Ernest Gellner on the Belief Machine
This collection of essays* falls into two groups, those which had previously appeared in literary/political journals, and those which had graced the philosophers' trade press. The stylistic difference between the two kinds is considerable, corresponding roughly to that between charismatic and routinized utterance. The routinized ones are much longer. The idea underlying their joint publication is an entirely sound one. — namely, that i4sues of fundamental belief, the so-called technical concerns of philosophers, are not logically separable.
The essays have two connecting threads — the denial of the demise of ideology, and the author's own development. This is a rather personal book. It is not merely the very large photograph of the author on the dust jacket, looking menacingly pensive, which conveys the sense that one is being invited to observe a spiritual pilgrimage.
Professor MacIntyre's position amongst professional philosophers is an unusual one. Taking them all in all, they are a dull lot, and MacIntyre is not. Their dullness, in most cases, springs from the belief that they operate a technical specialism, when in fact their techniques amount to very little, and merely sacrifice substance for the trappings of rigour. MacIntyre is one of the exceptions. He always seems to be involved, publicly and passionately, for or against (usually both in succession, and it doesn't make much difference these days) with the major belief sys tems of our time.
The book under review will provide much useful documentation for a com prehensive study of contemporary faiths, but it will be insufficient, for it is rather selective, and with a definite bias in its selection. The bias is already conveyed by the title, which promises that the book will be against the self-images of the age. Why against? What distinguishes Professor MacIntyre is not the number of beliefs he has doubted, but the number of beliefs he has embraced. His capacity for doubt we share or surpass; it is his capacity for faith which is distinctive and perhaps unrivalled. In his youth, he wrote a book on Marx for the Student Christian Movement, and if he did not at the same time write one on Jesus for the Young Communist League, it must have been a very close thing. It is no secret that he was, for many many years of adult life, a paid-up, card-carrying Christian. As for Marxism — like other important historical developments, it has made its appearance twice, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. This second coming of Marxism, the mystical soteriology of 'alienation,' was in its time much heralded by MacIntyre, and in fact a good deal of this survives even in the present volume. In addition to this attempt at Christian/Marxism synthesis, there have also been most curious attempts to marry Marx and Wittgenstein, and so forth.
It is this spiritual omnivorousness, and not the occasional recut, which is distinctive and interesting — even if it is a case of recular pour mieux croire. One would have preferred the positive declarations of faith to be more fairly represented, if one is to understand that inward movement of thought which the book appears to promise. The denials are parasitic on the affirmations and a return to an affirmative stance is strongly indicated.
Still, quite enough survives of the characteristic and rather priestly believer even in this volume, and he will not be obscured by the thinner and less plausible sceptic. The believer tells us (p.86) that what really matters is whether you are concerned with God's existence, not whether you affirm or deny it — an observation strikingly similar to the kind of modernist theology which he elsewhere denounces, with its Instant God generated tautologically from the mere existence of a central concern, and its indifference to the object of that concern. Freud is vindicated (p.37), though in a strikingly Wittgensteinian manner, as essentially an observer of detailed facts, whose significance is that he "broke all conceptual schemes — including his own." There is a rebuke (p.43) for "those for whom the whole project of the revolutionary liberation of mankind from exploitation and alienation is an absurd fantasy," and a defence of. the concept of alienation ((p.66). (This is combined with an historical account of the manner in which this notion originally acquired its psychological consent, which is excellent and in my view entirely correct.) So the word ' against ' in the title must
be read in a rather relative way. The author is not so much in favour of current faiths as he was at the apogee of his enthusiasms, but he is still a great deal more so than most of us.
As for shrines, he seems to have moved from Trotsky's to Guevara's. He is contemptuous of R. H. Tawnay's "cliché-ridden high-mindedness," exemplified by observations such as that "capitalism . . corrupts human relations by permitting the use of man by man as the instrument of pecuniary gain . . " (As the Polish schoolboy said, capitalism is the exploitation of man by man, and socialism is the other way round.) But, for some reason, Che's very similar remarks are treated with reverence and seriousness : " Essentially, nothing has changed, except that I am much more conscientious, my Marxism has struck deep roots and is purified."
The author's stance and style are remarkably pastoral — earnest, stern, admonitory, but understanding. He gives us to feel that he comprehends and sympathises with our doubts, but that we can take comfort fro,m the thought that even a mind such as his,,,As familiar as we are with the grounds of doubt, can nonetheless recognise the need and the possibility, nay the necessity, qf a much, much more complete conceptual fulfilment, if only we are big enough to overcome our inner, impediments. His Marxism was truly episcopal, and it was an achievement of a kind to get on a soapbox and sound like a bishop. If anyone objects that the star we are asked to follow changes with bewildering rapidity, one may reply that these terminological changes do no matter much anyway, for apparently Christ, Marx, Freud and Wittgenstein all very often point the same way, and even if at this moment some of them are out, no matter — a new vision of similarly gratifying richness is not far away, waiting to be found and revealed in, of all places, the philosophic analysis of moral and social concepts (p.94).
The contemporary ideologies with which the flirtation is most persistently and openly carried out are indeed Christianity, Marxism and psychoanalysis. There is also a fourth, much used and invoked, but which, for some reason, is not classed with the others — Wittgensteinianism. Why not? Is it because it is not of comparable historic importance (correct), or because he does not wish to group it with faiths he has currently " overcome "? It seems to me to deserve inclusion, as much as the pragmatic liberalism with its doctrine of the end of ideology, which he does include (without so visibly flirting with it). Here some points need to be made.
There is a curious affinity between the pseudo-technicians' tendency to be inter ested in almost nothing, and MacIntyre's inclination to believe in almost everything (in succession if not simultaneously). The same premiss, surprisingly, can justify both, and in each cast it constitutes a total misreading of our real intellectual problem situation. The narrow range of the would-be professionals springs from the view that all's well, and cannot but be well, in the sphere of belief. This carte blanche warrant for all faith they use, however, with most remarkable restraint. (In fact, in the main they used it only to disconnect their subject from questions of faith.) One is tempted to speculate whether the secret of MacIntyre is that he makes really full use of that utter conceptual permissiveness which is inherent in Wittgenstein's views, and which the other followers have used so modestly. This, as well as some deep ultimate lack of seriousness, would help explain the author's remarkable rate of ideological growth, or should one say rate of circulation of faiths. These faiths are always so to speak secondary, in the sense of being accompanied by insurance meta-beliefs about the very nature of faith, which at the same time constitute a justification of faith as such, quite independently of its concept. Such secondary faith is then invulnerable to the ordinary objections to which literal, straightforward faith is vulnerable. It is not clear why such secondary faith need ever be lost, except through a kind of ideological fidgetiness. But it cannot be hard to regain either. MacIntyre speaks scathingly of the lack of agony in Dr Robinson's prose (p.14), with his " cheerful, even brisk style." But the only sign of anguish conspicuous in this book is in the cover photograph of the author, which looks as if he were suffering from indigestion. Well, to lose one faith could happen to anyone, to lose so many looks like carelessness.
MacIntyre also takes too narrow a view of the "end of ideology" doctrine, which he repudiates. Under that blatant name, it was the way in which a New York exTrotskyist, doing well in the cold war, repudiated his youth, and with splendid chuzpah treated his own development as the paradigm for humanity at large. (I have in mind a species not an individual.) But the very explicitness of that doctrine made it vulnerable. Elsewhere, the same was achieved, though perhaps not consciously aimed at, with greater finesse and less candour. Wittgenstein taught that the supposedly big questions were fruits of conceptual confusion; if these confusions were eliminated, a residual reality would remain. This would be endless various, lacking a general justification, constitute its own legitimation, be incarnated in the local custom, and be quite viable when not disturbed by over-general questioning. It could also be spiritually luscious or soberly grey according to taste. Now this was a conservative end-of-ideology thesis if ever there was one, and a damned sight cleverer than putting everyone on their guard by calling itself by that name. Though MacIntyre notes the blindness of this tradition to history and change, he does not really seem to see how close a variant it is of the soporific evasion which he attacks.
In fairness to Maclntyre, it must be said that he is now quite clear, as the more technical essays show, about the logical error behind that universal carte blanche for faith, at any rate when abstractly formulated. So it can no longer be used to oil the dialectic. But the debt is repaid: the technicians are invited to return to interesting topics, by an argument which at the same time treats their erstwhile reasons for ignoring them as deserving of full and continued respect. So if they heed this sermon, they can retrace their steps without loss of face.
Instead of pursuing, as would seem logical, the local forms of the "end of ideology " thesis which is under attack, MacIntyre puts forward the entertaining idea that the philosophic analysis of the concept of action is an important prerequisite of action itself, notably such as would hope to bring about socialism with a human face. Unity of theory and practice could hardly go further, and this is clearly a new variant of his old aspiration towards a Marx / Wittgenstein synthesis. I relish the thought of socialist revolutionaries storming the barricades, having first fortified themselves by a careful analysis of their own concepts. Charge! You have nothing but your 'confusions to lose! Hurrah!
The main thing is, I suppose, that doubt of a secondary faith (in the sense indicated) is itself secondary, and thus subject to much laxer rules than primary conviction or doubt, and liable to go into reverse gear at any time. The Introduction does inded tell us that the quest for a new vision is on, and it will evidently retain the gratifying properties of the old ones. It will answer the "key question," and either find or vindicate "a language in which we can say what we sometimes desperately want to be able to say." I do not anticipate that he will have any inhibitions about saying it. This dialectic in double quick time, like some old film, will surely not come to a stop. (Though it is piquant to find him complaining of the eclecticism and lack of coherence of the new romantic young.) A heart so avid will not be denied, and though prediction is normally perilous, we can feel absolute confidence that, in the end, we shall see the reunion of Father MacIntyre and Mother Church.
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