Rhodesia (2)
The need to tinker
Xan Smiley
Bishop Abel Muzorewa has recently been Wing effusive in praise of Dr Hastings Banda, the despot who presides over one of the more efficient economies in Africa and Whose friendliest partner is the Boer republic down south. Now that the Methodist preacher has built up his private army, known as Pfumo reVanhu —the Spear of the People, he has informed a demure white lunchtime audience in Salisbury that he is also creating Ziso reVanhu —the Eyes of the People, a party intelligence service. But there is no fear that 'Big [Black] Brother will be watching you', he warned apprehensive housewives, 'unless you are up to no good.' In a similar vein, a confidant of the bishop told me, in an idiom in which Ian Smith Would have been at home, that 'Our RAR [the Rhodesian African Rifles, black wing of the regular army] have the finest troops in the world. And we shall hammer our enemies'.
Perhaps a mixture of religion and ruthlessness is what Zimbabweans want. The bishop has, after all, often been accused of weakness. His party —till Pfumo popped up— had seemed too goody-goody, bumbling, ehurchy. Indeed the bishop's apparent lack of cunning, his abstention from the bitter factionalism of the past, his dog collar and reputation as a man of peace and unity, have Clearly remained attractive to the voters who gave him the go-ahead last week. But now he IS developing a startling self-confidence. However inexact the figures for the elec4 t°ral turnout may have been, two facts emerged incontestably: the bishop's popularity is still immense. Secondly, though the guerrillas may hold sway over much of the rural populace, they are far too weak in Conventional military terms to destroy the White-officered army machine. Despite the encirclement of Salisbury, Mugabe's 'boys' have been suffering casualties at an unpre cedented rate. Morale must be low. Many are— in Rhodesian parlance— 'fence-sitting': waiting to see if the bishop can produce the fruits of black power from a 'whitewashed' constitution.
The political initiative has momentarily passed to Muzorewa. Yet it would be folly for a Tory government to believe — as the bishop and Smith may — that the internal settlement can 'work on its own'. To be sure, it is a remarkable achievement that Smith has signed a pact with a black leader who clearly enjoys substantial (if not necessarily majority) black support. Whatever its shortcomings, the agreement should be acknowledged as the best so far forged — because it has no competitor. But that is not enough to end the war.
Mugabe and Nkomo cannot be strangled or seduced without a reshuffle of the political pack inside and outside ZimbabweRhodesia, to use that comic combination of ruin and rogue. The bishop's cards must be re-ordered rather than thrown away. He has a goodish hand to improve upon. Unadulterated, the internal settlement would sink back into despondency under the remorseless pressures of black Africa and the Patriotic Front guerrillas, even if a Tory government and Pretoria gave it the temporary boost of recognition. But it has a momentum that should not be dissipated.
The Tories should launch a two-pronged • attack. Avoiding the high moral tone of the past, Britain should flatter and cajole the internal men—and offer the carrot of removing sanctions andgranting recognition only if extra concessions are squeezed out of the new Salisbury government. First, the symbol of white supremacy must be kicked smartly out of any office and back to the farm at Selukwe or beyond the Limpopo. (It is a passing misfortune that the new white tribal chief is also a Smith.) Secondly, the mode of election of the 28 white seats in the 100strong assembly must be changed, so that at least eight— preferably more — are chosen by a common (i.e. predominantly black) voters' roll: that means that white liberals are elected, so deflecting the threat of whites blocking black legislation. Thirdly, the provisions for all-white membership of the 'independent commissions' to determine promotion in the army, police, civil service and judiciary, will have to be hurled out. Fourthly, the inclusion of whites in a coalition cabinet will have to rest not upon statute but on the decision of the black prime minister. Finally, the Patriotic Front will be asked back to contest a new election under the amended constitution and under British/Commonwealth/UN supervision. The terms for such negotiations, however, have shifted — to the disadvantage of the Patriotic Front. On the one hand, black power in an assembiy must be unencumbered by the present capacity for white obstruction. On the other hand — and this departs from the Anglo-American proposals of September 1977 — the present whitecreated structures, institutions and traditions should remain the basis on which black Zimbabweans rebuild a society where all may prosper.
That applies especially to the security forces—the nub of any agreement. Mugabe's and Nkomo's guerrilla commanders must be offered senior posts in the high command, but the more efficient and professional Rhodesian army is the more practicable base for a new Zimbabwean army. Mugabe's hopes would then rest upon winning an election or becoming a partner in a ruling coalition (with the bishop ) rather than on relying on his military to seize power.
The second prong of a Tory strategy is international. Attention must be focussed less on Nyerere, Nigeria or Angola, more on Kaunda, who is at present exceptionally vulnerable economically and militarily—and might be amenable to a further massive dose of aid provided he leans on the hefty Nkomo to accept the updated constitution. The stumbling block could, it is true, be Machel and Mugabe's guerrilla bosses. Botswana's Seretse Khama would probably co-operate. South Africa, eager to curry favour with a new Tory government, would be required to shove Smith and the bishop into line.
'We have already made our last concessions', Smith will protest. It will be argued that tinkering with the constitution would precipitate a white exodus—and the bishop is obsessed with keeping whites to organise the army and economy. Yet he is torn by the conflicting need to convince doubting blacks that he is not 'Smith's new houseboy'.
I believe that many whites, even though they flocked in the past to vote for 'old Smithy', have moved further than their shepherd down the road to accepting real black power. The Tories have a chance of prodding them the few steps further than the present inadequate constitution allows. Only then can the bishop become a credible leader in black Africa. It would be unwise for the British to think otherwise.
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