THE WAR SURVEYED : THE SPRING CAMPAIGN
By STRATEGICUS
IT is still very difficult to discuss the Balkan theatre in any detail because we do not yet know which armies are likely to be engaged ; but there are certain new pieces on the board that must have a bearing on any alignment of the forces there. The new British minefield not only threatens to add significant fresh difficulties to any attempt to reinforce the shattered remnant of the Italian armies in Tripolitania but, what is even more important, it cuts off the Italian navy from the Aegean. Any attempt, therefore, to prepare for, assist or exploit a German descent on Salonika would find the cost, never very encouraging, prohibitive. Whatever should be the resolution of the Balkan situation, this is a material point that cannot be ignored. Naval bases cannot be excessively valuable if naval vessels cannot make use of them.
Although this position is still in suspense, it is possible to see more clearly the outlines of the enemy strategy for the spring campaign. Britain remains the chief objective of Germany ; and, for her second and presumably final campaign against us, she is making the most cautious and elaborate preparations. The summer and autumn campaign did not succeed because we were too strong, and the amount of our resources diverted from the decisive area by Italy was not sufficient to affect the result, though it was ample to reduce Italy to the verge of capitulation. For the new campaign, therefore, the diversion must be more massive ; and it is here that the operations in the Balkans and the threats in the Far East are to play their part. Their moral role is obvious. They arouse anxieties by their very vagueness. The outlines of possible movements are so indefinite, that they look much larger than they can possibly be. No one knows what are the dimen- sions of the forces Germany may fling into the Balkan cockpit or Japan into the southern China seas ; and it is not permissible to examine too closely what resources we have available to meet these threats. What is evident is the plain fact that the decision will not be gained there. In the immense territory which the enemy occupied during the last war almost up to the end, liberation was not direct but came through the decisive battles in the west.
It is wiser to recognise at once that the Japanese diversion has to some extent succeeded. It has been announced that Australian troops have gone to Singapore, that Royal Air Force reinforcements have also been sent and that aeroplanes are being shipped from the United States. The threats in the Balkans, moreover, have diverted resources to the Near East that would also be very useful here. In some directions, of course, such a diversion is not so much a loss as a gain, since troops there might find a value they do not possess in Britain itself. But aeroplanes and naval vessels would be of very great value in home waters when the real blow is launched. We must expect that the threats in the East and in the Mediter- ranean will develop their maximum tension at the same time that the main blow is launched in the West. The time for diversion will then be past. It will be too late to think of sending any further part of our strength. There can be little doubt that the enemy will synchronise his various operations ; and it seems improbable that the time for action will now be long delayed.
It has been a matter for debate whether Germany intends to invade this country or whether she will not rather attempt a blockade amounting to a siege. This, however, is less a matter of alternatives than of sequence. Germany will hardly attempt to invade without any local preparation, after making such elaborate preparations near and far It is, therefore, cer- tain that before very long the German submarines in greater numbers than ever will be attacking our shipping, with the assistance of new and more numerous squadrons of bombers and fighter-bombers. The respite we have had recently has been used to train the crews for the new fleets, and we can see from the losses which we suffered up to the last two months that we arc faced with a vital threat. The losses in the autumn rose steadily, after the (second) threat of total blockade, from about 70,000 tons weekly to over 90,000. It is true that this, the highest, average is not half the weekly loss during the critical month of April, 1917 ; but it is a great deal too much for comfort. The losses during the last nine weeks have averaged 42,433 tons, a very remarkable reduction.
In estimating the relevance of this figure we are faced with the difficulty that, while it is in itself most probably a thoroughly safe one, it is impossible to maintain that any figure will not cause us some discomfort. It is because we could profitably use almost any amount, of shipping that the problem of the submarine appears to be so much graver in the present war. Some of the larders upon which we depended for our supplies in the Great War are now in the enemy's hands, and we have to go to the ends of the earth for the foods they sup- plied. Now, transport may be a question of weeks, when before it was a matter of hours. Our rearmament depends upon a considerable volume of shipping continually passing across the seas into our harbours. So much more of our shipping is engaged in transatlantic travel that the total volume s, in effect, considerably reduced.
The new attack upon our shipping will, therefore, be a matter of the utmost gravity. It will be carried out not only by great numbers of submarines, but also by as many aero- planes as Germany can allocate to that service ; and this attack will be pressed with the greatest ingenuity and resolution. It will be accompanied by heavy attacks by fighters and bombers on this country. Probably the night bombing of great cities will be intensified, since the Germaas think that the morale of the provincial cities is lower than that of London, and that they can carry this attack to such a pitch that the cities will be in much the same state as if they had been captured by an enemy. Only when the campaign has apparently produced tangible results, when Britain seems to be actually besieged and the destruction has gone so far that morale has clearly declined, only then will the invasion be attempted. There may be numerous variations in the stages and tactics of this campaign ; but, broadly, that is what the spring will bring. The threat will probably be the most serious that has ever faced this country ; and, since we have fotind ourselves, and know that we are tough-fibred, we can disregard such con- siderations and examine the outlook.
In the first place, in spite of all the aeroplanes we have sent to one or. another seat of war, we are probably much stronger than we were last autumn, both absolutely and relatively ; and we shall grow stronger steadily. The problem of the German bombing-attack upon our shipping has been carefully pondered and we shall be better able to cope with it Similarly, we have been building steadily and the counter-attack by the Navy will also be more effective. Moreover, is it quite certain that the new small submarines will have anything like the effect the increased numbers imply? The problem of seaworthiness undoubtedly enters into the effectiveness of the submarine: and it is also doubtful whether crews can be trained in dK numbers suggested. The spring campaign undoubtedly 030' stitutes a new problem ; but the result is far from being foregone conclusion. The shipping losses will certainly Tie' and we can ill spare more of our tonnage ; but we cannot be certain that the increased numbers of submarines will n6 involve a greater percentage of casualties among them.
Finally, while we do well to be prepared to face the suffering which this new campaign will bring upon us, there is ° reason whatever to doubt that we shall see it through, w° an increasing bomber-fleet will be delivering blows of eve' growing strength upon the enemy. The possibilities in Lease-and-Lend Bill are great. Help, if not to the extent and! the time necessary to relieve us completely, is on the waY, it will turn the scale. Our position seems to be comparable that of the year 1918. The worst and the best are still before
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