Not the King's men
GREECE M. LLEWELLYN-SMITH
There is no parallel for the present situation in Greece. Last week's coup d'etat differs from all previous coups in that it was organised by young and determined men—the colonels and brigadiers, not the generals—holding key posts in the efficient and well-equipped army built up since the civil war with the help of American aid and advice (45 per cent of the 3,285.5 million dollars of aid channelled into Greece between 1946 and 1963 consisted of military materials or grants earmarked for the military).
It is a far cry from the periodic upheavals of the 'twenties and 'thirties when ambitious generals apparently had merely to ring up a few friendly army corps commanders and move in on the posts and telegraphs. A far cry also from the establishment of a dictatorship on 4 August 1936 by General Metaxas—the one encouraging precedent for a coup d'etar in Greece, since the regime of 4 August lasted until Metaxas's death in 1941; for Metaxas, a lone wolf with few close friends either in par- liament or in the army, owed his success as much to the tacit support of the old political parties, who abdicated from responsibility for the government of the country, as to his own powers of organisation and timing.
Last Friday's coup enjoyed neither the sup- port nor even the toleration of the political parties, except for the 'hard kernel' of the right-wing National Radical Union (ERE). The Centre Union (ak), on the contrary, has been clamouring for elections ever since its leader George Papandreou was ousted by the King in July 1965. Metaxas's coup was the action of one determined man, contemptuous of democracy and free speech, of the spoils system, and the antics of politicians who fiddled while the Communists prepared to burn Rome. It was a simple action by a remarkably complex man. The present coup is not simple, and is explained only by the peculiar conditions and history of the Greek army.
The Greek army since the end of the civil war has been carefully indoctrinated to be- lieve that Communism is the work of the devil and that the only true Greeks are non-Com- munist Greeks. Under the Karamanlis govern- ments of the 'fifties potential officers were systematically screened and promotiondepended on sound anti-Communist views, which amounted in most cases to support for ERE. The army's views on the subject were fully shared by King Paul and his son Constantine, who declared in his New Year message to the people for 1966, 'Communism is a miasma, born outside Greece and inspired and moved from abroad. Its ethic is lying and treachery. It corrupts and turns into an unforgivable enemy of the Fatherland everyone who comes into contact with it . . .'—a clear shaft aimed at Papandreou, since the many pro-Papandreou demonstrations of summer 1965 were dominated by the Communist front party, EDA.
But ideological anti-Communism and the memory of the horrors of the civil war were not the only reasons for the building up of a formidably right-wing army. Those with long memories could remember times before the war when a swing of the pendulum between Populists and Liberals could mean dismissal, a period on half-pay, or blockage of promotion —a process which started during the First World War when the animosity between Venizelos and King Constantine I meant that there were for a time two entire officer-armies in Greece which succeeded each other accord- ing to the results at the polls. (Other ranks, needless to say, continued to serve regardless of politics.) Loyalty to ERE and to PRE's American-orientated policies was thus both a path to promotion and an insurance for the future, provided ERE remained in power; and the army was a potent election weapon on behalf of ERE. Without it, Karamanlis would still have won the 1961 elections, but not by so much. The intimidating pressures exerted by the right at these elections gave Papandreou the platform from which he proclaimed the 'inexorable struggle' which brought him to power in November 1963.
The policies of Papandreou in his twenty months of office were far from revolutionary. Greece remained loyal to NATo, and continued the policy of Karamanlis's last years, seeking foreign capital in Western Europe in the hope of making up Greece's permanent balance of payments deficit in the absence of American aid, which had ceased in 1962-63. There was no cause for conservatives to shiver with alarm at the activities of the Centre Union, but for two things—the inflationary tendencies of Papandreou's programme of spending on long- overdue reforms, and his attempt to dismantle the right-wing structure of the army.
Inflation gave the right its opportunity to accuse Papandreou of irresponsibility, and it is true that the centre in opposition had made promises which it was beyond the capacity of the Greek economy to fulfil. The attempt to redeem election pledges led Papandreou to pump money into education, whose portfolio he took himself, and welfare measures such as insurance for the low-paid agricultural workers. The economic situation was further compro- mised by the inherited problem of wheat sur- pluses, bought from the farmers at inflated prices, which had to be sold off at a loss.
The economic troubles of Papandreou's centre government were immediately caused by the winding-up of American aid, which had helped to conceal throughout eleven years of right-wing government the basic structural weaknesses of the Greek economy. Neither Karamanlis, nor Papandreou during his short term, succeeded in attacking these weaknesses, and the foreign investment attracted to Greece by the monetary stability of the 'fifties and the concessions to foreign capital embodied in the 1952 constitution remains precarious and ready to be withdrawn if and when the reduc- tion of the tariffs which protect Greek industry makes Greece no longer a profitable and easy market. As an associate member of EEC, Greece must abolish all tariffs by 1984. It is, to say the least, doubtful whether her economy can stand the strain of open competition.
Rising prices and economic instability, how- ever, while giving his enemies the occasion for a good grouse, did not alarm the right as did Papandreou's inevitable attempt to undo the powerful grip on public services, police, and most of all army, established by ERE through eight years of patronage and pressure. Liberals felt that it was their turn at last, and the wheels of centre patronage began to turn, as needs they must if loyal party men were to be rewarded and future electoral success assured; ASPIDA sprang up in the army, a counterpart to the large and effective right- wing officers' association IDEA, as a means to the professional advancement of its mem- bers. The revolutionary side of ASPIDA had probably been exaggerated by the right- Some, including the King, were genuinely concerned by the possibility raised by asama of Com- munist infiltration by the army, and this, to- gether with the feeling that Papandreou was out to get him, explains his stand during July 1965. But the tough men in the army, men such as those who organised last week's coup, were frightened for their jobs. It was this fear which, probably as long as two years ago, led them to plot.
Since then many factors have seemed to the colonels to justify their conspiracy: the in- effectiveness of the palace governments which succeeded Papandreou : the realisation of the enormous popularity of Papandreou and the fear, genuine for the army though implausible to those who remember his record in 1944, that the Communists might ride to power on his back: alarm at the neutralist tendencies and violent language of Andreas Papandreou; and, mixed with all these, a vague Fascist desire for 'regeneration' which seems to overcome the Greek army whenever they have had a period of fifteen or so years in which to contemplate the extravagances of their politicians. This last was expressed in terms reminiscent of Metaxas by the new Prime Minister, Mr ,Kollias, who spoke of restoring the press to its 'national mission,' cleaning up the public services, and discouraging urbanisation. The mass rally at Salonika, a far less serious threat to stability than the general strike of 5 August 1936 -which gave Metaxas his chance, merely provided the colonels with a pretext.
The coup evidently took the King by sur- prise, but, should be in the end acquiesce in it, the bitterness of the left against him will be still further increased. If the military junta disintegrates, the same old round of party con- troversy and political animosity will re- emerge. There is no foreseeable end to this because of lack of trust; and there is no trust because the Greek political system is based on a network of patronage and personal attachments which the Greeks show no signs of abandoning. The abolition of the monarchy would not help unless a respected elder states- man could be found, acceptable to all parties, as president or regent. There is no such figure in view. Even if the Greeks were to abolish their king, it is quite possible that they would later recall him. They have, after all, done this twice before, in 1920 and in 1935, when the republic, after half a dozen coups, was break- ing up. But before the question of the monarchy arises, this group of officers has to be discredited. We may expect a period of brutalities such as the arrests of last Friday night and absurdities such as the abolition of the mini-skirt before the colonels either generate a dictator or try desperately to throw the ball back to the politicians they have pushed aside. There is no reason to believe that they
will have difficulty in repressing their enemies in the near future. They have American arms; the Communists have only the shotguns which they have been assiduously collecting (in com- mon with most other Greeks) for the last fifteen years.
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