TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT.
NIVE do not see any reason for either minimising or ex- aggerating the "Agreement" which Lord Salisbury has concluded with the German Government. It does not solve the immediate Chinese question, which, indeed, as we shall shortly show, it leaves almost untouched, but it is an important agreement nevertheless, likely to be most beneficial both to Great Britain and Germany. It puts an end, to begin with, to a number of international suspicions, fears, and perhaps projects which were menacing Europe, if not with disasters, at all events with panics, which when they are on a large scale interrupt human progress nearly as much. There can be no coali- tion against this country while Great Britain and Germany are allied. Even the imagination of French Nationalists, who just now are feeding themselves with dreams, would shrink from the idea of risking an " adventure " in the face of that huge mass of power. True, the agreement is only for China, but allies cannot stand by each other in one quarter of the world and threaten each other in another quarter, and the mere fact, therefore, that Germany and Great Britain have combined to do a specified and very big thing solidifies all political specu- lation, and in Europe, at least, is the weightiest of all possible guarantees for peace. The disturber, who ever he is, may have to reckon with Great Britain, Germany, and Austria—that is, with the strongest Power on the seas and the men who control four millions of trained soldiers—a prospect which would daunt even a new Alberoni. At the same time, no Power or statesman with millions behind him can, in presence of this agreement, go racing away; into the unknown just because he has determined to do so. If Russia has decided to reach the Pacific in force, she must explain herself and give guarantees. If the Chau- vinist traders who talk so glibly of British ascendency in the Valley of the Yangtse could force Lord Salisbury's hand, and compel him to make that ascendency direct, he would still have to ask the consent of his ally, and give explanations which it would take much time and many concessions to make acceptable. Or if William II. is thirst- ing to build up an India in China, he must first prove to Lord Salisbury that his plan involves no detriment to Great Britain or the world. There must, in fact, be counsel among the great of Europe before anything tremendous can be done in China, and that is, under the circumstances, a great security to have obtained. All that has been decided yet is that Germany and Great Britain, whose force, if they act together, is well-nigh irresistible, will discourage to the utmost any partition of China, and will insist on the whole world's right to trade freely, not only with "China," which means the coast, but with the inhabitants of the huge river valleys, whom as yet they have scarcely directly reached. Granting, as we must grant in Asia, that one nation has a right to dictate to another what her commercial laws shall be, that is sound policy, for it extracts from China the maximum of economic benefit for Europe and for her own people—for the benefit of trading can never be one- sided—yet avoids the awful task and responsibility of governing the Chinese.
But then there is Clause 3, the clause which declares that, if any Power begins partitioning," the two Contract- ing Parties "—mark that expression, which makes of the agreement a contract—reserve to themselves the right to come to an understanding as to the steps they may think it. necessary to take to protect their own interests. All kinds of meanings are being read into that clause, one being that partition once begun, Germany and England will take their shares. Another is that Germany and England will fight the partitioning Power, that is, in practice, will fight Russia. This explanation has caused some uneasiness in France, and many placating expressions of good will to Russia in Germany, but we do not see any rcascai for rejecting the plain meaning of the words. If circumstances tempt any Power to claim territory in China, Gei Many and Great Britain will hold their pledges as to the integrity of China to be overridden, and will do what- ever circumstances and their own interests dictate ; but gill do :t tot4er. Timt, to our thinking, is the core of the third clause, which, as it seems to us, some of our contemporaries have missed. Neither Power is to be left isolated in China, but both are to decide on a plan, and then to make that plan work to the utmost of their power. What the plan is to be is, of course, unrevealed, because you cannot reveal what does not exist, and a plan made before events have happened is nothingbut athought. Lord Salisbury and Count Hatzfeldt have, we dare say, talked over contingencies and expressed views, and possibly even discussed modes of action, but experienced statesmen do not indulge in prophecies, knowing too well that it is usually the unexpected with which they will have to deal. They may have discussed the advantage of a uniform tariff in all Chinese ports, including those held by foreigners, or may have speculated on the results of a condominiuni in the Valley of the Yangtse; but the only thing settled is that should a cataclysm occur they will, if humanly possible, act together. That is a good preliminary settlement, and we may leave the question of which gains the more by it to be fought over when the crisis arrives. The English always think they are going to be cheated in their political bargains, but the Empire perpetually waxes, and in bargains about territory they always come out with their hands almost too full.
While, however, we regard the agreement as distinctly creditable to the farsightedness both of Lord Salisbury and the German Emperor, we must point out its one weak place. The Empress-Regent has not assented to it. Those who drew it up have evidently been penetrated with the old idea that Europe can dispose of China as it pleases ; but just at present that idea seems to be a little discredited by events. The Empress-Regent has just said with &dreadful plainness of speech that she had rather Europeans kept out of China, and though a retort has been uttered, it has not apparently made much impres- sion. The European and Indian soldiers march about North Chinaalmost as easily as mites march through cheese, but the marching seems to produce nothing except burned villages. Suppose the Empress and her nobles sit quiet in Sian—this is to be the official name of the new capital —preparing an army, decline all terms, and refuse to let foreigners trade in safety on all rivers, what do the "Con- tracting Parties," Great Britain and Germany, propose to do ? Are they to remain at Pekin for ever, or to seize ports, or to occupy the banks of rivers ? If they do this, what becomes of the policy of "maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire "P and if they do not, how is their economic policy to be carried out? This, as it seems to us, is the difficulty of the Chinese situation, and it, is not removed, or even diminished, by this agreement. Suppose the whole world adheres to the agreement, self-denying clauses and all, what is that to the Empress while she sits undisturbed in her great city of Sian, amidst its triangle of hills, and all official China obeys her orders, except indeed that the agreement shows that she is not, in any case whatever, to lose territory ? The Treaty is most valuable for European purposes now, and will be most valuable for Asiatic purposes when the Empress has accepted what are, in fact, its proposals ; but suppose she does not accept them ? At present there is not a, sign that she will, beyond a rumour that Prince Tuan and his confederates are about to commit suicide. A statement of that kind would naturally be made if the Empress intended to submit, as it would save her dignity without hurting her agents ; but then has it been made ?
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