THREE YEARS OF WAR
By STRATEGICUS T is not a coincidence that each anniversary of the war finds the Allies in a period of crisis. Hitler has from the first been fighting with every weapon in his possession, and it is a tribute to his showmanship that everyone is anxiously speculating what he will do next. It is known that the first anniversary was designed to find the war in its final stages, and the Battle of Britain was his first decisive defeat. The second anniversary was intended to coin- cide with the fall of Leningrad, and on September and the Germans were actually within fifteen miles of the old capital ; but it held out under conditions that are little known even now. The third anniversary is presumably intended to coincide with the capture of Stalingrad and the rupture of the Volga line of supply. On each occasion Hitler has been within an ace of securing vital suc- cesses. If he had achieved the first there would jrave been no need of further fighting. The capture of Stalingrad would be a grave blow, but with the memory of so many Russian triumphs over disaster in our minds we need not write off Stalingrad or the Volga before they are lost.
If, however, the third anniversary finds us faced with that depress- ing possibility it should not be overlooked that the power of the Allied bloc has remarkably increased. It is absurd to imagine that the position is not immensely better than at the time of the first anniversary, when we stood alone against Germany and Italy. The German war potential cannot be greater for the attack upon Russia. It has absolutely and relatively declined. The economic exploita- tion of Russia, which Dittmar now builds upon, implies a change from the mood that challenged America, and must then have reckoned on victory before the United States could mobilise its full power. It would at best strengthen the material side of the enemy potential ; and it is foolish at this stage in the war to exaggerate the material factor.
The main successes of the German army have not been achieved by a gross numerical or material superiority. The progress of the war has witnessed a steady popular depreciation of the value of position, as such ; but the general public does not yet realise that weapons are, of themselves, no more effective. The aphorism which a French officer framed as the conclusion to be drawn from the Spanish Civil War ; Le materiel rie vaut que par ceux qui Putilisent is not one that is readily grasped by the civilian ; yet it contains a truth which we ignore at our peril. Undue emphasis on weapons and war material generally tends to distract the attention from the more important factors in success—thought, tactics and leadership ; and it is not withou! its point that the two battles in the last war in which we lost most heavily were those in which our material superiority was greatest. It was not so much the tank that won for us victory in the last war as the discovery of the tank and how to use it. In it was but another evidence that thought Was alive and active.
It seems now to be clear that Hitler's successes have been won by pitting his armies against the apparently impossible ; and, even if sve agree that the lesson of war is that more is lost by caution than by taking risks, it is still surprising that the Germans have so often overcome what seemed to be prohibitive handicaps. In the Norwegian campaign, in the Yugoslav campaign and in Crete, bold planning, confident opportunism, perfect training and disci- pline achieved what seemed incredible. These lessons are coming home slowly ; but it is not the professional soldier who required the teaching. They may all be found in Wavell's early writings ; and they are the substance of the higher training for leadership. It IS the factor of training and discipline that seems to be accepted With most reluctance ; and yet an examination of the German successes proves beyond a doubt that the effect is produced by the combination of such- perfect training that individual initiative can be trusted with such perfect discipline that it can be welded into Complete unison of effort. It is, in fine, not the number and strength of the instruments so much as the individual technique 01 the players, their aptitude for orchestral playing, and the confident conducting that produce the effect.
Much of this is known or should be known by this time ; and it is vital that it should be assimilated. But the three years of the war have seen so many disturbing vicissitudes that the thread of Allied progress may escape notice. The fall of France had the effect of dissipating our resources ; and yet, even at the nadir of our power, the enemy initiative was never absolute. The bulk of Mussolini's empire has been swept away and great Italian armies destroyed. The air offensive has only begun to damage Germany's war potential,
and with the assistance of the United States our own has grown enormously. The attack upon Russia, failing a true military decision, may turn out to be a f elo de se. At least it has inflicted a blow upon the most important element of Hitler's army—its trained personnel—which we could not in our wildest dreams have expected • to accomplish at this stage in the war. So great indeed was this drain and so obvious the growth of British power that Hitler might now have been in serious difficulties if our resources had not been dissipated further by the Japanese attack.
Even at the expense of involving the United States in the war Japan was encouraged to attack in the Far East. Some of our reverses there were due to conditions that were remediable ; but it is no condonation of these to point out that the basis of our defeats was the fact that we were pinned down by commitments in the western theatre, and much that we have done and omitted since then has been conditioned by the inevitable dispersal of our effort. But this handicap has begun to lose its force. Already in the Pacific the United States naval power has proved strong enough to provide the background for an attack in the Solomons that must test the Japanese navy. At this very moment it seems to be challenging the inevitable by a strong counter-attack. Whether this is a sort of Canute gesture or a well-founded plan only the event can show ; but at the very least the United States is applying to the Japanese the diversion which has fettered our initiative in the west. It is an evidence of growing power after the apparent eclipse that masked the process in December.
This is no small thing ; and we should mark that Allied sea power, never complete, has never been so incomplete as to prevent us assuring perfect safety to troop convoys, and now appears to be on the upward turn. The shipping losses have, at least temporarily, fallen and the shipbuilding is steadily increasing. The adherence of Brazil will add something to the strength which supports it ; and, of course, it is and must remain the basis of our war effort. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Dieppe raid was the demonstration that the British Navy can maintain for nine hours perfect control of the Channel crossing ; and the raid was but a reconnaissance, an examination of the position with a view to further action. It is true that sea power is recognised as dependent upon sea craft alone only on the high seas ; but it Was never more obvious that the resistance and offensive might of an island rest upon sea power.
This fact governs not only our own fate but that of Japan also. Both must stand or fall by sea power ; and the simple foundation of our strategy is therefore clearly indicated.
Another lesson that has become increasingly clear is the tremendous effect of air power. It has only recently been appreciated that the theoretical may become the formal and the practical. In battle so great is its effect that a second important lesson of the Dieppe raid is the demonstration of the sharpness of the weapon that is already in our hands ; and it may be that it is by enforcing a diversion of air power from the Russian theatre that we can best help our ally immediately.
But it is on land that the enemy must be made to feel our power ; and it is common ground that every motive of self-interest, as well of loyalty to our ally, demands that we should strike our hardest while Russia is holding so great a part of Hitler's armies there. It is for this reason that the changes in the Near and Middle East gather point. Allied armies are standing in Egypt, and real success there might change the whole face of the war. At least the three years of the war have brought home to us the need of united and intelligent planning. It is because we detest the arbitrament of war that we blind ourselves to the truth of Jomini's description of war as an "impassioned human drama." It is not until it is fully recognised that it falls into the category of human actions, and should be approached as a human activity, with all our wits and will, that we shall begin to reap the success which our potential strength deserves. We know now that we have the material means. What remains now is that we shall apply the gifts of imagination, insight and experience to the problem of applying them.
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