DE PRESSENSE'S "STUDY OF ORIGINS."
DE.PasssEssk is already well known as the author of important historical books on the life of Christ, and on the early years of Christianity. These works showed that he was a diligent and competent historical student, and they also revealed speculative power of no ordinary kind. The various phases of the conflict between Christianity and Greek and Roman culture, which he had to describe, led him to ponder deeply on the ultimate pro- blems of knowledge, of being and of duty. In his historical studies he found phases of thought, and modes of regarding religion, life, and duty, which he also found in scientific and philosophical discussion among the chief European nations. He has consequently studied with enthusiasm and success the chief currents of modern thought, an I the result we have in the volume now before us.
He calls his book A Study of Origins, and his object is to examine critically the various theories which are now current regarding knowledge, being, and duty, and to set forth what he regards as the true solution of these problems. It is a weighty task, which has taxed even his consummate powers to the utter- most. Nor has he been successful on all the lines of attack and defence. Sometimes he seems to surrender a position which might be easily defended ; sometimes he regards as vital and important positions which many have abandoned as indefen- sible. But when all allowances are made, we regard this work of De Pressens6 as of great importance, and as a weighty con- tribution to the philosophic literature of our time. The style is clear, lucid, and felicitous, adapting itself readily to all the sinuosities of his subject. The arrangement of topics is such as to make each chapter an introduction to what follows, and all are grouped into one artistic whole. He has thought out his subject, and has anticipated the objections which may be brought against his conclusions. The point of view from which the book is written is thus described in the preface :—
"To think freely is to lay aside all prejudice, and to accept simply the results of experience. I am increasingly convinced that experi- mental science is in no way hostile to the principles of theism. It is not the province of science to demonstrate these principles; all that can be fairly asked of it is to recognise their possibility. When once this possibility of a divine and moral world is granted, other processes of experiment adapted to the nature of the subject supply its demonstration ; the way is open. This is the conclusion to which I would bring my readers. Once thoroughly established, this con- clusion suffices to secure to humanity its most precious possession,— that higher life apart from which man misses all that distinguishes him from the brute, and is without any light beyond the grave, without any compass on his voyage through life, without morality, without law, without liberty, given up to the chances of brute force, a hopeless and degraded thing. I refuse to accept such a horoscope for humanity. If, indeed, the first and final term of the world's his- tory were force, I should be a pessimist of the sombrest dye, both as regards society and the individual." (p. xi.)
The issues are vital, and when a writer is thus conscious of the greatness of the issue, we may expect him to put forth all his strength.
• A Studeof °rising ; or, Du Prnbtross nf Ksovtadjs. of Boiog, and of Date. By E. De Premised, D.D. Translated by Annie Dirwool lioliztlen. London Hoddsr end Stough:ca.. One feature in this work is worthy of respect and of imita- tion. M. de Pressense is careful to state the opinions of his opponents with the utmost precision and accuracy, and he always speaks of them with the respect due to their position and eminence in the departments of science they have respectively cultivated. He has no jealousy of science, no distrust of its method, nor fear of its results. He is a theist, and to him jealousy of science means distrust in God. Bat he is careful to distinguish between the method and results of ssience, within their proper sphere, and the vast and vague speculations, mainly of the negative sort, which have cast their dark shadow on every side around the stable-ground of science. He insists that the method which is true and adequate in physicial science must be modified and enlarged when we study the phenomena of life, and again, must be further enlarged when we regard moral, spiritual, and social life. The method of study must vary according to the conditions of the problem, and modes of acquir- ing knowledge must be adapted to the diversity of objects to be known. A man of science who has mastered the methods of physical science, and is recognised as an authority, say, on light, heat, or electricity, is often rendered unfit by his very success in his own field of knowledge to form even an intelligent opinion on matters of a more complex nature. He usually deals with motives as if they were physical forces, with men as if they were atoms, and with the vast and complicated phenomena of human life as if those were as simple as are the laws of matter and motion. As a matter of fact, when such men speak of moral and spiritual things, their first procedure is to eliminate all that is characteristic of the higher life, reduce the problem to its lowest terms, and so find nothing in the problem which cannot be expressed in terms of matter and motion. It is easy for the human mind to find resting-places on any of the ascend- ing planes of life, and by the easy process of denial of all that lies above and beyond seek to affirm that a true and adequate solution has been found of the mystery of being, thought, and life. While ready to welcome all the positive conquests of science, he is prepared to show that these are not inconsistent with, rather they are in fullest harmony with Theism and with Christianity. It would lead us too far afield to enter into detail, but a brief summary will not be out of place.
The first book discusses the problem of knowledge, and, as was to be expected in a French writer, the author begins with a statement and criticism of Positivism. The famous law of the three stages is discussed; and these stages turn out, on examination, to be not successive, but co-existent, and in truth three aspects of things all equally necessary for embracing things in their totality. Then, again, Posi- tivism has not been able to keep within the bounds assigned to it. On the one hand, Comte has passed beyond the positive limit, by allowing scope to the religious sentiment ; and on the other hand, M. Lithe has transgressed the limit, by tending more and more to materialism, as the solution of the problem of the Universe. Then follows a luminous discussion of the new psychology of England, France, and Germany, in which we find a clear statement and a stringent criticism of the views of Stuart Mill, Spencer, Taine, Herbart, Lotze, to mention only the more prominent names. We are lel on to the views of Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant ; and growing out of this his- torical disquisition, we find what Be Pressense regards as the true solution of the problem of knowledge. This book is valuable for its wealth of historical information, as well as for its contribution to the theory of knowledge. The most import- ant section is that which describes the share of the will in knowledge.
The second and third -boas are devoted to the discussion of the problem of being, and treat of the questions of the origin of the cosmos and the origin of man. Here M. de Pressense comes into contact with those theories which have this element in common, however diverse in method and result they may other- wise be,—that they seek to account for the Universe from within the Universe. They cannot endure the thought of a Creator, and relegate him to the position of the Unknowable, or think of him as identified with the sum of things. Here it is necessary for the author to grapple with the theory of Darwin, or rather with Darwin's theory as modified and extended by subsequent writers, —with the transformation theory of Herbert Spencer, and with the theories of Immanence, as set forth by Hegel, or of uncon- scious will or purpose, as maintained by Schopenhauer and Hartmann. Here, again, we note the accuracy of statement with which he sets forth the views he has to controvert. As regards the
origin of man, in a series of chapters he discusses the more im- portant questions raised in more recent years. Man in his two- fold nature, the relations of the physical and the moral, man and the brutes, language—its origin and influence on knowledge,— and human society and animal societies, are the titles of this part of the book.. We quote the following paragraph :—
" In any case, the moral unity of mankind remains beyond ques- tion. We do not say that this unity has been felt and recognised in all ages. The consciousness of it has gradually grown clearer, as it has been raised from the purely natural into the higher sphere of the moral life, till in the end man has learnt, not only to acquiesce in, but to desire it. The highest form of society was to receive this seal of the free and conscious life which separates it from animal societies. Hence it has needed long ages for the groat idea of humanity to over- come the exclusivism of the clan, the tribe, the nation. The ancient world was built upon principles the very reverse of this ; each nation applied to other nations the insulting name of barbarians. The alien was as much outside the protection of law as the vanquished foe ; the rights of man, as man, had no recognised existence. Philoso- phical thought, indeed, anticipated free institutions. Cicero, as a true prophet of the ideal, spoke of the republic of mankind ; but it was not till the Son of God had appeared in history that the grand word of emancipation was spoken. In Christ, there is neither Jew, nor Greek, barbarian, Scythian, bond or free.' On that day, the great human society broke all the fetters of tribe and nation. But many centuries had yet to pass, and many a moral battle to be fought, before the idea of humanity was accepted in all its breadth, and embodied in free institutions." (pp. 359-360.)
In the book on the problem of duty, the old questions, old in some forms as the Schools of Greece, are discussed with clear- ness, freshness, and power. De Pressens6 is against utili- tarianism in all its forms. He is against determinism and an advocate of free-will, and he makes a notable contribution towards the settlement of this olden controversy. There is also a valuable discussion on moral sanctions. Another chapter treats of the significance of art, and yet another, and this is one of the best, deals with the origin and nature of religion. This chapter takes advantage of the full and ripe discussions on the great subject of Religion by thinkers of the eminence of Hegel, Pfleiderer, and Reville. The concluding chapter is on "The Savage and Primeval Man."
It will be seen from this brief summary how extensive is the range of questions discussed by De Pressens6 in this volume. We have also to state that each part of the volume is written with full knowledge of the literature of each particular subject. It has been well received in Prance; it will, we believe, be warmly welcomed in England. The full and accurate description of the views of many writers in Germany, Franco, and England makes it of great value to those who reside far from libraries, and who are unable to procure many books ; while the positive contribution to the great Theistic argument, and the criticism of opposing views, will help those who, in many places, have to contend with and overcome the anti-theistic theories of the day. It may be added that Mrs. Holmdel] has translated the book into English in every way worthy of the importance of the work. The translation is specially happy in the rendering of technical terms in science and philosophy.
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