Political Commentary
The myth of the '1922'
Patrick Cosgrave
more than one occasion in recent weeks uLlsquiet has been expressed in Tory back
Ch circles about both the effectiveness of "le Government's general economic policy athi
more particularly, about the prospects ,1,,er the attack on inflation. During that period ;11ere have been two meetings of the famous `a,lid, in some mouths, notorious) 1922 Corntee, which consists of all Tory backben-ers. We have read of mutterings in the '22; 0,1 trips, or planned trips, by its chairman, Mr cti(liward du Cann, to see, and perhaps warn, b: Prime Minister about the state of backOpinion ; one or two writers have even hinted at revolts in the '22, though others 1.r_,e spoken of the Committee rallying be0;11u the Prime Minister, particularly against egpe increasingly virulent attacks of Mr Powflow the secretary of this eponymous heuY has written a succinct little book about is about time that some new general-11'1°ms about the '22 were laid down to rethose in Professor McKenzie's British ar'itcal Parties, if only because the tradition, sense of what the Committee is, partly for111)1111ated by McKenzie, and to some extent au,ttressed by Mr Goodhart, is too convenient to`rutch for too many commentators who like , advert to the supposed semi-conspiratorial "aature of Conservative backbench politics, to give themselves and their readers a suo'rP Political thrill by conjuring into being bsedly powerful concatenations of backa„1,° opinion which can, on occasion, worry -"even threaten the Tory leadership. poThe supposition that the 1922 Committee th:sesses power of some kind is false, save in Eeneral sense that the backbenchers of Party theoretically have power to out'arid even destroy those who lead them. go backbenchers almost never overthrow .ch'ernMents: even in May 1940, when the poamberlain government resigned, it still ssessed a comfortable majority in the °11se of Commons, and Neville Chamberlain thent because his own nerve had cracked in th: face of widespread discontent: even then ier', crucial vote which broke the Prime MinisHos heart took place in the chamber of the '22 Unheralded unheralded by any discussions in the top,"11. May 7, 8 and 9, 1940, there were many sio 'Piracies, and many gatherings of distheert Tory backbenchers, most notably at all ,"LoMes of Eden, Salisbury and Churchill: apci`,11e 1922 Committee had to offer was an Si of of fifty on May 8 to hear Sir John verr)n outline "The general principles go ts tng the Budget ". The truth of the matter "et the regular Thursday meetings of the serigmittee are no more than a semi-useful opihe;s of clearing houses for Conservative i,,1°11: they have little life of their own. ern "„ere was, however, one occasion in mod` rah,oritish political history when an unfavouik„,,e backbench vote on a matter of crucial gov,"rtance brought about the fall of a Qas.ernrnent. This was the celebrated octiv,,!()o on October 14, 1922, when Conservaap,' backbenchers met at the Carlton Club voted overwhelmingly against the conqe„"„erice of the Tory coalition with Lloyd 5irAge. The Government immediately fell. Nk`.‘t-ISten Chamberlain resigned the leadvile,11,IP of the party and, with some colleagues, for a time into the wilderness. Bonar ter Made a comeback, and was Prime Minisc`r a brief period, while Lloyd George was 1922. Philip Goodhart, MP (Macmillan
finished for ever. From this incident the 1922 Committee took its name, but it was not itself formed until April 23, 1923. One of the moving spirits, it is true, was Reginald Clarry, whose smashing victory at the Newport by-election on the day before the Carlton meeting gave evidence of the strength of feeling against the coalition in the party and the country. Save, however, for the whimsical desire to dub the committee first formed in April 1923 the 1922 as opposed to the 1923 — or the True Blue League or something similar, for that matter — there was no serious connection between the two events.
Yet, every account of the 1922 begins with that meeting at the Carlton. The purpose of the meeting was a direct and serious one, to . discover the strength of backbench feeling against the alliance with Lloyd George and, if necessary, to compel Sir Austen and his senior allies to break with the Welsh wizard. Even after thei'r defence of the wartime alliance had failed it was not absolutely neces-. sary for Sir Austen or his friends to give up their positions. That Chamberlain himself did not predict what would happen, and that he felt obliged to resign when it did happen, is merely an illustration of the old and wounding dictum about him that he always played the game and always lost it. But the Carlton meeting was an ad hoc, if not exactly a spontaneous, act of survival by Tory backbenChers who were aware of the damage being done to their cause by the unsavoury compact with the Liberals. There was no idea of allowing the specific occasion to give birth to a new institution within the party.
Indeed, the purpose of the April 1923 meeting was altogether different and more humble. The general election of 1922 saw the introduction to the Hoi..of Commons of a larger than ordinary ruitoother of new and un tried backbenchers, en, like . others before and since, felt tost in the ramb ling corridors of the Palac Westminster, and huddled together for °O. The gath ering of April 18 discussed the ormat ion of a committee
for the purpose of mutual coope tion and assistance in dealing with political and:„parliamentary questions, and in order to enable new Members to take a more active part and interest in Parliamentary life, it being clearly understood that it is the intention and desire of the Committee to render every assistance to the Government and the Party Whips in their efforts to carry on the affairs of the Nation upon the sound basis of Conservative principles.
Indeed, at the beginning it was new mernbers alone who belonged to the Committee0t, was May 1923 before a request to join was received from an already established member, and it was not until after the electoral defeat of October 1923 (in February 1924) that a resolution was passed to make the committee fully representative of the backbench membership of the party. One of the reasons behind this resolution was that the members of the committee had not been consulted before Baldwin chose to hold an election, and they were rather miffed as a result. But, truth to tell, Baldwin's rather casual attitude was similar to that of his successors: Tory leaders have paid far more attention to the specialist backbench committees than to the 1922, and have used the latter only when it is convenient to see all their non-ministerial followers at one time together.
Only a few Weeks ago it was the specialist backbench Finance Committee which put Mr Barber through the wringer on the general subject of economic policy, and it was the pressure of opinion in that committee which edged the Chancellor towards his recent reductions in public expenditure. The successful revolt against the Government on immigration regulations last year, and the much earlier defeat of the patriality clauses as originally drafted for the Immigration Act, were both engineered and foretold in the Home Affairs Committee. The 1922 Committee rarely discusses anything of any importance. Since the political and press debacle which followed the attempt of the Committee in 1932 to produce a general report on economic management — a debacle which led to the defeat of an attempt to gain reelection by the Committee's chairman, Sir Gervais Rentoul — the 1922 has kept away from detail, and avoided trying to give itself a stronger identity than is provided by the existence of officers for its own management.
From time to time, however, the chairman of the Committee has been an important figure. Sir Arthur 'ere Harvey was much consulted, both by Mr Heath and Mr Whitelaw. in the run up to the 1970 election; and the late Sir Harry Legge-Bourke enjoyed a high pos:i-. tion in the eSteem of the party leadership. But this was because of the special representative, ' and personal qualities of both men: they were. both typical of a certain kind of Conservative backbencher, and representative of a certain important strand of Tory feeling in the country. They were, further, men above personal ministerial ambition, who could be relied upon to report judiciously and without fear or favour on the state of morale among backbenchers. They were objective, and could be seen to be objective. It is not an attack on the present incumbent, Mr Edward.du Cann, who has many admirable qualities, to suggest that he is a very different kind of political animal. He is known not to have given up hope of advancement and, however fairly he may discharge his task of reporting opinion and feeling, he cannot be as detached or as disinterested as were Sir Arthur or Sir Harry.
Mr du Cann's tenure of office will therefore probably see a steady decline in the myth of the 1922. It is right and good that this should be so, since illusions are always dangerous in politics; and this is especially true at a time when the whole problem of backbench identity and influence — as, indeed, the very nature of parliamentary life and purpose itself — are under re-examination. To suppose at such a time that there is a coherent organisation representing Tory backbenchers, over and against the leadership and the government, when there is not, could be damaging indeed to that re-examination; and, by extension, damaging to Parliament itself.
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