BOOKS OF THE DAY
PAGE
Russia—Friend or Foe? (E. H. Can)
151
Charles Masterman (Wilson Harris)
152
Light Out of Darkness (Honor Croome)
152
The Anglo-Saxon Tradition (D. W. Brogan) 153
PAGE
A History of Socialism (A. L. Rowse) ...
• • •
153
The Poet and Society (Stephen Spender) ...
• • •
154
The Trail of Opium (Pamela Hansford Johnson)
... 156
Fiction (Forrest Reid) ...
... 158
DARKNESS OVER RUSSIA
By E. H. CARR Russm—friend or foe? is a question on many people's lips in this country at the present moment; and though Mr. Sloan's book does not provide us with any clear or convincing answer to it, it offers a convenient background against which the problem can be examined. It contains a popular, though rather too carefully selected, account of Soviet foreign policy and Soviet re'ations with this country down to March of this year. One had hoped that Mr. Sloan, in view of his past experience of Soviet Russia, might do something to lift the veil of silence which has descended on Soviet policy since that time. But unfortunately he practises the same self- restraint as the Soviet Press itself ; and his speculations on the subject are those which could be read in any English news- paper two months ago.
The Bolshevik revolution placed the class issue in the fore- front of international politics. In early days, the Soviet regime was unpopular in Great Britain (and France), firstly, because Lenin and Trotsky, having taken Russia out of the War, were regarded as " traitors " to the Allies ; secondly, because the open confiscation of property—far more shocking then than now—frightened and antagonised property-owners every- where. This second issue made a different impression on the unpropertied ; and for the first time opinion in Great Britain on an issue of foreign policy was divided more or less on class lines. This division persisted till about 1924, and finally petered out in 1927, when Stalin took the reins, when Trotsky was expelled and Comintern put in leading-strings, and when the Soviet leaders ceased to play at m.orld revolution.
After the Nazi revolution, a new issue arose. The Soviet Government began to organise an anti-Fascist, pro-League front. In Great Britain, this led to the development of a bloc consisting of old anti-Germans, new anti-Nazis, old pro- Russians and supporters of collective security, all fervently preaching friendship with Soviet Russia. This new bloc embraced the extreme Left, the extreme Right, and the Liberal Centre ; and the division of British opinion on foreign policy from 1935 onward had nothing whatever to do with the old class issue of the British attitude towards Soviet Russia fifteen years earlier. No doubt old prejudices survive among individuals. There are still foolish people who believe that everything Soviet Russia does is wicked, just as there are still foolish peope who believe that everything she does is right. But public opinion is not made by cranks. It is as silly to suppose that Mr. Churchill and Mr Eden and Mr. Duff Cooper are inspired by " ideological " sympathy for Soviet Russia as to suppose that Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax are actuated by " ideological " antipathy to it.
Mr. Sloan cannot rid himself of the iclie fixe that this is a class issue, and therefore, while he gets most of his facts right, his perspective is wrong. The issue is one of foreign policy. Great Britain, for well-known reasons, entered what the Prime Minister called a "new epoch" of foreign policy last March. It may be argued that the change should have come before Munich, not after. It may have been, as Mr, Sloan more than once insists, a tactical error to turn down flat the Soviet proposal last March for a "conference," though an international conference was hardly a practical method of dealing with the critical situation which had arisen. But serious people who want to do something do not waste time over recriminations. The problems which now confront us are those of Soviet Russia's attitude to the "new epoch." Let us consider frankly what those problems are, and what light Mr. Sloan sheds on them for us.
Russia—Friend or Foe ? By Pat Sloan. (Muller. is.)
The fin t problem is that, so far as the meagre published statements allow us to judge, Soviet Russia ot unreasonably asks that the Baltic countries should be guaranteed concur- rently by herself and Great Britain. But she apparently pro- pcses that we should underwrite an arrangement by which she would be entitled to "come to the assistance" of these countries at any moment chosen by herself, whether or not they have invoked her assistance, and whether or not they have actually been attacked. The countries in question have protested against being made the object of this rather high- handed kind ot "guarantee." The problem is a real one for British statesmanship. However much we value Russian co- operation, it is distasteful to have to acquire it on terms which wculd drive okl, if not very powerful, friends straight into the opposite camp. In his femous memorandum of 1908, Eyre Crowe argued that to uphold the rights of small nations must be the guiding principle of British policy in Europe. Soviet Russia confronts us with an uncomfortable dilemma if she makes the abandonment of that principle the price of her friendship. Mr. Sloan's only contribution to this problem is a rather airy quotation from Mr. Duff Cooper pointing out the parallel of our relations with Belgium. But when have we claimed the right, or announced the intention, to "come to the assistance" of Belgium in defiance of her own wishes? This is a point on which Russia, if she is as anxious for an agree- ment as we are, must not push us too far.
The second question is the doubt gradually growing up whether Soviet Russia does, in fact, attach urgent importance to the proposed agreement. It was never easy to believe that M. Litvinov's sudden resignation meant nothing at all. Accord- ing to Mr. Sloan, it meant that "the Soviet leaders intended to devote more attention, not less, to the question of foreign relations." But this explanation seems to have been belied by events. It is sometimes said that Soviet hesitation is due to doubt whether Great Britain really does intend to come to the assistance of Poland and Rumania. The opposite seems more likely to be true. When Soviet Russia had reason to fear German attack, and saw no other hope of securing the help of the Western Powers, she embraced collective security. Now that Russia knows that any German attack towards the East will automatically bring Great Britain in, she is in the fortunate position of having already got the guarantee she wants without having to give anything in exchange. It is precisely because she has confidence in the British guarantee to Poland that Russia can afford to allow the present conversa- tions to pursue their leisurely and circular course round in- numerable minor details.
The third problem is one which cannot be discussed for lack of knowledge: the state of Russia's military preparedness. Mr. Sloan has a longish chapter on the subject. But (apart from one or two official pronouncements of a routine character) the authorities whom he quotes to demonstrate Soviet military efficiency are Mr. Lloyd George, Herr Hitler, the Volkischer Beobachter, a remark made in 1934 by a French deputy who has (I think) never visited Russia, and another made by a retired British General who visited Russia in the same year. This is rather typical and not reassuring. The blank wall of inscrutability which has, during the past thre.: or four years, been built up round every aspect of Russian life, and behind which M. Molotov now appears to be taking shelter, precludes any intelligent judgement. The Soviet Press is uninforma- tive to a degree hitherto undreamed of by Dr. Goebbels and Signor Gaycla. Mr. Sloan's concluding pages show that he is just as much in the dark as the rest of us.