Adamant for drift

PERSONAL COLUMN PATRICK COSGRAVE

It is usually forgotten by readers of Churchill's famous description of the Baldwin government --`decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent'—that this was not an excessive rhetorical condemnation, but a painstaking attempt to describe precisely the character of the government's policy. The substance of Churchill's criticism of the governments of the 'thirties was not simply that they had chosen to pursue weak and foolish policies, but that by their tactics they had shown that they failed to understand the basic principles of international action. They were not only weak, but resolved to adhere to the tactics that demonstrated and multiplied their weaknesses.

The choice of right policy, after all, is in the end a matter of often difficult judgment, but it may be possible, by careful reflection on international affairs, to lay down principles of International and diplomatic strategy and tactics which should govern the implementation of any policy. Churchill's effort in the 'thirties remains the most sustained attempt to do this in the political arena in our recent history. And his criticism is applicable today to the foreign policy of the present Government.

It is difficult to name any substantial body of opinion which is today content with British foreign policy or its implementation. The source of this dissatisfaction lies in the fact that we appear to have neither prestige nor power. The United States can console itself, In a period of declining prestige, with the facts of its enormous power. France, unable to reach superpower standards, can reflect with satisfaction on its prestige. Britain appears to have neither.

Critics too often assume, kowever, that the reason for Britain's failure to win respect or prestige lies in its pursuit of wrong or mis- taken policies. It is certainly true that, in inter- national affairs, there is often a distinction be- tween a right and a wrong policy. But it is even more important to ensure that the manner of pursuing a policy is the correct one. British diplomacy today is directed, with consummate energy, towards avoiding real choice as between policies, towards evading the temptation to make a position clear and towards concealing from other nations what, if any, choice has been made. Of no aspect of foreign policy can it now be said that the Government will act positively and consistently on its implica- tions. Therefore, we cannot depend on any policy being other than rhetorical.

For a long time now Europeans and Ameri- cans have believed that the British will always yield on the principle of an argument, only showing their teeth later, when it comes to im- plementing that principle. This technique is often useful, if often dangerous (because it shows a country afraid to stand up for its interests), but it is foolish, for example, in the present attempt to secure membership of the Common Market, to believe that the EEC countries can be persuaded to let us in on a principle and risk the danger of our resisting the responsibilities of membership afterwards.

Lord Chalfont's recent speech at Strasbourg illustrates this point. He displayed on that occasion the character of current British

policy: . . people a year ago,' he said, 'were full of scepticism about Britain's ability to accept the Treaty of Rome . . . We know how wrong these sceptics have been proved.' This is a splendid example of the British willingness to make almost any commitment in principle without attaching any particular meaning to it. In what meaningful sense has Britain accepted the Treaty of Rome? To what are we bound as a result of such acceptance? Moreover, to turn to another of Lord Chal- font's recent pronouncements on the Common Market, what does it mean to say Britain has abandoned her special relationship with the United States? Does it mean we forgo the advantage of access to nuclear information? Apparently not: for Lord Chalfont said nothing about giving up that aspect of the special relationship. This, like Lord Chalfont's other statements, conveniently involves us in no additional difficulties or responsibilities.

At Strasbourg, however, Lord Chalfont went further. 'We shall not be discouraged,' he said, 'we shall not give up. We shall not take No for an answer, and again, 'If we fail, if we are delayed, we shall go on.' Though critics at home may sigh with relief that the Wilson gov- ernment is at last committed to the EEC, it is embarrassingly apparent from this speech that Lord Chalfont and his colleagues are only too willing to be tied up indefinitely in Brussels talks if these are ever allowed to begin. More- over, in his evidently genuine dismay at the Commission's report on the British application, Mr Brown revealed another danger in British policy. The failure to expect and provide for the unfavourable aspects of the report suggests that the Government (and the civil service) have been lulled by their own speeches into expect- ing successful negotiations on general prin- ciples, ignoring the evidence that the French are determined to have discussions on specific issues.

The first essence of a successful diplomacy, Lord Curzon used to say, is to know your own mind, and the second is to make sure the other fellow knows it too. It is towards avoiding such a situation that the activity of the

present Government is directed. Wherever we look today it is impossible to find an identi-

fiable, coherent British policy on anything.

Who claims to know, for example, what Mr Wilson's position on Rhodesia really is? Or what it means to say, in the Nigerian crisis, that we are 'neutral'? What are we to under. stand by Mr Brown's remark on Vietnam: 'II is not our business to criticise our friends and allies. It does not mean that we always see things the same way,' especially when it is put alongside his claim to neutrality at Scar. borough, 'I can speak to the Russians from an impartial standpoint . . . I would lose the position and influence that the British Foreign Secretary has if I were to change that stance and come out against one or other of the com- batants'? Yet, Mr Brown is on record as criticising the intransigence of Hanoi, but has never overtly criticised the policy of the us.

The present Government refuses to recognise that a successful foreign policy is based on two principles. First, it is desirable to have an identifiable coherent view on all major ques- tions. Secondly, it is desirable to separate from these major questions the issues which it is possible to influence, and to act decisively on these. It is a continual British pretence that we have some influence in Vietnam, but this has never been seen to issue in results. One of the reasons for declining British prestige is the over- use of the claim to influence, and another is the refusal to take action and make decisions in areas where we can actually alter the balance of events. The basic weakness is the failure to recognise where we can exercise influence and where not, and the absence of the determination to act on such a discrimination between issues.

It is only fair to the Wilson government to say that it has merely exaggerated a tendency to be found throughout recent British history. In the nineteenth century Britain wanted to maintain the balance of power in Europe, en- sure command of the seas and protect the Empire, without spending money on the armed forces or risking war. As a result, it was often forced into shifts and withdrawals that other countries claimed to find disreputable. Our success in those days, however, was in the main based on the fact that, though we were Slow to act, when we acted we did so decisively. In recent years we have tried to act in two similar cases—Rhodesia and Suez (similar because in both cases the object was to subdue a country greatly our inferior in strength)— without taking the painful measures necessary for success. On both occasions British govern- ments revealed an absence of will-power and discrimination in policy and tactics.

These failures have perhaps frightened the Government into avoiding decision of any kind at all costs. The fact is that they have failed to realise that a successful foreign policy is based in equal parts on power and prestige, and on considerations based on these pheno- mena. These considerations are based in turn on a capacity to reflect systematically on the nature of the international equilibrium and to act in a fashion that both becomes one's place in it and accords with the national interest. These are considerations of tactics and strategy, prior to the adoption of particular policy. But there is no value in commitments of the kind made by Mr Wilson's government, for they are clearly based on neither an under- standing of international affairs nor a sense of the direction of events. And if policy is not based on large considerations like these, why should one bother to stick to it under pressure?