THE FRENCH ARMY AND THE CHINESE DILEMMA.
ON the morrow of her humiliating defeat, France thought to secure safety for the future by adopting the military system of her formidable antagonist. And she had hardly an alternative ; for conscription, when pitted against the armed nation, had failed as signally as the muzzle-loading rifle had failed when pitted against the needle-gun. Even if France had possessed a heaven-sent General, it is quite clear that, with the relatively small force which was all the country could have placed at his disposal, he would have been unable to make head against the enormous levies that Germany poured over the border. For now-a-days it is more true than ever that Providence is on the side of the big battalions ; and, as we showed a fortnight ago, the time has gone by when a single man could control a great battle, and by a brilliant stroke or a bold stratagem convert a lost cause into a crowning victory. War, like politics, has been demo- cratised. To ensure success, a General, like a statesman, must be backed by a nation. But universal military ser- vice, though highly effective for its special purpose, is in some respects, and very fortunately for the interests of peace, cum- brous and complicated. It is too tremendous a weapon for common use, and can be employed only on great occasions, when the country is in danger or the majority of the people are spoiling for a fight—a contingency which, seeing that the bellicose will themselves have to go to battle, is not likely to be of frequent occurrence. It was never meant for small wars or distant expeditions ; and this the French are finding out. The Tunisian campaign—a campaign in which there was no fighting—disorganised the Army and disgusted the people; and the trouble with China is creating difficulties on every hand. Unless the Chinese can be frightened into submission by the bombardment of a few of their ports, it is quite clear that either a large force must be landed and Pekin seized, or the contest ignominiously abandoned. But how is the large force, say, an army of 40,000 men, to be raised ? The only troops of whom the Government can at present dispose for foreign service are the Foreign Legion and the Marine Infantry ; the number of the former is limited, and cannot be increased, the latter are already taxed far beyond their strength, and in pressing need of reinforcements. It has been stated that this force is composed of volunteers ; and so it is, after a fashion, but not in the English sense of the word. A certain proportion of the first numbers drawn for military service are allowed to volunteer for the Marine Infantry, and the service being popular, volunteers are rarely wanting ; but this means no more than that they prefer being Marines to serving in the Line. The contingent annually required to fill up voids in the ranks caused by disease and to replace the men whose term of service has expired, is from seven to eight thousand. Since the downfall of the Empire no more have been wanted; but according to a statement just made by M. Vacher, Deputy of the Correze, the Government have taken during the present year just double this number, a fact which has been studiously concealed by the authorities. This revelation is causing a great sensation, as well it may ; for if M. Vacher's statement be true, the mortality among the troops in Tonquin has been greater than anybody supposed or the Government have ad- mitted, since, besides the men surreptitiously enlisted in the Marine Infantry, a considerable number of Line soldiers have been allowed openly to volunteer for service in the East. All these drains tend, of course, to the weakening of the Con- tinental Army ; and General Campenon is said to have declared that not another man can be spared without serious risk of throwing out of gear the machinery of mobilisation. The story that 7,500 men were to be sent from Tunis to Tonquin has been contradicted. They are leaving Tunis, it is true, but for their own homes, not for the Far East. They have all served their four years, and are now free. The Government dare not keep these men with the colours a day longer than their time, much less send them to the China seas. Equally unfounded is the project attributed to the Government of mobilising and despatching to the East a whole corps d'armee. No Minister of War could agree to such a depleting of the Continental Army as this expedient would involve, even if the French people would consent to so grave a violation of justice and equity as it would render necessary. Under the old system, a division, like a battalion or a regiment, was composed of men taken at hazard from all parts of France ; under the new system, a corps d'arme'e com- prises all the able-bodied young men of a particular district. Hence, if a corps d'armee were sent to China, the district from which it was drawn would be plunged into mourning and stricken with desolation ; commerce, industry, and agriculture would be paralysed ; and as much unhappiness occasioned as if France were engaged in a life-and-death struggle with a European Power. And this district would be alone ; for the adjoining Departments, so far as their personal feelings and material interests were concerned, would be quite un- touched. So iniquitous a measure no French Chamber could sanction, and if attempted, it might even provoke a local in-, surrection.
In these circumstances, the idea of a Colonial Army, first mooted some three years ago, has naturally come once more to the front ; and several influential French papers advocate the speedy convocation of the Chambers, and the immediate formation of a special force for foreign service. But a Colonial Army cannot be organised in a day ; and though the project may seem easy on paper, it is far from clear that it can be put into effect. To carry out M. Ferry's ideas of colonial enterprise, at least 40,000 men will be necessary. Where are they to come from ? If from the young men of a certain year, some of whom might be induced by heavy boun- ties and extra pay to volunteer for the new force, they would not be fit for foreign service under two years, and there would be so many fewer recruits for the Home Army. If from men who have completed, or nearly completed, their time in the Line, the Reserve would be deprived at one stroke of 40,000 trained and seasoned soldiers ; and as Frenchmen are always casting their eyes across the border, and the Germans are in- creasing and multiplying three for their one, the nation will not easily be persuaded to sacrifice security at home for the
winning of barren victories abroad. Then there is the question of expense. Suppose the men are forthcoming, how will the money be obtained ? For the Colonial Army would be in addition to the Regular Army ; and to in- duce men to enlist for hard service in unhealthy climates they would have to be well paid,—as well paid, probably, as our English soldiers. The force could not be maintained for much less than four millions sterling a year ; and schemes even less objectionable have had to be abandoned owing to the out- lay they would involve. Some time ago it was proposed to put an end to the system of "one-year volunteers," whereby young men who pass a certain examination and provide their own equipment are allowed to serve, as in Germany, one year instead of three or four. This system was said to be repug- nant to the French idea of equality ; it gave an unfair advan- tage to the well-to-do, and the Chambers voted its suppression ; but when the Minister calculated the cost which the alteration would entail, it was not considered advisable to carry it into effect. Since that time the financial position has decidedly grown worse ; the revenue continues to diminish, and the ex- penditure to increase. The cost of the expedition to Tonquin, and the Naval operations in China, have to be met by the issue of Treasury warrants, to cover which, and pro- vide for accumulated deficits in the Budget, will, as a French financial paper stated last week, require a fresh and heavy loan. In these circumstances, and on the eve of a general election, it is quite certain that the French Chambers will not give their sanction to the formation of a Colonial Army.
How the Government will get out of the difficulties into which greed and unwisdom have brought them, it is not easy to see. If China can be conquered by ironclads, all may yet be well ; but if the Mandarins remain firm, it is evident that M. Ferry must adopt one of three courses,—either withdraw ignominiously from the contest ; retire from office, and leave the dilemma as a legacy to his successors ; or send an army to Pekin—if he can and France will.
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