THE COUP D'PTAT IN EGYPT.
THE decree suspending the Egyptian Sinking Fund is in itself a small matter; but it may yet compel the British Government to assume a new attitude in Egypt. It has been possible for them, by a somewhat violent fiction, to interfere as they pleased in the internal affairs of Egypt in the char- acter of mere friends,—to suppress a rebellion, to dismiss a Ministry, to cast off a province, and to defend a frontier, and yet to say that they are only advising the Khedive. But it will hardly be possible to advise a breach of treaty, and pro- tect Egypt against the consequences of that breach, yet deny point-blank that they have assumed the position of the Protecting Power. The situation involves the protection of itself. If the house-master pleases, the friend of the house may do as he likes inside, and no one can say a word ; but if he kicks the rate-collector off the steps, he be- comes personally responsible. Under the agreement between Egypt and fourteen other Powers—called the Law of Liquidation—certain revenues must be paid into an In- ternational Debt Office, created to pay the Bondholders. If the amount was insufficient, the Office was authorised to demand more from the Egyptian Treasury, and if it was more than sufficient, the Office was instructed to pay off debt. The Egyptian Government, however, being strongly pressed for money, has, at the instigation of Lord Northbrook, suspended all payments to the Debt Office, and for a time kept its whole revenue for itself. As a matter of fact, the Debt Office has enough money to pay the next coupon, and may receive enough from the Treasury to pay future coupons ; but the special security guaranteed by the agreement, the prior right over certain revenues, has ceased to exist. It may be revived, and there is a promise in the decree of its revival ; but for the present it has ceased, and ceased without any formal consent from the Powers interested. Clearly, if they please, therefore, they have a right of remonstrance, which they are exercising, and a right of action, if they think action worth while. The Law of Liquidation may be, as it is, at once an oppression and an absurdity,—an oppression, because every State except Egypt is allowed to repudiate without punishment, except from the Bourses ; and an absurdity, because no State will give to creditors means indispensable to its existence but it is an international agreement for all that. Any State, therefore, which signed it may protest, and, as it happens, the means of protesting effectively are close at hand. The French Agent, or any other, has only to apply to the International dourts, and he must obtain authority to seize sufficient property belonging to the Egyptian Government to make up the loss. There is no alternative for the Courts, and there would be no alternative for the Egyptian Government except to pay—as was shown when, to avoid that very neces- sity, the Law of Liquidation was signed—but that the British being at Cairo, the Courts, or the Powers setting them in motion, cannot employ the small force required to carry the judgment into effect. The British Government is, in fact, the protecting Power, it is held responsible as such by all Europe ; yet it is not acknowledged as such, does not claim to be such, and holds in theory no legal position whatsoever. We do not believe it possible that such a position can be long sustained, more especially as the step now taken must be the first of a series. Nobody particularly cares about the Sinking Fund. It is not large enough, or regularly supplied enough, to reduce the Debt seriously ; and the absurdity of paying money into a savings' bank, while borrowing because of those payments, is too great to be invisible even to Bondholders. But the Egyptian Treasury is embarrassed beyond any sum to be saved by the seizure of the Sinking Fund ; having recovered its revenue, it will use what it needs to pay its expenses, and if the remainder is insufficient to pay the coupon, the Powers,
undoubtedly, will seek to make some one responsible. They have no right by European law to do it, for Power after Power has repudiated or reduced its interest —witness quite recently Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Turkey— and no one has interfered ; but they have a right by special international agreement, and they will exercise it. France will move the Courts out of spite, and to satisfy the financiers who control groups in the Chamber ; Germany will agree, because she wishes England to take a decided line, or to embroil herself with France ; and Austria will follow suit, in order to keep step with Germany. As England cannot allow the Egyptian Government to be overturned for accepting its advice, she must protect it ; and she can only protect it by assuming an attitude of avowed control and responsibility comprehended by European opinion, and satisfactory to it. She may, of course, retire ; but in that case she can hardly object to the remaining States enforcing their treaty in their own way, even if she were prepared, when herself out of Egypt, to face all Europe in defence of the Egyptian Treasury.
We cannot conceive in what direction the road of escape from the dilemma lies, or see in what way a temporary assumption of avowed control in Egypt would increase our present responsibilities. We are defending the southern frontier in Egypt with a powerful and costly army. We are maintaining order in Egypt itself. We are regulating the movements, organisation, and patronage of the Egyptian Army.
We are controlling Egyptian finance ; and we are conduct- ing all negotiations on her behalf with the European Powers.
We are, in fact, exercising all the functions of government, excepting only those which would enable us to reduce taxation, and secure to the body of the people some measure of personal freedom and ordinary justice. More than that, we are held responsible for all these things, and combinations are made in Europe based on that responsibility ; and European journalism, because of that responsibility, taunts us in a way which, but for the superb British scorn of foreign opinion, and for the suspicion that on Egypt French journalists are not honest,
and utter neither their own opinion nor that of the public, would produce a dangerous quarrel with our nearest neighbours. What is the advantage of protracting that situation ? We understand perfectly well how we got into it, how Mr. Gladstone's generous hope that self-govern- ment might be practicable even in Asia blinded him to the feebleness of the Egyptian people ; but surely the evidence of the facts is now irresistible. We have become, in the Premier's despite, and in that of the British people, who, convinced or un- convinced, have like ourselves recognised the nobleness of his purpose and steadily supported him, the protecting Power ; and in refusing to say so we are keeping up a sham which always in politics, as in private life, ends in mischief of some kind. We are not even keeping open any door of retreat which otherwise would be shut. We could just as easily quit Egypt in 1894 as Protectors, having placed its affairs in such order as were those of the Ionian Islands when we left them, as we could quit it in 1894 as "friends," after a struggle with anarchy which at the best had only been partially successful. There are plenty of precedents for quitting a place after we had benefited it by direct and supreme rule. We quitted Sicily after five years of government, still remembered for its ex- cellence; we quitted Java ; we quitted Mysore ; we quitted the Septinsular Republic ; in every case by voluntary decision. What do we gain for ourselves, or the world, or Egypt, by keeping up this dual control of English statesmen and Armenian or Circassian Pashas ? We relieve ourselves of no responsibility, no expense, no demand for men, and no opprobrium ; indeed, as matters stand, we increase all four. We do no good to the Egyptian people,—indeed, we are guaranteeing their oppressors against insurrection. We are keeping the whole world in turmoil, and throwing all affairs in Western Europe out of gear, by ereating an impression that sooner or later England and France must quarrel over Egypt. And, finally, we are surrendering the last chance of teaching the people to govern themselves, which can only be done, if done at all, by calling a deliberative assembly to aid the British authority with its debates and advice, and conceding to every Egyptian the right of exemption from arbitrary arrest. No Asiatic alive will voluntarily do either of these things. It seems to us that the time for a decision has arrived, and that for however short a period—ten years if you will—or under whatever forms—say, as in Gibraltar, military occupation only—all authority in Egypt should end before that of a High Commissioner, whose gazetted order should have the force of an Act of Parliament.
It will come to that at last, and every day's delay only in- creases the possibilities of confusion.
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