An Anglo-Saxon Pacific Policy
Much the most important event, potentially if not actually, in the United States in the past week has been the series of general conversations—the term negotiations is specifically repudiated—between Mr. Cordell Hull, Lord Lothian and Mr. R. G. Casey, the Australian Minister in Washington. The fact that such conversations are proceeding is not surprising. The success of the negotiations on mutual defence between the United States and Canada make it natural, and indeed almost inevitable, that problems affecting the Pacific should be dis- cussed between the United States, Great Britain and the British Dominion most concerned in that region. How far or how rapidly the talks will develop cannot be forecast, but it may be taken for granted that if at any moment the commander of the American Pacific fleet found the use of Singapore as a base convenient it would be placed immediately at his disposal. That possibility is being canvassed with apprehension and dis- approval in Japan. Whether America enters the war soon or late or never, it is accepted doctrine now on both sides of the Atlantic that her cause and ours are one. The only question is how she can help most effectively, and it is significant that the latest Gallup poll shows an actual majority of voices- 52 per cent.—in favour of the extension of the maximum help to Britain, even if it meant involving America in war. On the effects of Anglo-American co-operation in Asia it would be premature to dogmatise. It might involve closer relations between both Powers and China—and possibly with Russia. That might drive Japan closer to Germany, but it would be a largely checkmated Japan. The decision that must soon be taken for or against the reopening of the Burma road may throw the first light on the future. In that matter we cannot afford to line up a second time with Tokyo against Washington.
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