DEFENCE
The great debate
LAURENCE MARTIN
Lord Mountbatten's unexpected intervention in the great defence debate has made Lord Wigg's attack on Mr Healey's policy a big affair; probably bigger than it deserves. On careful examination Lord Mountbatten's letter to the Times proves so cryptic as to be almost incomprehensible. Indeed Mr Healey promptly said it was intended to support him. It is certainly odd that Lord Mountbatten should speak up now after having had so long to collect his thoughts since he presided over a defence policy not very different from the present one.
Lord Wigg's own scathing attack was too intemperate and too imprecise to serve as an ideal basis for discussion. Nevertheless his main charge, that NATO is excessively depend- ent on the threat of nuclear retaliation and that that threat is not credible, is too im- portant to dismiss without comment, even if it is far from original.
Lord Wigg is perfectly correct when he says that Europe depends on nuclear deterrence for protection against deliberate Russian aggression. Governments prefer not to admit the fact, but our present military posture derives rather more from Mr Dulles than from Mr McNamara. In the early years of his reign Mr McNamara urged the alliance toward a much larger conventional capability, but these efforts foundered on a mixture of economy, &genie and strategic scepticism. NATO'S capacity for conventional resistance remains undeniably limited. , In the current state of doctrine and technology, I believe that Lord Mountbatten and Lord Wigg are also right, when they condemn the implication in the white paper that tactical nuclear weapons can relieve us of our dependence on strategic deterrence by offering an effective nuclear local defence. Lord Wigg does nothing, however, to create confidence in his familiarity with modern weapons when he asserts that 'the smallest nuclear weapon is the equivalent of thousands of tons of high explosive'—far neater weapons now exist—but the point he makes is sound. Very few experts really see any way to control a tactical nuclear battle so as to preserve a decent proportion of the local population and retain a semblance of command and control. When the white paper records agreement on guidelines for the 'initial' use of nuclear weapons, it is almost certainly speaking of a very limited, so-called demonstrative employment. The next subject for allied discussion, the 'follow- on' use, is a far harder political and strategic nut. Thus tactical nuclear weapons are pro- bably better regarded as part of the mechanism of strategic deterrence than as a means of actual defence.
Ever since 1949, when the first Russian atomic test proclaimed the imminent end of American nuclear immunity, people have argued that stalemate at nuclear level would require balance at the conventional also. But experience has shown that the allies will not pay the price necessary to match the Warsaw Pact on its own terms. They have been encouraged in this refusal by the fact that so far there has been no Communist at- tack. Partly, no doubt, this reluctance to arm arises from improvidence. Deterrence being a negative achievement, it is never possible to prove that it has been successful. But the reluctance also rests on a justifiable refusal
to accept the prospect of fighting World War Two all over again, and on a perfectly coherent if not unquestionable argument for believing that strategic deterrence makes such a prospect unnecessary.
Nuclear weapons are, as Lord Wigg says, so destructive and so potentially un- controllable that they are better suited to deterrence than to defence. As a deterrent, however, they are superb. The probably catastrophic nature of nuclear war even for the stronger party to any conflict has been deeply and universally appreciated. By comparison a conventional balance is inherently unstable, for even if it is in rough equilibrium the uncertainties of conventional warfare leave ample room for miscalculation and for some Schlieffen or Hitler to hit upon a plan that seems to promise the fruits of conquest without the direr consequences.
There is thus some ground for hoping that nuclear deterrence will prove more effective than pre-nuclear precedent suggests and for arguing that efforts to transfer the game right back to the conventional arena might do more for instability than for security. It is true, of course, that the situation might be safer if western Europe were a sizeable nuclear power in its own right. Lord Wigg raises the old question of whether America would sacrifice Chicago for Bonn. The answer may well be negative, but Mr Dulles would have argued that that was the wrong question. Instead, one should ask whether the Russians can be sufficiently certain of American infirmity of purpose to take the initiative in starting war in Europe. Everything we know of Russian behaviour suggests that the answer is an even more resounding negative. Their reluctance to take risks is well established. We should not allow the proper awe with which we contemplate the possible decision to use nuclear weapons to blind us to the gravity of the decision the Russians would be taking if they began a European war; a decision they would have to take first and in cold blood.
Thus the deterrent against outright aggression seems substantial. If it fails we are certainly all in dire straits. But it is by no means clear that a lot more conventional forces would help. A Russian attack would mean either that they do not care if we use nuclear weapons or that they are confident we would not. If they do not care they will probably use nuclear weapons themselves, from the outset. This is, indeed, what their overt strategic doctrine suggests. If they do care, an early demonstrative use from our side ought to make them do some quick reassessments. It is hard to see why this reassessment should be more favourable after a larger rather than a smaller number of western divisions had been defeated. In theory, perhaps, if the west were prepared to fight a prolonged conventional battle of at- trition, the war might go to a decision without nuclear action. It seems improbable and it would make a mess of Europe. But in any case no one, not even Lord Wigg ap- parently, is willing to pay to meet an all-out attack in World War Two terms. Thus we are arguing about where the nuclear threshold should be, not about its abolition.
Where it should be is another and a com- plex subject. The danger of arguing against an extreme position like Lord Wigg's is of appearing to go to the other extreme. There is a place for substantial conventional forces in Europe. Against the very unlikely event of deliberate Russian aggression, conventional forces bolster the essentially nuclear deterrent by providing a framework within which American forces can remain on the
ground in Europe. By affording at least a limited pause for reflection on both sides, conventional forces make the risks of nuclear commitment more tolerable for the United States. For no one can pretend that the decision to use nuclear weapons will be easy to take.
Above all, conventional forces have a vital part to play in the far more likely con- tingency of a military collision occurring as the unintended result of a crisis, very pro- bably arising in eastern Europe. Effective western forces may prevent events unfolding so favourably for the Russians that what was unintentional begins to appear promising, tempting them to revise their estimates of the risk. In particular we need to prevent Russia being left in possession of substantial western territory when a ceasefire comes, for the task of compelling withdrawal would be a very difficult and dangerous one.
The white paper says NATO forces are just adequate for these tasks. This may well be over-optimistic. There is plenty of room for improvement, and we should be highly irresponsible if we permitted any further deterioration. But we shall only increase public reluctance to pay the price if we pre- tend to be working toward a defence in tradi- tional, Second World War terms. The nuclear genie is out of the bottle and no amount of conventional divisions will put it back again.
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