NEW LOOK FOR NATO
13v PAUL ANDERSON WHAT good. and how much of it, has come of this month's Paris meeting of the fifteen NATO powers? Well those of us who have learned not to expect too Irma have genuine reasons to be gratified. It was a coinci- dence, of course (but, as it turned out, a happy one), that the main business was to examine ways and means of greater non-military co-operation. Way back in May, 1956, in the sunny spring days of 'peaceful co-existence,' and in an atmosphere 'rather different from today's.' as Lord Ismay PUt it in masterful understatement. the Council had charged its Three Wise Men (the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Norway and Italy) to prepare a report on non-military co-operation Another happy (or should one say, lucky) circumstance was the fact that the bulk of this report was completed well before the two major European members of the alliance practised non-co-operation and non-consultation in Suez.' And finally, it must surely be regarded as a lucky circumstance that the Atlantic Ministers met to discuss the report's practical recom- mendations only in December; and not, say, four weeks earlier and closer to the events which `caused the biggest rift in the Atlantic alliance there has ever been'—again to quote Lord Ismay.
13Y now, in fact, the Atlantic Ministers came to the con- ference table no longer hot with anger about some of their allies' misbehaviour, but well and truly frightened by the blazing red-light danger signals of disunity in their own ranks. 'N0 recriminations' and 'the closing of ranks' were the con- ference slogans in the Palais Chaillot as well as outside. and, as far as one could discover, they were genuinely followed in all discussions. No time seems to have been wasted on Past recriminations. This is perhaps the main cause for gratification.
it was done sufficiently successfully to permit the unani- mous adoption of the main practical recommendations of the `,Committee of Three' report—i.e. recommendations for k) more mutual consultation among the powers before embarking on any unilateral action (and even before pro- nouncing major policy decisions by individual governments); (2) a firmer obligation to consult other Treaty partners; and (3) extended powers of NATO's General Secretary to call by meetings, to settle disputes among Treaty partners HY mediation and arbitration.
Add to this the further agreement that the Treaty partners are henceforth obliged to use NATO consultation and NATO mediation of disputes before other international agencies (such as the UN) are called in and you have, as a result of the last Paris meeting, a substantial extension of NATO into Hon-military spheres which are important enough to be described as a structural change. Even so, it should not be Called destructive to ask the test question : What would have been the effeot of these new obligations—freely accepted by all members of the alliance—had they been in force before the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt? Let us speculate! In Paris, much emphasis was put on the term 'increased firmness' of the obligation for mutual con- sultation. But there is absolutely no way of proving that these new obligations are, in fact, any firmer than those solemn obligations all members of the United Nations have once accepted—obligations which London and Paris chose tO disregard. And nothing, alas, permits one to say that the new and 'firmer' NATO obligations to consult could not have been disregarded.
Continuing to speculate—what follows? Should one con- clude that the acceptance of new and additional obligations to consult simply makes no difference and that they are, there- fore, without any value?
This was, in fact, the conclusion drawn by a number of French editorialists—always prone to think 'logically' rather than politically, and only too ready to misread any statement by John Foster Dulles, who had made the purely formal pro- viso that the US Government must reserve, the right for immediate action without consultation in cases of extreme urgency or extreme danger to the security of the United States. Quite apart from any genuine misunderstanding (or deliberate misinterpretation) of Mr. Dulles's formal proviso, the prevailing view in Paris was that such extra obligations as have now been accepted might well have acted as an effective brake. Much more important, however, seemed the general conviction that the new obligations to consult— accepted so soon after having broken another. older obliga- tion—will make them more binding.
But one purely political topic which played a major role in the Paris discussions may have a more immediate effect in reducing the dangers of another major war. The accumulat- ing signs of increasing stress and strain and, indeed, of open disintegration, within the Soviet Empire are a source of incalculable danger. NATO is supposed to be our shield against that nightmare. But having reaffirmed its basic defence principle of 'forward strategy'—which is NATO jargon for saying that any attack on any part of the NATO area must be answered by the collective defence of all Treaty partners— an extremely and desperately dangerous situation could arise if fire breaks out along its most vulnerable stretch of border : in Eastern Germany. The men in the Kremlin who can hardly feel pleased with the world as it is now, might become desperate men—and desperate men may do desperate things. Ultimately, there is no defence against acts of madness. But such danger beyond the control of even the combined political and moral force of the free world could easily be increased a thousandfold if only the slightest suspicion were allowed to take root that NATO's 'forward strategy' might, after all. mean 'roll-back' rather than 'containment.'
There was certainly no unawareness of this in Paris. Herr von Brentano's intervention that all satellite problems should be approached with the greatest caution and that particular care should be taken not to encourage 'dramatic action' by the peoples of Eastern Europe was most timely and most welcome.
But even more important than the German intervention was an earlier and very forceful intervention on precisely the same lines which Mr. Dulles appears to have made at the very beginning of the conference. While it is perfectly easy to appreciate West Germany's anxiety on this point, we must surely regard it as a major political event that, of all the NATO members, the representative of the United States should have uttered (as is alleged he has) the strongest warn- ing against any form of incitement to further satellite rebellion against Moscow's heavy rule.
This alone—if one's information proves correct—will have made the latest NATO conference 'the most important meet- ing of the Council since the foundation of the alliance,' as Lord Ismay told us.
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