased, at a cost which to England means nothing, and which, indeed, may possibly prove to be almost nominal, the profit from the Canal ultimately exceeding the low interest paid by this country for money, a predominant vote in the management of a Canal which is of vital importance, not only to our commerce, though it is probable that the whole Asiatic trade of Europe may yet pass through this channel, but to the permanent security of our Asiatic possessions. He has saved Egypt, moreover, from a collapse which might have precipitated all manner of questions with disastrous haste, and has announced, as we conceive, the commencement of a novel and sound course of action in the East.
It would be affectation to deny that the British Government has purchased a preponderating vote in the Suez Canal for political reasons, and though Continental publicists will declare the transaction a mystery, it is not hard for English- men to understand what those reasons are. There can be little doubt, or at all events, there is little doubt in this country, in spite of denials at St. Petersburg, and cross- purposes at Vienna, and silence in Berlin, that the Eastern Question is about to be reopened ; that Turkey is in danger, either from within or without ; and that Great Britain is called upon to decide once more upon her course in the East. There can be little doubt either that her usual course of appearing, to use M. Lemoinne's expression, as "the sworn and authorised [patentee] protectress of the independence, the sovereignty, and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire " is no longer supported by public opinion. Twenty years of painful experience have disenchanted Englishmen with the Turks. They will not spend their soldiers or their money any more to preserve an empire which only exists by ignoring the commonest principle of civil justice, namely, the equal rights of all creeds, which is detested by the majority of its subjects, and which is so badly administered, that with almost bound- less resources it has borrowed £200,000,000 in fifteen years, and so wasted the money that it is compelled to repudiate half the Debt. A new policy must be found, and the British Government has found one which may be unsuccessful, but is, at all events, decided, intelligible, and moderate. Turkey must defend herself. If she proves unable, and the ultimate arrange- ment of her affairs threatens the interests or the honour of Great Britain, her voice will be given for a course which, if neces- sary, she will support by force. What that course will be is not signified, or is, perhaps, not yet decided, though if the Times has been inspired, it is clear enough, namely, to support Austrian claims to the reversion of European Turkey as against Russian—but meanwhile she guards her one im- perative individual interest by assuming the control, not of Egypt, as M. John Lemoinne asserts, and still less of Egypt and Syria, but of the arm of the sea through which her commerce and her soldiers must henceforth pass to Asia. If the Khedive, who obviously understands and approves the arrangement, can remain independent enough or friendly enough to Great Britain to make the Canal safe, he may, if he will abolish slavery by the Indian method, remain as safe as Scindiah or the Nizam, and pursue in his own way the policy of civilising Egypt. Many Englishmen may wish for the new and burdensome task 9f civilising Africa from Alexandria to the Lakes, for that is what the absorption of Egypt would imply; but the Govern- ment will avoid that task if possible, will support and amelio- rate the Khedive's Government, and will await calmly the result of the great experiment, merely insisting against all the world, and at any hazard, that she shall remain the chief trustee of her and the world's most important highway. That may be—we will discuss that point directly—a selfish policy, but at least it is not a treacherous one. Turkey remains as before; the Khedive is not only unmolested, but supported ; and the countries of the Mediterranean have an additional guarantee for the safety of their indispensable road.
But, retorts M. John Lemoinne, this is a cynical policy. If you " protect " Egypt, why should not France protect Belgium ? France does protect her ; France is one of her guaranteeing Powers, bound, as England will be in Egypt, to remain friendly- while the conditions of her friendship are fulfilled. Does M.. Lemoinne mean to assert that if Belgium massacred French- men, or declared war on France, or entered the Germanic Federation, or fell into such hopeless anarchy that transit was unsafe, the French Government would be bound to look on unmoved? And if it would not look on unmoved, in what. respect would its motives differ from those which actuate Great, Britain on the Nile ? The neutrality of Egypt is as vital to us as•• the neutrality of Belgium to France, and we are securing it by the same means,—namely, by insisting that its control, or rather, that the control of its special right of way, shall pass, into no foreign hands. Even if we held Port Said, we should. be in no better position as regards Egypt than France is in as. regards Belgium, she possessing by nature the south-westward_ gates of the little State. The truth is that M. Lemoinne, like most French publicists, is indignant that England. should reap the benefit of M. de Lesseps' work, annoyed. that she should not need firm French alliance in the East„ enraged that she should be prepared to resist in certain con- tingencies a Power to which France looks as her most hopeful immediate ally. He is therefore, with grave imprudence, help- ing to create an anti-English excitement in Paris, which may easily be carried to injudicious lengths. Nothing could be more ill-judged, or wasteful in the interests of France herself. M. Lemoinne may rely upon it, that while this country upon all Asiatic questions must and will take a course of her own,. guided only by her conscience and her interests, as indifferent to friendships as to menaces, she is nevertheless the firm friend, of the French people, rejoices in the immense prosperity of France, and if it were conceivably possible that diplomacy could restore Lorraine to France, would be enthusiastic for the project. That she failed France in her hour of need may be true,. as it may also be true that the failure was unavoidable, but the way to make her repent is not to taunt her with "cynicism" for a change of policy forced on her by the hopeless folly of her- former ally and the disruption of all European alliances. Would_ France help us to defend the Turkish Empire? Not a bit of it.. M. Lemoinne says he never believed in Turkey. Well, England_ has come round to his opinion, and is shaping her policy at last on the basis of his thought. Is it for that reason that M. Lemoinne, the spokesman of the Moderate politicians of France„ denounces her policy as cynical, selfish, and unprincipled ? In deciding that Egypt must remain as Egypt now is, independent of any European Power, whom is England betraying V We do not know that the sentence is worth adding, but we• may add that there is no reason to believe that Mr. Disraeli's• action will offend any Power, except perhaps France and Turkey.. The "Imperial Powers," whatever their designs or whatever their innocence, must long have known that whenever Turkey was shaking, England, whether she protected Turkey or not, would protect the Suez Canal, and beyond the natural commotion which follows any serious and dramatic coup, we- expect no consequences from an act which merely announces that England takes the course which every man of foresight in Europe knew that sooner or later she would be compelled to take. We expect the most serious protest to come from M. de Lesseps, who, always disinterested and always patriotic, may not find in the now assured solvency of his great enterprise sufficient compensation for the extinction of his dreams.
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