THE POLICY OF MUNICH
Sts,—Those familiar with the vital facts of British foreign policy in the last twenty years will, reading Sir Stanley Reed's letter in last week's issue of The Spectator, recognise that his ingenious card- castle of speculation as to what might have been is founded upon an initial misapprehension. Sir Stanley writes as if the initiation of the policy of France's breach of faith with Czecho-Slovakia originated with the French Government. M. Leon Blum, former Premier of the Republic, and others have revealed that the breach of faith was not merely suggested but practically necessitated in the develop- ment of the British policy of "no fighting for a country of which so little is known."
Sir Stanley at this late date appears to be ignorant of the truth that that war, had it come then, would not have been simply to protect C-zecho-Slovakia. It would have been the present war, probably on a smaller scale. but for the same cause of world freedom. We should then have had more Allies fighting with us and greater possibilities of divisions among the Nazis. Sit Stanley is still able to write that with certain disadvantages, Britain would have been fighting "to keep the Sudeten Germans within Czecho-Slovakia." If anyone of standing wrote so loosely on Indian affairs, how severely would Sir Stanley bring him to book!
The claim that Mr. Chamberlain procured peace for a year is often described as one which gave us an opportunity for rearmament. Possibly Mr. Chamberlain's statement that he had secured peace in our time accounted for the somewhat leisurely fashion in which the too long delayed work was undertaken. But the same year afforded Herr Hitler a similar opportunity, of which he took advan- tage with his usual energy, speed and completeness, to prepare his plans for the subjugation and making his preparations at home and abroad for carrying those plans into effect. One has seen with what catastrophic results.
Into these and other matters connected with the policy which has brought about these results a national inquest must be held. That should be at the end of the war. Sir Stanley Reed's letter would suggest it now, for it must provoke discussion of a kind not conducive to essential national unity—for misleading statements must be countered at once, lest they get a hold that will not be easily loosened. When that inquest does take place the British-speaking world will be staggered by the irresponsibility with which the nationally dictated foreign policy was abandoned, its able and experienced conductor dismissed, the subsequent conduct of the disastrous policy of appease- ment taken over into amateur hands, and persisted in with total disregard of warnings as to its inevitable effects.—Yours, &c.,
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