TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE SEIZURE OF KIAO-CHOW.
WE do not see why Great Britain should mind the German seizure of Kiao-chow Bay. If Russia thinks, as is alleged, that her reversionary rights are interfered with, Russia is quite strong enough to defend them, and, as a rule, is quite prepared to do it. If Japan sees with regret the settlement of another European Power on the coasts of Northern China, let Japan protest, or, if it likes, do its best to blow the German fleet out of the water. It is no part of our national business to protect Russia unless we are bound by treaty to do it, or to provide against possible menaces to the maritime future of Japan, which is not, after all, the least aggressive or most unambitious of States. It is not even part of our business to protect China, though if Pekin were not what Pekin is we could imagine that very impressive moral arguments could be advanced upon that side. There is a certain cruelty in the way in which the great half- drowned whale is being sliced up by every crew that can get near enough to it to use its knives. Russia, France, Japan, Germany, everybody is having a cut, and the huge beast is too languid and fatigued even to spout. The Government of China is, however, too completely non- moral, too cruel, and too cowardly to excite the sympathy of the civilised world, and, at all events until it will do something for itself, it must be considered diplomatically a derelict, and left to any spoilers that may come. As for our own interests, we cannot see that they are sufficiently affected to justify intervention. The Germans are not invading or threatening the part of China which we should claim if the Empire were partitioned ; they are not the stronger, but the weaker, for a naval station so far from the centre of their resources ; and as for any advantage to their trade, they have a right to get any advantages they can, provided they get them fairly. They would have no right, to use the most intelligible of illustrations, to buy concessions at Pekin by bribes to officials in order to keep us out ; but if they think it profitable to undersell us, that is the ordinary struggle of commercial men.
It is time that some one should speak out upon this matter. We detest the dog-in-the-manger policy which some of our statesmen regard as adroit, and which too many of our contemporaries are prepared on all occasions to support. We English have gone about the world for a century snapping up every position of vantage we can obtain, opening up new trade routes everywhere, and even conquering broad regions for the sake of trade, which, as we think, follows the flag, though France does not find it so, and then when any Power pursues the same policy we fall into fits of righteous indignation. What kind of moral right have we to say that Russia, wanting as she does to turn Siberia into a Canadian Dominion, shall not find a port of exit for her vast possession a little to the south of the ice-bound regions of the Siberian coast? How long should we be, if Canada had no port, before we made it a primary object of our policy to get one for her ? Or what claims have we, who hold Hong-kong. Labuan, and Singa,pore, to declare that Germany, with her large Far Eastern trade, shall not have a port in which the warships necessary to protect that trade shall be refitted ? If anything that is ours is taken away or menaced, or if we are violently prevented from acquiring our fair share of influence or commerce, let us fight, and fight with our whole hearts ; but let us not give way to these unreasoning fits of jealousy and spite. We do not like Russia, as an auto- cratic State hostile to many of our just claims ; but her rights are, and must be, precisely those which we claim for ourselves ; and so are those of the German Emperor, though he is not only hostile, but would dearly like, if be could only do it, to take away our splendid possession of South Africa. There is not a, man in England who, if our Government while seeking reparation for the murder of Englishmen had seized Kiao-chow, would not have exulted in that "instance of energetic action," and the fact that we have been anticipated does not alter either moral or international law. It may make it more necessary for us to reoccupy Chusan, or to select some still more advan- tageous position ; but the only Power with right of pro- test or resistance is China herself. She is both injured and insulted by the Emperor's invasion without a declaration of war, and has a clear right to drive out his Marines if she can ; but she must protect herself. Whether any Power has any right to cut slices out of an organised State in order to make itself stronger or to extend its trade is, of course, an arguable question ; but most cer- tainly, unless we are prepared to affirm that China is• civilised, the argument does not lie in our mouths. How did we come by our score of maritime cities scattered all over the world ? To object to German action in ICiao-chow,. except upon grounds which would impeach our tenure of half our property—we got Bombay without violence. or menace, or ousting savages, and it is the only place we did so get—is to play the part of dog in the manger, and is unworthy alike of our reputation and our maritime supremacy.
Whether the German Emperor is wise in making such a settlement so far away from his own dominions is a different matter. We should doubt it, though as a rule a nation, like an individual, knows its own business best. We take it that he has two principal objects. One is to facilitate an extension of German trade, without which, as be thinks, the Social Democratic party will become too formidable ; but it is uncertain whether the trade will be much facilitated. Germany may be able, if seated in Kiao-cbow, to squeeze China a little more easily ; but she is already influential at Pekin, and already enjoys all the advantages of the most favoured nation. It is supposed that Kiao-chow—or Port William, as we suppose it will be called—will grow into a great city ; but that is not certain, for trade does not like the German methods of interfering with liberty, and it is quite possible that the trade, like that of Tonquin, may fall into English hands. It is only a hope that Germany has obtained, and for it the Emperor has incurred bitter resentment in Russia, a secular difficulty with China, and probably a quarrel with the financiers of the world, whose hold over Chinese Customs duties will be very roughly interfered with. His second object, no doubt, is to commit his Parliament to a large outlay on the Fleet. Here,' he will say, is a position of great advantage which my energy has acquired for you ; but to keep it I must have cruisers, and for those cruisers you must pay.' It is a subtle argument most adroitly addressed to the German love of position and the German desire for profit- able trade, and if it succeeds William II. must be recognised as a, master in a certain kind of statecraft ; but suppose it fails. Then the Emperor will either have to quit Kiao-chow, or to hold it as a most expensive, yet scarcely defensible, seaport-town eight thousand miles from Germany, and in no way formidable to the states. men of Pekin. And he may fail, for though Germans are patriotic, they are desperately afraid of fresh taxation ; they doubt whether they can compete with Great Britain upon her own element, and in a contest of purses ; and they are not sure that the " world-wide " policy of their Sovereign will bring them anything except new reasons why the control of the Empire cannot be trusted to any representative body. It is not for foreigners to prophesy on such a subject, but we should be little surprised if the seizure of Kiao-chow deepened the distrust of his people in their active-minded master's power of selecting good objects for his obviously far-reaching ambition. It would be a wonderful thing to build a railway to Mars ; but would sensible people fond of their cash be likely to subscribe ?
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