THE RELATIONS OF CHILI AND ARGENTINA.
BUT for one factor of unknown force, we should say with confidence that a serious war between Chili and the Argentine Republic was in the near future almost inevit- able,—a war which will produce disaster on every Stock Exchange in the world, and may materially affect the future destinies of both the Americas. Both States are acting as if they expected war, and one as if her rulers wished and intended it. Even the immediate subject of the present quarrel is not quite so absurd as it is sometimes represented to be, and behind. it lurks another, which by all the rules observed in Europe would justify a war a autrance. The Chilians claim at one point of their frightfully narrow territory some high forest valleys, through which, if circum- stances favoured them, they could enter Argentina. The Argentines protest that the valleys belong to them, and it was originally agreed that the matter should be referred to the arbitration of King Edward. The Chilians, how- ever, either believing that the award must go in their favour, or, as we should suspect, wishing for war, while the matter was still unsettled cut broad roads through the valleys, alleging that, whichever way the award might go, these cuttings would be convenient for trade. The Argentines, who, be it remembered, are in most essentials Spaniards, jealous of their honour, and rather inclined to suspect designs upon their possessions, did not regard the cuttings in that light at all. They felt themselves treated. with a light disregard, and, moreover, menaced, for good roads for trade usually imply good roads for light artillery. They demanded an apology, therefore, and the abandon- ment of the valleys, and failing to obtain either, they called out their militia, and prepared for self-defence. They protest urgently that they do not want wax, and. are quite ready to submit to arbitration—indeed, by the latest accounts an arbitration has again been accepted; but they will not, they say, endure either insult, or trickery, or perpetual menace, of all which they conceive the Chilians to have been guilty. As Argentina has nothing to gain by war, and much money and credit to lose, as her Fleet is not very strong, and as any land war must for her be a war of self-defence, we may fairly suppose that she is sincere, or at least sufficiently so to make negotiation com- paratively easy ; but we do not feel equally confident as to the governing influences in the rival State. Its rulers, also, are earnest in their pacific protestations, and very anxious to carry opinion with them, but they need time to buy and bring up more ships, and somehow there is always a hitch impeding arrangements for any satisfactory or final settlement. The reluctance with which the States of Spanish America ally or federate themselves with each other is as obvious as it is inexplic- able, unless we remember that the provinces of Spain itself have never been completely fused, and that the more intense forms of Spanish patriotism still bear a strong trace of localism ; and. Chili finds herself in many ways in the position of Prussia before the Seven Years' War. She is for her size very strong in military strength. Her people, whether Spanish or Araucanian, are accustomed to hard lives, love fighting, and have something of a natural genius for fighting in a suc- cessful manner. The conscription is in force, the Army has been reorganised by a German general, who crushed President Balmaceda, and is now supported by a German Staff, and. Chili has for some years been collecting munitions of war. A little State so organised is apt to think that it can wage war with advantage, and the Chilians have motives which strengthen the desire for military glory. Expansion is to them, as it once was to Prussia, almost a necessity. They have hardly room to breathe. No State in the world — unless we call Andorra a State—is so completely throttled. The huge wall of the Andes and the enormous breadth of the Pacific prac- tically cut Chili off from everywhere, and reduce the wealth of her inhabitants to the little they can extract from a narrow coast line rich only in patches, and over- large portions of it with a most inconvenient, though not intolerable, climate. It is as if a great landlord owned the grassy bits by a great road for a hundred miles, but none of the farms which it accommodates. Naturally, so far as historic precedents can make anything natural, the Chilians would like to break out of their narrow though defensible fortress, and acquire some of the rich lands which, as they know, lie beyond the great wall. They had almost succeeded in obtaining their object when in 1883 they crushed Peru; but in fear, we believe, of a war with Brazil, they retired, sullenly enough, from that enterprise, and. once more set themselves to gather military strength. They are now inclined, as we read their action, for another spring, and. this time the quarry is Argentina. They believe, rightly or wrongly, that they are as strong as that Republic, they know that they cannot be followed over the Andes even if they are defeated, and they see that their enemy has splendidly fertile provinces almost un- occupied, which if she were once defeated she might be compelled to cede. Every one of the motives, therefore, which induced Prussia to make war on Austria impels Chili to make war on Argentina, and as State nature is the same on all continents, we do not doubt that but for the incalculable factor war would be made. The war would be a war of mere conquest, and utterly immoral ; but Spanish America is not in advance of Europe in the eighteenth century, and the sincerely Catholic house of Bourbon then waged war after war avowedly to enlarge its possessions or its trade.
The incalculable factor is, of course, the Government of Washington. That Government might interfere with its whole weight, and then the Chilian enterprise, otherwise promising, might prove abortive, or, even if victory were secured, unfruitful. There is nothing, it is true, in the Monroe doctrine to prevent Washington from looking on in tranquil disdain while Spanish-American States fight each other, shift their boundaries, or even federate themselves into larger aggregations. Washington is not deeply con- cerned by bloodshedamong Spanish-Americans and Indians, and would not be afraid. if all South America passed into one hand, provided only it were Indian or Spanish Neverthe- less, President Roosevelt has uttered sentences which show him prepared to disapprove wars of pure conquest even in South. America, his people do not want to see any State there too fully organised for battle, and there has been for some years past a fretfulness between Chili and. the United. States. The little State is supposed to dislike North American influence, she has already spoiled the Pan-American Congress, and. she is believed to wish for a South American federation for defence, which might greatly interfere with North American ascendency. The establishment, too, of a Paz Americana would be a justi; fication of the Monroe doctrine which would weigh heavily with the consciences of mankind in favour of that excep- tional principle in diplomacy. Mr. Roosevelt might, therefore, be inclined to intervene, and if he does intervene with the decision which characterises both himself and the Republic, it is hard to see any course open to Chili except sullen submission. Her Fleet would be swept off the water, her sea path, which is practically the only line of communication between her scattered provinces, would. be barred, all imports from Europe would be stopped, and her best port would pass out of her hands, it might be, as the Union is expanding its territory, for ever. The Chilians would. find no powerful friend. in Europe, for the German Fleet is not ready, and. the British Government; which desires Argentina to be at peace, would approve President Roosevelt's action. The Chilians must, it would. seem, either yield to intervention from Washington or be beaten ; and. the only question, therefore, is whether Presi- dent Roosevelt, who has the Filipinos on his hands, and wants his magnificent surplus to spend on the Nicaragua Canal, will or will not intervene. The idea of our inter- vention, except in his support, is, we should say, a mere dream. We have quite enough to do, and though we have a heavy stake in Argentina, we do not yet conduct our foreign policy "in the interest of bondholders." It is for the President to set the rule, and, as we conceive, his action will be in the direction of commanding peace.
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