Deter, Britannia!
Oliver Knox
rr his is an article by a sub-lieutenant RNVR (1944-46) plunging in where admirals fear to swim. The traditional role of the Navy is under fierce attack, and it may be no bad thing if amateurs have their say. If in the past there' had been more general debate on the changing face of war, and of the new strategies which new technologies ought to bring in their wake, we might just possibly have been spared the catastrophe of Passchendaele and Maginot. But old traditions die hard and nowhere harder than in the Service which is proudest of them.
To those of us whose early memories include scenes, if not of ourselves clinging to rafts in the cruel sea, at least of Noel Coward and John Mills bravely doing so on our behalf, the proposal that the Navy should no longer regard itself (as it has done since 1917) as above all else the wartime guardian of the Atlantic sea-lanes, may seem as lunatic and impossible as would be the carrying of passengers in a liner without lifeboats. Yet eminent voices, including those of a group of men who until very recently were in charge of the coun- try's defences (Sir Frank Cooper among them) were heard saying that convoys should no longer have any place in our defence strategy.* How can this be?
Nothing more vividly illustrates the dif- ference between the advocates of defence and those of deterrence. On the side of the former, it may seem as clear as the polestar that any steps — well, almost any steps which might help to safeguard our supplies 'I shall need written permission from your parents.'
in time of war should be taken. In this hideous case (assuming the postponement of holocaust) would it not be essential immediately and massively to reinforce the European theatre? Should we not there- fore proceed to strengthen our depleted merchant fleet. lay the keels of dozens of new escort vessels, develop better systems of decoying at sea missiles both airborne and seaborne, new ways of detecting and destroying packs of enemy submarines which travel ever faster (already at speeds of over 40 knots)? And what if, as some intelligent admirals are heard to assert, the three-to-one superiority which is tradi- tionally required on land by the attackers, is now required at sea by the defenders? Must not the consequent vast expense, calculated in figures which only astronom- ers can understand, nevertheless be taken on board? Do we not otherwise succumb to counsels of despair? No, no one pushes the logic of his policies so far ad absurdum. But there those who settle for a lesser sum (but no lesser,an absurdity), and plead for an extra frigate here, an extra frigate there - each one costing in real terms at least 50 times as much as a second world war destroyer. In any case, strategists who are set on the course to deterrence do not attempt to meet these questions, or pleas, head-on. They do not need to. Their starting point is different, and they travel across different seas. Reductions of the risk of war take precedence for them over the means of waging war. If these two considerations in practice conflict, then it is the latter one which must be jettisoned. The chief bogey of the Deterrer, the spectre which haunts his dreams and tits waking hours alike, is miscalculation. His prime task is to make the enemy aware, at all times and in all places, of the unaccept- able consequences if he does so miscalcu- late. So far as nuclear strategy is con- cerned, this is plain sailing. Even although the Soviets may well think we are unlikely ourselves to commit suicide by resorting t° nuclear weapons, the remote possibility of our doing so in the uttermost crisis appears to have been (and let us hope, under the stars, will continue to be) sufficient deterr ence to the major hostilities upon which, they might otherwise have embarked. But the difficulties arise from the galaxy °` minor miscalculations which are possible. The geostrategist's eye swivels round the world to look at suitable victims of Soviet greed, alights on northern Norway, and detects uncomfortable similarities t°
* Diminishing the Nuclear Threat (British Atlantic Committee 1984) Afghanistan. Remote, forbidding areas, both coveted fot generations by Russia, both doubtless seen by many in Moscow as necessary for the defence of the homeland! And how many formidable military exer- cises preceded the invasion of the one, are directed even now against the other? One difference alone bobs on the horizon — a few ships of our NATO allies and of the Royal Navy. Their propinquity reminds the Soviet Union not so grossly to mis- calculate as to reckon that it can annex a Piece of Norwegian territory without risk of a war far bloodier and more unpredict- able than that waged several thousand miles to the south and east. What more important duty should England expect of her Navy?
Nor, if the Deterrer's counsels are prop- erly heeded, will that duty be confined to the inhospitable waters of the Barents Sea. Opportunities for Soviet greed cannot be so conveniently limited. Of course, there are many shores off which the warships or the Navy cannot patrol with any degree of credible deterrence. Nor can NATO's ambition reach to matching Soviet naval gunpower. That has to be accepted. But what is possible, indeed imperative, is clearly to identify, and signal to the enemy, those areas which are vital to our strategic interests, for which we shall be and be seen to be willing to put up a fight, however desperate. When it comes to matching these areas with our resources, in nine cases out of ten it is the Royal Navy which will best be able to answer the call for the Most effective means of preventing Soviet miscalculation. No Service is more flexible, none easier to deploy, none more accept- able to local opinion in many parts of the world.
This is not to deny that there are secondary roles which the Royal Navy may be called upon to fulfil: one need think Only of the Falklands, or the cod wars. But let the admirals unite in acknowledging that to man the front line of deterrence in the seven seas of the world is their most important one by far, and that to abandon their role of sheepdogs of the Atlantic lanes is not a betrayal of a — fairly recent tradition. It is not their fault that new technology is rendering so many of their so-called 'platforms' obsolete. A few fast, independent missile- equipped cargo-ships might nevertheless Win, or limp, through. Convoys are another matter. They have no chance. Even supposing a miracle, they would arrive too late, since they take four weeks or more to mobilise and cross the oceans. It is believed that at present we could not sustain a 'conventional' war in Europe for more than three or four days at the most. Raising this low threshold is indeed the second call on our resources — that is, after strengthening our front line of deterr- ence. All the same, by the end of four reeeks both lines — non-nuclear and nuc- ,ar — would have been breached. The
final choices would already have been Made, Alas.
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